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Psychiatry is the medical field that deals with mental illness. A woman
who finds herself depressed and anxious will seek help from a psychiatrist.
A young man who hears voices when no one is present, speaks incoherently
on occasion and declines all social invitations may likewise go to a psychia-
trist, or be taken to one by his mother. The psychiatrist will interview the
person, order some basic medical tests, and perhaps review a brain scan.
Once the psychiatrist has diagnosed a specific disorder, treatment begins.
Most patients are told to take a drug targeting some specific area of the
brain or some specific neural pathway. New drugs are constantly being de-
veloped, in many cases by psychiatrist-scientists with expertise in genetics,
neuroscience and related biomedical fields. This is modern psychiatry. It
developed gradually, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Everyone is familiar with the great medical discoveries of the nineteenth
century – antiseptic surgery, x-rays, vaccines, general anesthetics. Psychi-
atry had no such discoveries, at least none in the usual sense of the word.
Nineteenth century psychiatry saw advances, but few came from the labora-
tory. Instead, the history of psychiatry in the nineteenth century is mostly
the history of ideas and the men (only men) who came up with them. By
promoting the idea that insanity is a disease, not a moral punishment or a
social deviance, these men lessened stigma and improved patient care. By
demonstrating that madness is not unitary, but rather a diverse group of
separate illnesses, they instituted major changes in psychiatric diagnosis.
And, with the idea of bringing science into psychiatry, they broke ground
for the molecular, genetic and neurobiological findings that now offer real
hope for better treatments.
Before psychiatry, there was simply medicine, and from its beginning,
a small minority of physicians specialized in mental illnesses. In the pe-
riod from the Renaissance up until the beginning of the nineteenth century,
physicians provided services to individuals and families, but there was not
yet a medical field of psychiatry. There were no hospitals reserved for psy-
chiatric patients and no professors of psychiatry in universities. Patients,
usually described as “mad”, were kept at asylums located far from cities.
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They received custodial care, but were offered little in the way of treat-
ment. The few doctors whose responsibility it was to manage the asylums
pondered the nature of what they confronted. They asked questions. Why
do some patients improve with time whereas others fall into irreversible
dementias? Can anything be done to help them? Does punishment work?
Does reward work? What causes madness? Is the defect in the body or in
the mind?
Psychiatry became recognized as a medical specialty when it turned the
foregoing questions into scientific questions. This happened first in Europe,
and mostly in Germany after the German victory over French forces in the
Franco-Prussian War. The new German nation that formed after the war
was flush with money and confidence. By investing heavily in transport sys-
tems, factories and educational institutions, it fostered a social environment
and infrastructure ideal for science and medicine. With scientific projects
springing up everywhere, psychiatrists at first observed, then participated.
The central figure in this book is Emil Kraepelin, the man most respon-
sible for creating modern psychiatry. While Sigmund Freud was also highly
influential, his contributions were different from Kraepelin’s and, overall,
less enduring. Whereas Freud adopted a psychological approach to mental
illness, Kraepelin became an advocate of biological psychiatry. Freud’s pa-
tients had relatively mild disorders (neuroses), while Kraepelin’s patients
had more severe illnesses (psychoses) such as schizophrenia (which he called
dementia praecox ) and bipolar disorder (which he called manic-depressive
insanity). Over time, Freud’s innovative method of treatment, psychoanal-
ysis, lost favor within the psychiatric profession, even as his broader ideas
became absorbed into popular culture. Contrastingly, Kraepelin’s classifi-
cation of mental illnesses remains embedded in the widely used Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Although Kraepelin was the main actor, he was by no means the only
person bringing about changes. His support for a science-based psychiatry
was shaped by the writings of Wilhelm Griesinger, a German internist who
extolled the benefits of basic biological research for medical advancement.
As well, Kraepelin’s ideas on disease diagnosis drew upon the novel insights
of Karl Kahlbaum, a somewhat eccentric and reclusive psychiatrist from
eastern Prussia.
Two other men, also associated with Kraepelin, are featured in this
book. Bernhard Gudden was Kraepelin’s mentor early in his psychiatric
career. Gudden was schooled in the old asylum-based psychiatry, but he
became a pioneer of the new hospital-based psychiatry. Besides introduc-
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ing Kraepelin to clinical psychiatry, he also taught neuroanatomy to Krae-
pelin’s long-time colleague, Franz Nissl. Unfortunately, Gudden suffered
an early, tragic death in circumstances indicative of psychiatry’s growing
social power.
Nissl was a psychiatrist who, like many other German psychiatrists at
that time, mixed clinical care with neuroanatomical research. Whereas
Kraepelin relished the intellectual challenges of clinical psychiatry, Nissl
lived to work in the laboratory. He made a few discoveries, but he also
squandered time trying to prove untenable hypotheses. Thus, he was not
nearly as successful, nor as influential, as Kraepelin. Nevertheless, because
of his close personal relationship with Kraepelin, and because he partici-
pated in the campaign that demonstrated the brain’s astonishing complex-
ity, I highlight his life and work.
Germany was not the only country in which modernization occurred,
nor was neuroanatomy the only pursuit of the scientifically minded nine-
teenth century psychiatrists. The Parisian Phillipe Pinel and his pupil
Jean-Etienne Esquirol instituted reforms and began to identify and define
specific mental illnesses. The task of diagnosis was to prove especially
troublesome for many psychiatrists, and it became an obsession of Emil
Kraepelin. Also in France, the theory of hereditary degeneration was born.
It was a seductive speculation that seemed to explain the prevalence of
insanity within certain social classes.
Degeneration theory spread rapidly throughout Western Europe, but less
so in America, which was still relatively isolated from European develop-
ments. Although Benjamin Rush and Dorothea Dix accomplished impor-
tant reforms in patient care, Americans did not significantly advance the
science of psychiatry until European ideas arrived in America early in the
twentieth century.
Readers may be surprised to find fulsome descriptions of scientific exper-
iments in this book. I have included them because science is the hallmark
of modernization in psychiatry, and it was not all brain research. Krae-
pelin, for example, ardently pursued experimental psychology, believing it
to be the key for understanding mental illness. Nonetheless, for most of
Kraepelin’s peers, neuroscience was the main attraction.
Before Galileo, it was assumed that all celestial objects circle around
the earth. God’s works were perfect and the earth was at the center of
the universe. The telescope changed everything, because it allowed Galileo
to see a different kind of universe. Several centuries later, neuroanatomists
began seeing small nerve cells in the human brain, thanks to newly powerful
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microscopes. The outward looking telescopes helped humans find their
place in the universe, whereas the inward looking microscopes provided
clues to our mental lives.
I tell the stories of the men and their ideas in roughly chronological order,
albeit with sidetracks. My account of early modern psychiatry begins in
the early 1800s and ends at midnight, New Year’s eve, in the year 1899.
The final chapter differs from all preceding chapters. It brings nineteenth
century European advancements to America and updates them to present
day concerns; intermixed with that, I offer my thoughts on the future of
psychiatry.
No full-length biography of either Kraepelin or Nissl has yet appeared,
although Kraepelin did leave an autobiography of sorts in his Memoirs.
Elsewhere, the lives of Kraepelin and Nissl are documented in their re-
search articles, letters and administrative papers. Many important works
of the nineteenth century were published originally in German, but most
have been translated into English; when available, I have relied on these
translations.
I am indebted to the intrepid scholars whose research in this treacherous
field enabled the present work. Several of their books are listed in the
Recommended Readings. The Osler Library of the History of Medicine at
McGill University was a great resource for both printed and online sources.
I thank Dr. Maike Rotzoll, who hosted my visit to Kraepelin’s former clinic
at the University of Heidelberg and allowed me to photograph documents
held in the clinic’s archive. Ursula Voss translated a nearly impenetrable
article from the Heidelberger Tageblatt , and Rüdiger Krahe helped with
other translations. Karen and Gene Brewer reviewed an early version of the
manuscript. Special thanks to Volkhard Buchholtz, publisher and editor




Mental illness may well been present in human communities from the very
beginning. Persons portrayed as having bizarre behaviors or nonsensical
speech are mentioned in the preserved writings of ancient Greece. Plato
thought that such cases arise when passion and appetite gain control over
reason. He, together with most of his contemporaries, believed that the
gods were behind mental disturbances. Any god can take possession of a
person’s soul, and if so, troubles will follow. Hippocrates had a different
opinion. He blamed poisoning by the accumulation of bile and phlegm,
suggesting that “those who are mad from phlegm are quiet, and do not
cry out nor make a noise; but those who are mad from bile are vociferous,
malignant, and will not be quiet.”1
Later, in medieval Europe, Church doctrine encouraged a view of mad-
ness similar to Plato’s. In the revised version, madness was seen as the
sign of spiritual possession by devils, witches, sorcerers and werewolves.
Affected individuals threatened the community and were dealt with ac-
cordingly, that is, harshly.
How communities elsewhere and at other times reacted to having a men-
tally ill person in their midst, is hardly known. Surely some individuals
were physically restrained – in chains for example – to prevent them from
harming themselves or others. By contrast, other individuals may have
been seen as gifted with rare positive qualities such as fortune telling, heal-
ing, or sorcery. These latter persons may have had a relatively high status
within their communities.
What to call these persons who behave so differently from the majority?
The history of psychiatry is a wondrous thing, as will be demonstrated
on many pages of this book. The earliest known term for a mentally ill
person was wode, an Old English word that dates from around 1000 AD.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word mad (in the sense
of a mental disorder) first appeared around 1330. By the year 1384, at
the latest, wode had become wood, and it had roughly the same meaning
as mad. The equivalence of wood and mad can be seen in a translation
1Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease.
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of the Hebrew bible dated to 1384. There, in the Book of Hosea, chapter
9.7, it is written, “Yrael, wite thou thee a fool, a wood prophete ... for
the multitude of thi wickidnesse, and multitude madnesse.” From the time
of the Renaissance to the end of the Enlightenment (around 1800), mad
and madness were the predominant English language terms for what we
now call mental illness. One particularly quaint reference to madness is
credited to Henry Swinburne who wrote, in 1590, “They did see him hisse
like a goose or barke lyke a dogge, or play such other parts as madfolks
use to doo.” The Oxford English Dictionary lists a remarkable number of
synonyms of mad. The exact number, from the fourteenth century to the
present, is 168.
After madness, came insanity, which from the start had a legal meaning
as well as a clinical meaning. In British courts, an insane person was one
whose mental state excused him or her from civil and criminal responsi-
bility. The French equivalent of madness, up until the nineteenth century,
was folie. In 1801, Phillipe Pinel starting using the word aliénation. He
thought it more accurately represented the marginal status of mentally ill
persons – outcast and largely ignored. After Pinel used the term in the ti-
tle of his influential textbook, Traité Médico-Philosophique de la Aliénation
Mentale, it was widely adopted in Europe and America. A German physi-
cian, Johann Reil, coined the term, Psychiaterie, in 1808, but it would be
decades before that word came into general use. The German equivalent
of insanity was Wahnsinn. The Latin word, vesania, had a similar mean-
ing, and it became incorporated in the names of several specific conditions
known throughout Europe, for example, vesanic dementia.
When mentally deranged (mad) citizens turned unruly or violent in the
densely populated cities of medieval Europe, they were confined for security
reasons. The Priory of St. Mary of Bethlehem, in London, was perhaps the
first institution to serve this purpose. It was established in the thirteenth
century as a hospice for all citizens in need, whether they be mentally
disturbed, physically sick, or wounded. Records show that, in the year
1403, Bethlehem housed six insane men along with several social misfits.
In subsequent centuries, the hospice became increasingly specialized for the
custody of insane persons. Its name was shortened to Bethlem, and later
still, Bedlam. Taken over by the City of London in 1547, the Bethlem
Hospital remained in service until 1948.
Bethlehem was an early example of what later became the common prac-
tice of confining mentally ill persons alongside the socially marginalized or
physically sick. Unfortunate persons of all types filled the beds in hospitals,
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almshouses and workhouses. Gradually, toward the end of the eighteenth
century, communities in Europe and the United States began reserving
buildings and wards exclusively for the insane. These institutions were
known as asylums in England and the United States, Tollhäuser (fools’
houses) or Irrenanstalten (mental houses) in Germany, and hôpitaux in
France. In 1808, when the New York Hospital opened its new building
exclusively for psychiatric patients, it was called the Lunatic Asylum, from
the French word lune, or moon. Psychiatric workers in the nineteenth cen-
tury were intrigued by periodic or intermittent insanities, and some believed
that they were caused by changes in the moon’s appearance. The purpose
of these early asylums was to confine, restrain, and hide people likely to
cause trouble.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Philippe Pinel, was asked to take
charge of a large psychiatric hospital in the Parisian suburb of Le Kremlin-
Bicêtre. Born into a humble family, Pinel followed his father and uncle into
medicine. As a young man, he participated in the French Revolution. La
Bicêtre, the institution to which he was assigned, was already a historic
institution, having first opened its doors in the early seventeenth century.
In the ensuring years, it served as an orphanage, prison, lunatic asylum,
hospice, and finally hospital, which it still is today. When Pinel worked
there, it held about four thousand men, mostly criminals and pensioners,
but Ward number seven held about two hundred “alienated” patients. Pinel
focused his attentions on Ward Seven.
The halls and the passages ... were much confined, and so ar-
ranged as to render the cold winter and the heat of summer
equally intolerable and injurious. The chambers were exceed-
ingly small and inconvenient. Baths we had none [of], though
I made repeated applications for them; nor had we extensive
liberties for walking, gardening or other exercises.2
After two years at La Bicêtre, Pinel went to another Parisian hospital,
La Salpêtrière, which was even larger. Patients were segregated by sex.
Whereas La Bicêtre was exclusively for men, La Salpêtrière was exclusively
for women. In 1795, the year of Pinel’s appointment as chief physician,
it held about seven thousand patients, most of whom were elderly and
indigent.
2Philippe Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, translated by D.D. Davis. London, Cadell and
Davies (1801, 1806), p. 53.
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Pinel accomplished many things in his long career, yet he is most often
recognized as the man who unlocked and removed his patients’ chains.
True, he did not like chains and true, he removed them when he found them,
but he was not the first to do so. That person was Jean-Baptiste Pussin,
the manager of the La Bicêtre hospital. Pussin was neither a psychiatrist
nor even a doctor. Prior to becoming manager, he had been a patient at
La Bicêtre, undergoing treatment for scrofula, an infectious disease of the
lymph nodes. Pinel called him “citizen Pussin”.
Patients at both La Bicêtre and La Salpêtrière were restrained when
disruptive, but otherwise left mostly alone. Some were given the powdered
roots of hellebore plants, as earlier recommended by Hippocrates in the
fourth century B.C. Hellebore is highly toxic, and even in small doses it
causes numerous adverse effects. It was thought to relieve insanity by
purging the body of bad substances – usually named as humors – but in
reality its only effect on mental illness was temporary distraction. Bleedings
were also occasionally performed as an alternative method of purging, until
Pinel stopped them. Agitated patients were soaked in baths, either hot or
cold. Pinel preferred the so-called “surprise” baths.
Pinel believed that he could cure, or at least lessen, his patients’ misery by
psychological manipulation. He took advantage of the hospital environment
– and the patients’ awareness of that environment – to institute a system
of rewards, threats and punishments. For example, if a patient kept pulling
out her hair, Pinel would warn her that if she persisted, her hands would be
locked into gloves. Another patient might be offered better food or a work
opportunity if he refrained from shouting. These measures were designed to
encourage rational behaviors. Pinel called the approach traitement moral.
Unknown to Pinel, a merchant named William Tuke was experimenting
with a similar approach in the north of England. Tuke was the manager of
a small, local asylum. Like Pinel, he sympathized with his patients’ misery
and the poor conditions under which they were forced to live. Looking
ways to improve their situation, he arranged for accommodations in a large
country house. The atmosphere was family-like, and the patients were
encouraged to perform simple chores. They were never punished, and good
behaviors were rewarded. Tuke’s innovations became known as “moral
therapy”. Despite the similarity between his approach and Pinel’s, and the
similar names attached to them, they were rooted in different beliefs.
Tuke was a Quaker managing a Quaker asylum. His ideas on the treat-
ment of patients were presumably based on religious, or at least moral,
considerations. Pinel, on the other hand, was skeptical of religion. He was
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a physician motivated by Hippocratic concerns, in particular the search for
effective treatments. He was not resolutely opposed to harsh measures; it
was simply that he found them less effective than the “moral” methods.
The following passage suggests that he took a practical approach, applying
physical or psychological measures, as needed, in individual cases.
... straight waistcoats, superior force, and seclusion for a limited
time, are the only punishments inflicted. When kind treatment,
or such preparations for punishment as are calculated to impress
the imagination, produce not the intended effect, it frequently
happens, that a dexterous stratagem promotes a speedy and
unexpected cure.3
Also relevant to the comparison of Pinel and Tuke, is the fact that the
word moral had mixed meanings at the time, in both French and English.
It had an ethical connotation in some contexts, but a psychological or
emotional connotation in other contexts. Tuke probably used “moral” in
the former manner, to imply kindness, whereas Pinel probably intended
a reference to psychological manipulation. Leaving aside their differences,
Pinel and Tuke were the two most influential early reformers of institutional
care. Their innovations encouraged both humane care and the possibility
of cures.
The influence of Pinel and Tuke extended well beyond their respective
national borders. In America, their ideas took root largely through the
actions of a single social reformer, Dorothea Dix. While some of her work
was directed toward abolishing slavery, curbing alcoholism and broadening
voter rights, her greatest devotion was on behalf of the insane, especially
those who were poor or otherwise disadvantaged. Her voyage to England
in 1836 was instrumental in setting her agenda, for it was there that she
encountered Samuel Tuke and his circle of Quaker reformers. After return-
ing to America, she personally investigated conditions for the insane in her
home state of Massachusetts. At the time, there were no public asylums
or hospitals for the mentally ill in Massachusetts, only facilities privately
owned and privately operated. Dix spared no words in her passionately
written report prepared for the Massachusetts legislature.
I come as the advocate of helpless, forgotten, insane, and idi-
otic men and women; of beings sunk in a condition from which
the most unconcerned would start with real horror; of beings
3P. Pinel (1801, 1806), p. 68.
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wretched in our prisons, and more wretched in our almshouses
... I proceed, gentlemen, briefly to call your attention to the
present state of insane persons confined within this Common-
wealth in cages, closets, cellars, stalls, pens! Chained, naked,
beaten with rods, and lashed into obedience [italics in original].4
Similar investigations and reports followed in several other states, and
most resulted in significant reforms. It was through her efforts, for example,
that the State of Pennsylvania established its first public “lunatic hospital”.
–//–
If Pinel is the father of modern psychiatry, his pupil, Jean-Etienne Esquirol,
could be the uncle of modern psychiatry. The two men became acquainted
at La Salpêtrière hospital. Pinel was so impressed with the young physician
that he appointed him head of the hospital’s psychiatric division. After-
wards, Esquirol directed a large asylum in the Parisian suburb of Charen-
ton. While Pinel was a broadly qualified physician with a special interest in
psychiatry, Esquirol, by contrast, was a doctor almost exclusively dedicated
to psychiatry. Moreover, he took upon himself the task of modernizing the
delivery of psychiatric care, not only in the asylums where he worked, but
throughout France.
Figure 1: Jean-Etienne Esquirol.
4Dorothea L. Dix, Memorial to the Legislature of Massachusetts (1843). Quotes on p. 2.
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Esquirol traveled around France at his own expense, assessing conditions
at mental asylums. He was shocked by what he saw. Clearly, the reforms
undertaken by Pussin and Pinel in Paris had not gone beyond the capitol
city.
I have seen these unfortunate insane, naked, covered with rags,
having nothing but straw to protect themselves from the cold
humidity of the pavement on which they are laid. I saw them
roughly fed, deprived of air to breathe, water to quench their
thirst, and things necessary for life; I have seen them delivered
to genuine jailers, abandoned to their brutal surveillance; I saw
them in narrow caves, filthy, stinking, without air, without light,
chained like wild beasts ... In Toulouse, in a room of about
twenty beds, under the roofs, a chain was suspended from the
walls bearing an iron belt; the insane, as they ascend into their
beds, shake off those chains that will weigh upon them during
the night.5
After completing three such trips, Esquirol submitted a report to the
Minister of the Interior recommending certain reforms. Most emphatically,
he wanted psychiatric patients to be cared for at institutions that were de-
signed and maintained especially for that purpose. He wrote that the large
dormitories at asylums should be replaced by smaller buildings where the
patients could live more comfortably and with improved hygiene. More-
over, he believed that patients should be kept busy and socially involved.
He recommended fresh air, calisthenics and physical work.
As part of his travels, he visited the town of Gheel in Belgium. In this
centuries-old agricultural community, chronically ill persons – both male
and female – lived side-by-side with resident villagers. Esquirol was so im-
pressed with what he saw that he urged the French Ministry to experiment
with similar arrangements. In later years, he helped set up a smaller version
of the Gheel community at a farm situated close to the hospital at Bicêtre.
Also at Bicêtre, he occasionally invited patients to his family home for an
evening meal.
Therapeutic farms, of the type established at Gheel, came to the at-
tention of American psychiatrists many years later. When a proposal was
floated to build similar farms in the United States, some doctors objected,
5The quote is from Esquirol’s Mémoire, presented to the Minister of the Interior,
September, 1818 and excerpted in Mémoires de l’Académie des sciences, inscriptions
et belles-lettres de Toulouse, tome VII (1885), p. 80.
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citing concerns over male patients and female patients living in close prox-
imity. Esquirol had written that there were no moral transgressions on the
farms and that pregnancies among female patients were “exceedingly rare”,
but his testimony failed to reassure his American critics. A comprise was
proposed, according to which the actual farms would be worked by men,
while “a separate establishment, on a smaller scale, [would be] adapted to
the females.” The female establishment, they said, would be like an “el-
egant pleasure-grounds” or “merely a large garden.”6 The first American
therapeutic community was established in 1913, at the Gould Farm in the
Berkshire hills of Massachusetts.
Esquirol advised the Minister that physicians ought to be specifically
trained in the care and treatment of psychiatric patients. Moreover, he
insisted, the state should give doctors absolute authority and full respon-
sibility for managing affairs at mental institutions. Esquirol argued that
while aliénation was a social problem, it was also, and principally, an ill-
ness. It followed that,
The physician must be, in some manner, the vital principle of
a lunatic hospital. It is he who should set everything in motion
... The action of the administration, which governs the material
aspect of the establishment and supervises all the employees,
ought to be hidden. Never should the administration appeal a
decision made by the physician, never should it interpose itself
between the physician and the lunatics or between the physician
and the non-medical staff. The physician should be invested
with an authority from which no one is exempt.7
Responding to Esquirol’s reports and recommendations, the French par-
liament passed a law on June 30, 1838 that called for the building of new
institutions – real hospitals – throughout the country. It stipulated that
these hospitals should be specifically designed for the needs of psychiatric
patients. Requirements with respect to accommodations, hygiene and hu-
mane care were detailed. And, importantly, the law clearly stated that
aliénation was a medical condition requiring medical care and medical
treatment. With its many additional provisions, the law was essentially
a bill of rights for alienated individuals and, as such, a major achievement
for Jean-Etienne Esquirol.
6John M. Galt, “The farm of St Anne,” American Journal of Insanity 11:353-357 (1855).
Quotes on p. 357.
7Quoted in J.E. Goldstein (1987), p. 132.
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Pinel’s reputation as a reformer obscures his important role in advancing
a rational understanding of psychiatric illness. Following the advice of
Hippocrates, and in keeping with his empathetic character, Pinel listened
carefully to what his patients told him. Like other physicians before and
after, Pinel found their symptoms baffling. Recalling his experiences at La
Bicêtre, he wrote,
On my entrance upon the duties of that hospital, everything
presented to me the appearance of chaos and confusion. Some
of my unfortunate patients labored under the horrors of a most
gloomy and desponding melancholy. Others were furious, and
subject to the influence of a perpetual delirium. Some appeared
to possess a correct judgment upon most subjects, but were
occasionally agitated by violent sallies of maniacal fury; while
those of another class were sunk into a state of stupid idiotism
and imbecility. Symptoms so different, and all comprehended
under the general title of insanity, required, on my part, much
study and discrimination.8
He was intrigued. As a doctor, he knew bodily illnesses. Each was
characteristically seated in a particular organ, each had its recognizable
symptoms, and many had known causes. He wanted to know if that was
equally true of mental illnesses. In attempting to answer that question,
Pinel arrived at one of the earliest classifications of mental illnesses. It
may seem obvious to us today that bipolar disorder is related to depression
but different from obsessive-compulsive disorder, but in Pinel’s time such
distinctions were not apparent.
Early in the nineteenth century, when Pinel was trying to figure out how
to diagnose mental illnesses, there were no departments of psychiatry at
the medical schools. Nor was there any academic psychology. Considera-
tion of most things mental fell within in the domain of philosophy. It was
generally assumed that the mind is not unitary, but rather a composite
8P. Pinel (1801, 1806), pp. 1-2.
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of several semi-independent functions. This was an old idea. Aristotle,
for example, mentions five “psychic powers”, namely those responsible for
nutrition, appetite, sensation, locomotion and thought. The great German
philosopher, Emanuel Kant, recognized three “faculties” of mind: sensi-
bility, understanding and reason. Given this concept of mind as a divided
entity, psychiatrists naturally tended to parcel mental symptoms along sim-
ilar lines and assign illnesses to one or another of the mental faculties.
Plato also weighed in on divisions within the mind. In one of his books,
Plato writes of his friend Socrates in conversation with Phaedrus, an Athe-
nian aristocrat. Socrates apparently told Plato,
We [Socrates and Phaedrus] made four divisions of divine mad-
ness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was
inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic
by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite
and Eros ...
Socrates goes on to explain two principles of rhetoric. The first of which
is “perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars.”
The second principle is,
that of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints
are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad
carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common
principle, unreason, and then, just as the body, which is one,
is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called
by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness
as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting
off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found
among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly
reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand
part of madness ...9
So, while madness may appear unitary to the casual observer, the dis-
cerning philosopher, by cutting cleanly at its joints, will recognize four
types. Whether the actual number is four or something else, philosophers,
physicians and regular folks have been looking for the “natural joints” of
mental illness for centuries.10 The result is a complex history of symptoms
9Plato, Phaedrus, sections 265B, 265d-266a.
10The branch of medical science that specializes in the classification of diseases is called
“nosology”.
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and concepts that is full of changing definitions, confusing terminologies
and national differences of opinion. Only a few scholars have dared enter
the tangled mess. The eminent British scholar, German Berrios, plunged
in and came up with a book of 565 pages. His History of Mental Symptoms
is a rich meal, not easily digested.11 Its tales of discarded terms and seem-
ingly ridiculous classifications serve as reminders of how far we have come
in understanding mental illness.
Psychiatric classifiers generally assume that they are working with “real”
illnesses, in the same sense as zoologists see zebras and giraffes as “real”
animals. Mental illness are not simply abstract notions, the products of
scholarly debate. Although there are reasons for questioning this assump-
tion – as will be seen in the closing chapter of this book – few nineteenth
century psychiatrists thought otherwise. Instead, they started by identi-
fying and naming the disorders. From there, they proceeded to group the
disorders by their apparent affinities, just as zoologists place zebras and
giraffes near other mammals but distant from spiders and butterflies. Be-
cause psychiatrists believed that the entries in their classifications were real,
they took the classifications to be objective accounts of natural order, but
that is not likely the case. Psychiatric classifications, like all classifications,
are the products of observation, judgment and critical thinking. As such,
they inevitably reflect the biases of the classifier.
The earliest classifications of mental illness contained just a few high-
level categories and a similar small number of sub-entries. Over the years,
the number of entries grew. The current edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), considered the standard
reference in clinical psychiatry, has about three hundred disorders organized
and described in twenty chapters.
The first hurdle faced by a prospective psychiatric classifier is choosing
the criteria by which disorders will be defined. There are, first of all,
symptoms, which are the subjective experiences reported by the patient.
Obviously, such reports will be interpreted differently by different observers.
There are also signs, which are the outward indications of disease; they
can be seen or heard by any observer and therefore do not depend on the
patient’s report. Behaviors, speech patterns and physical abnormalities
all fall into the category of signs. They tend to be less ambiguous than
symptoms and hence more reliable for identifying illnesses. Nevertheless,
even signs may not be what their observers think them to be. Phrenology,
11German E. Berrios, The History of Mental Symptoms. Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press (1996).
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Figure 2: “Types of Insanity, from photographs taken in the Devon County
Lunatic Asylum.” [John Charles Bucknill and Daniel Hack Tuke,
A Manual of Psychological Medicine, 1858]
the pseudo-scientific method for assessing a person’s mental qualities from
measurements of his or her skull, offers a good example.
The phrenologists relied on an imaginative inventory of mental functions,
or mental faculties. They thought that each mental function was served by
a different part of the brain (albeit limited to the cerebral cortex), and they
invented a map of the anatomical locations. Crucially, they further believed
that as the power of a function grew in any given person, that part of the
brain which was responsible for the function grew too, and pressure from
the swelling would deform the overlying skull. Therefore, deformations of
the skull reflected the vitality of the corresponding brain function below.
Given this set of convictions, the phrenologists palpitated the heads of
clients searching for telltale bumps and crevices. They claimed that they
could discern the strengths and weaknesses of more than forty mental mod-
ules, among which religiosity, love of persons, love of property, mechanical
ability and combativeness. It became a thriving business. And, since ex-
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treme measurements were considered pathological, psychiatrists jumped on
board offering phrenological analyses to patients and their families.
Physiognomy was a physical method similar to phrenology that was like-
wise used as a diagnostic tool. Rather than looking to the skull for informa-
tion about an individual’s character, as the phrenologists did, physiognomic
practitioners looked at the entire body, especially the face. Already in an-
cient Greece, learned authors – including Aristotle – wrote that a person’s
character could be read from an examination of his or her facial features.
The idea was revived in the late eighteenth century by a Swiss theologian
named Kasper Lavater, who wrote persuasive essays extolling it. Then,
an Englishman, Charles Bell, went further. Starting from the premise that
the creator had given humans certain sensibilities unknown to animals, and
asserting that such feelings are evident in expressions not seen in “lower”
species, he concluded that madness is revealed when an individual’s expres-
sions are exclusively of the animal type. As he explained it,
If ... I were to set down what ought to be represented as the
prevailing character and physiognomy of a madman, I should
say, that his body should be strong and muscular, rigid and
free from fat; his skin bound, his features sharp; his eye sunk;
his colour a dark brownish yellow, tinctured with sallowness,
without one spot of enlivening carnation ... You see him lying
in his cell regardless of every thing, with a death-like gloom, I
mean a heaviness of the features without knitting of the brows
or action of the muscles.12
The final step in physiognomic analysis was taken by those who claimed
that each type of madness has its own characteristic face. Physicians who
added physiognomy to phrenology in their diagnostic tool kits, were thus
able to grow their clientele and enhance their incomes.
–//–
Neither phrenology nor physiognomy held sway with Philippe Pinel.
Rather, his approach to psychiatric diagnosis and classification relied
almost exclusively on symptoms. There are always symptoms in every dis-
ease, but no psychiatrist before Pinel had paid so much detailed attention
to them, nor so earnestly endeavored to sort out meaningful constellations.
12Charles Bell, Essays on the Anatomy of Expression in Painting. London (1806),
pp. 153-154.
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Pinel’s classification was the first in a long line of contentious classifications
based on symptoms. As explained by the historian Jan Goldstein,
The classification of data under clear and distinct rubrics was
the sine qua non of enlightened scientific method in France at
the end of the eighteenth century. With respect to psychiatry,
that meant – and continued to mean throughout the nineteenth
century – drawing up and periodically overhauling ... classi-
ficatory systems of mental disease, in which each disease was
defined by the cluster of symptoms it regularly presented, and
the ensemble was presumed to exhaust all the pathological pos-
sibilities.13
Pinel occasionally mentioned the cause or causes of an illness, but these
speculations neither defined the illness nor influenced the classification.
Later authors would place more emphasis on causes, and they added other
criteria such as the disorder’s course over time and its ultimate outcome.
These additions yielded more sharply defined clinical entities, as we will
see.
Before Pinel, it was customary to name mental diseases after the circum-
stances of their onset or the contents of their irrational beliefs. Thus, his
predecessors had coined such illnesses as masturbatory insanity, religious
insanity and wedding night psychosis. Pinel discarded all those illnesses.
Guided by the concept of mental faculties described above, he chose names
that captured the fundamental types of psychological disturbance – as he
saw them.
Pinel’s classification appeared in his textbook, first published in 1801.
He began with mania, an ancient term that had a meaning roughly equiv-
alent to insanity. He sharpened the definition by introducing a distinction
between two types. The first type, manie avec délire (mania with delirium)
affected only intelligence, whereas manie sans délire (mania without delir-
ium) affected the emotions and basic human drives like sex and hunger,
but not intelligence. Intelligence had a different meaning for psychiatrists
in the nineteenth century than it does in common speech today. It referred
less to smartness than to rationality.
Delirium, like mania, was a word commonly associated with insanity, and
this was true in England as well as in France. It referred to states of excited
13Jan Ellen Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the
Nineteenth Century . Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press (1987), p. 5.
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confusion, particularly when accompanied by disorientation, clouded con-
sciousness and delusion. Then, as now, a delusion is a firmly maintained
false belief. Anyone who has had the good fortune (or otherwise) of lis-
tening to a patient speak of his or her delusions will likely have thought
them highly bizarre. They occur in delirium as well in most other types of
severe mental illness. Those delusions that are interpreted by the patient
as threatening, are known as a paranoid delusions, and the range of subject
matter contained in paranoid delusions is extraordinary. “The patients,”
one nineteenth century author reported, “believe that they are persecuted,
surrounded by spies, tormented by secret enemies who employ electric-
ity against them, tormented by freemasons, possessed of a devil, eternally
damned, robbed of their most valued treasures, etc.”14
That someone could be crazy without losing his or her rationality (ma-
nia without delirium) was not an entirely new notion, but some of Pinel’s
contemporaries were nonetheless skeptical. To convince them that mania
without delirium was credible, Pinel described the case of a man detained
at La Bicêtre during the French Revolution. When his comrades broke
into the hospital to free the political prisoners, Jean-Baptiste Pussin, the
manager at La Bicêtre, told the brigands that this particular man, whether
political or not, was insane and that he should not be released. The brig-
ands did not believe Pussin, because the man in question made perfect sense
when speaking. They liberated him from his chains and shouted “Vive la
République!” Upon hearing these words, the man fell into a terrible rage.
He grabbed one of the men’s sabers and assaulted his liberators. For Pinel,
it was a clear case of mania without delirium.
Mania’s partner in the traditional language of madness was melancho-
lia. It too has undergone numerous changes of meaning and implication.
It initially referred to irrational or lethargic behaviors, but not necessarily
sadness as we think of it today. For some physicians, it was akin to demen-
tia. The term took on a more definite meaning in Richard Burton’s book,
The Anatomy of Melancholy, published in 1621. Burton was a cleric in
Oxford. He was neither a psychiatrist (there were none then) nor a doctor,
but he wrote about melancholy with the insights of a victim. He described
melancholic individuals as “not always sad and fearful, but usually so.”
These persons are, he said, “[for the] most part sad: pleasant thoughts de-
part soon, sorrow sticks by them still continually, gnawing as the vulture
14Wilhelm Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics, 2nd edition, translated by
C. Lockhart Robertson and J. Rutherford. London, New Sydenham Society (1861,
1867), p. 328.
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did Tityus’ bowels, and they cannot avoid it.” (Tityus was a vile crim-
inal in Greek mythology. He was punished for attempting to rape Leto,
mother of Apollo and Artemis.) After Burton, the popular understanding
of melancholia came to be associated with subjective feelings of sadness,
but psychiatrists often had their own views.
Pinel recognized melancholia as a type of mental illness, but he struggled
to define it. He saw it as a kind of delirium – with delusions – but also as
a mood disorder in which the mood might be either up or down.
Delirium exclusively upon one subject; no propensity to acts of
violence, independent of such as may be impressed by a pre-
dominant and chimerical idea; free exercise in other respects of
all the faculties of the understanding; in some cases, equanim-
ity of disposition, or a state of unruffled satisfaction; in others,
habitual depression and anxiety, and frequently a moroseness
of character amounting even to the most decided misanthropy,
and sometimes to an invincible disgust with life.15
Next on Pinel’s list came dementia, a Latin word translating as “without
mind”. Originally, it was yet another term roughly synonymous madness.
Later, it acquired a more narrow meaning, referring to a state of men-
tal incompetence and associated with the elderly. A classic description of
dementia was provided by Richard Burton,
[T]hey dote at last ... and are not able to manage their estates
through common infirmities incident in their age; full of ache,
sorrow and grief, children again, dizzards [blockheads], they carl
[act roguishly] many times as they sit, and talk to themselves,
they are angry, waspish, displeased with everything, suspicious
of all, wayward, covetous, hard, self-willed, superstitious, self-
conceited, braggers and admirers of themselves.16
Pinel characterized dementia as “the abolition of the thinking faculty”.
As usual, he wrote at length about representative cases,
... a man who had been educated in the prejudices of the ancient
noblesse... His passionate effervescence and puerile mobility
were excessive. He constantly bustled about the house, talking
incessantly, shouting and throwing himself into great passions
15P. Pinel (1801, 1806), p. 149.
16Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621).
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for the most trifling causes. He teased his domestics by the
most frivolous orders, and his neighbors by his fooleries and
extravagances, of which he retained not the least recollection
for a single moment. He talked with the greatest volatility of
the court, of his periwig [powdered and gathered at the back),
of his horses, of his gardens, without waiting for an answer or
giving time to follow his incoherent jargon.17
The last of Pinel’s mental illnesses was idiotism, about which Pinel wrote,
A defective perception and recognizance of objects, a partial
or total abolition of the intellectual and active faculties. This
disorder may originate in a variety of causes: such as exces-
sive and enervating pleasures, the abuse of spirituous liquors,
violent blows on the head, deeply impressed terror, profound
sorrow, intense study, tumors within the cavity of the cranium,
apoplexy, excessive use of the lancet in the treatment of active
mania.18
The above description of idiocy is unusual because the simple, one-
sentence definition is followed by a long list of possible causes. Pinel was
rarely so specific in regard to causes. Here, perhaps, he wished to empha-
size the nature of idiocy as an illness of youth or middle age, as opposed to
dementia, an illness of old age.





• With elevated moods
• With depressed or anxious moods
• Dementia
• Idiocy
17P. Pinel (1801, 1806), pp. 160-161.
18P. Pinel (1801, 1806), p. 165.
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Esquirol’s classification built upon Pinel’s, but was more complex and
included a few significant modifications. Altogether, he had five varieties of
insanity. He included traditional mania (Pinel’s mania avec délire), but he
rejected Pinel’s mania sans délire because, in his experience every manic
patient had some degree of impaired reasoning. Somewhat confusingly,
Esquirol introduced two new illnesses, both of which incorporated the word
mania in the sense of madness, and yet were distinct from traditional mania
and from each other.
The first of his innovations was lypemania, which was similar to Pinel’s
melancholia, but always “of a sorrowful and depressive passion.” His de-
scription of lypemania closely matches the present illness of depression. The
second new disorder was monomania, a disorder “in which the delirium is
limited to one or a small number of objects, with excitement, and predom-
inance of a gay, and expansive passion.” Monomania, Esquirol maintained,
was a “partial insanity”, not just because of the small number of delusional
“objects”, but also because each patient was insane only in respect to a
single mental faculty, of the sort already identified by philosophers. Thus,
there were three forms of monomania: affective (emotional), intellectual
and instinctive.
In addition to those three forms of monomania, Esquirol also mentions
several types of monomania. The names of the types reflect the contents
of the delusions. Thus, reasoning monomania, drunkenness monomania,
incendiary monomania and erotic monomania. The last mentioned type
must have been especially common, because Esquirol detailed many cases.
He, like Pinel, was a keen observer who filled his writings with colorful
case descriptions. Because they are so absorbing, one suspects that Es-
quirol knew that they would be sensational and he encouraged the effect.
Nevertheless, few readers would deny the persuasive effect of symptomatic
detail in differentiating between various mental conditions. The following
description of erotic monomania is a case in point,
M, thirty-six year of age, is of a nervous temperament, a melan-
choly disposition, and a small stature. His hair is black, and his
physiognomy but slightly agreeable ... He goes to the theatre,
and conceives a passion for one of the most beautiful actresses of
Feydeau, and believes that his sentiment is reciprocated. From
this period, he makes every possible attempt to reach the object
of his passion ... The actors, and the husband of the actress, re-
vile this wretched man; repulse, abuse, and maltreat him... He
is, at length, arrested in the Tuileries, for having raised his cane,
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the dress of this lady ... On every other subject, he reasoned
very correctly, his interests were regarded, and his conversation
was coherent.19
Esquirol’s monomania resembles the present-day disorder of obsession-
compulsion, especially in its “instinctual” form. He wrote of instinctual
monomania that “a lesion of the will exists. The patient is drawn away
from his accustomed course, to the commission of acts, to which neither
reason nor sentiment determine, which conscience rebukes, and which the
will has no longer the power to restrain.”20
After the customary addition of dementia and idiocy, Esquirol arrived at









We should linger a while longer on Esquirol’s monomania, for it illustrates
how messy the cutting up of mental illness can be, especially when it comes
to naming the results.
People had been familiar with obsessions for ages, but the concept of
obsession as a disease dates only from the nineteenth century. French
alienists had several names for it prior to monomania, among which manie
sans délire (Pinel), maladie du doute, folie du doute avec délire de toucher,
folie lucide, délire émotif and onomatomania. Notwithstanding Esquirol’s
fulsome description of monomania, disagreements about the nature of
obsession-like disorders persisted for many years. And so did confusion
over the names.
19Etienne Esquirol, Mental Maladies, translated by E.K. Hunt. Philadelphia, Lea and
Blanchard (1838, 1845), pp. 337-338.
20E Esquirol (1838, 1845). Brief definitions of lypemania and monomania, as well as the
remaining three types of insanity, appear on page 29.
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The story of how afflictions of the monomania type got the current name,
obsessive-compulsion disorder, merits telling, because it exemplifies the tor-
tured path traced by so many psychiatric terms. The story begins with
Richard Krafft-Ebing, a German expert on forensic psychiatry working in
Graz, Austria. He coined the term Zwangvorstellung in 1867, and its trou-
bles began soon afterwards. According to German Berrios, an authority on
German terminology, the name Zwangvorstellung ,
reflected [Krafft-Ebing’s] views on the origin of the disorder:
Zwang derives from the high German dwang via twanc which
is the middle high German for ‘to compel, to oppress’. The
word Vorstellung, in turn, meant at the time ‘presentation or
representation’ and had been introduced by Wolff a century
earlier to refer to the Cartesian ‘idea’ [italics in original].21
Fine, but later German psychiatrists subdivided Kraft-Ebing’s Vorstel-
lung into pure mental experiences (obsessive ideas) and precursors of action
(compulsions). Then, when Zwangvorstellung was translated into English,
it came out as obsession in Great Britain, but as compulsion in America.
Hence, the now familiar obsessive-compulsive disorder arose as a comprise
between the two English translations.
The written works of Pinel, Tuke and Esquirol were known to American
doctors and widely respected. So much so, one might say, that the Amer-
icans hardly bothered to improve upon them. Only Benjamin Rush, the
so-called “Father of American Psychiatry”, wrote at length about mental
illness and, for the most part, his ideas either mimicked those of his Euro-
pean contemporaries or offered poorly thought out alternatives. It would
not be until a century later, after the importation of German advances,
that American psychiatry began to modernize.
Rush was an extraordinary person, brilliant of mind, deeply immersed in
civic life and prolific. Born in 1745, he served as a top physician in Amer-
ica’s revolutionary army, and he signed the Declaration of Independence
along with George Washington. Later, as professor at the University of
Pennsylvania, he wrote the first American textbook on chemistry, the first
American textbook on psychiatry (1812), and numerous tracts on social
reforms. Like his European contemporaries, Rush was not actually a psy-
chiatrist, but a broadly trained doctor with a particular interest in insanity,
or madness. His unusual conclusions regarding the cause of mental illness
21G.E. Berrios (1996), p. 141.
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and the treatments appropriate to it, will be examined in the next chapter.
Here, we examine his classification, which he presented in his textbook.22
Rush’s classification re-arranges the categories named by Pinel and Es-
quirol, while adding other disorders and introducing numerous neologisms.
He describes madness as intellectual derangement, which he claims comes in
two forms, partial and general. Some types of partial intellectual derange-
ment resemble monomania. When the obsessions relate to the patient only,
Rush calls it hypochondriasis. When relating to objects external to the
patient, it is melancholia (which he renames tristimania). Amenomania,
akin to paranoia is another type of partial intellectual derangement. Gen-
eral intellectual derangement also has three forms: mania, manicula (like
mania but less severe) and manalgia (like schizophrenia).
Rush sometimes calls dementia, demence, from Pinel’s démence, but
more commonly, he uses his own term, dissociation. Rounding out the
classification are derangements of specific mental “faculties”, among which
fatuity, or “the total absence of understanding and memory”; it “decays
with the passions, in despotic countries.” Other affected faculties include
those of believing, dreaming, reverie and passions (love, grief, fear, etc.).
He credits the ancient Roman poet, Ovid, with suggesting two remedies for
the “disease” of love: getting a new mistress and dwelling upon all the bad
qualities of the present mistress.











• Derangements of specific faculties (numerous)
22Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind.
Philadelphia, Kimber and Richardson (1812).
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Both Pinel and Esquirol often wrote about the life circumstances surround-
ing their patients’ illnesses. Yet neither man had much to say about the
ultimate cause or causes. They viewed the illnesses in terms of either in-
tellectual impairment or psychological disturbance, but did not speculate
on what might be called the underlying mechanism. For others, however,
the question of whether the ultimate cause lies in the mind, in the brain,
or both is paramount. The debate about mind versus brain is a recurrent
theme in the history of psychiatry. It began with Plato and Hippocrates,
continued in the nineteenth century, and remains with us today.
A commonly held understanding of mind and brain was articulated by
René Descartes in the seventeenth century. Descartes wrote not in Latin,
as was customary at the time, but in the vernacular French language. He
argued that le cerveau (the brain) is completely different from, and indepen-
dent of, l’áme (the soul). Although Descartes did not comment specifically
about so-called mental disorders, it is fair to assume that if he had, he
would have characterized them as soul disorders. For Descartes, who was
staunchly Catholic, it was perfectly natural for him to use the word, soul.
Today, we seldom speak of souls outside of our churches and temples. But
we do speak of minds, and mind and soul are related concepts, both refer-
ring to non-material entities. For many people, mental illness is literally
an illness of the mind.
The brain’s outward appearance reveals nothing of its function, and it
was not until recently that its activity could be studied in a living human.
Aristotle is reputed to have thought that the brain is an organ for cooling
the blood. Other ancients, however, inferred a key role for the brain in
sensation, movement and consciousness, most likely because they knew
what happens to those functions when the brain is damaged. Building on
that knowledge, certain physicians proposed brain-based theories of mental
illness.
Hippocrates was the most astute of early physicians – so far as we know.
Judging from the following statement, it appears that he believed mental
illnesses to be brain illnesses.
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Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come
joys, delights, laughter and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despon-
dency, and lamentations. And by this, in an especial manner,
we acquire wisdom and knowledge, and see and hear, and know
what are foul and what are fair, what are bad and what are
good, what are sweet, and what unsavory ... And by the same
organ we become mad and delirious, and fears and terrors assail
us, some by night, and some by day, and dreams and untimely
wanderings, and cares that are not suitable, and ignorance of
present circumstances, desuetude, and unskillfulness. All these
things we endure from the brain, when it is not healthy ...23
Much later, in 1650, Nicholas Malebranche got more specific. Writing
about hallucinations, one of the hallmarks of severe mental illness, he pro-
posed a mechanism based the properties of “animal spirits”. Spirit is a
curious word with many meanings. We usually think of it as a state of
mind, but in other contexts, it refers to distilled alcoholic drinks. In Male-
branche’s time it meant, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “One
of certain subtle highly-refined substances or fluids ... supposed to perme-
ate the blood and chief organs of the body.” Galen, a Greek physician living
in the time of the Roman empire, had proposed that animal spirits regulate
brain activity, create mechanical forces and contract muscles. Variations on
that theme were still prominent in the seventeenth century, when Nicolas
Malebranche’s came up with an explanation of hallucinations,
[It] sometimes happens that persons whose animal spirits are
highly agitated by fasting, vigils, a high fever, or some violent
passion have the internal fibers of their brain set in motion as
forcefully as by external objects. Because of this, such people
sense what they should only imagine, and they think they see
objects before their eyes which are only in their imaginations.24
Animal spirits also entered into the proposal of Thomas Willis, an in-
fluential English doctor who published a book that has been described as
“the most complete account of a brain-based psychiatry since the Greeks
began practicing medicine.”25 Willis was a bright, curious gentleman who
23Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease.
24Nicholas Malebranche, The Search After Truth. Edited and translated by T. M. Lennon
and P. J. Olscamp. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1674, 1997).
25Carl Zimmer, Soul Made Flesh: The Discovery of the Brain and how It Changed the
World. London, Free Press, 2004.
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had a passion for examining human brains, usually brains “donated” by
individuals who had been hung for committing crimes. In a famous inci-
dent, the body of a young woman who had been executed for infanticide
was delivered to the home of a professor friend of Willis. When the men
opened the coffin in preparation for the dissection, they were shocked by
an unmistakable gagging sound. The woman, thought dead, was trying
to breathe. Fortunately, Willis and his colleague were able to revive the
woman. They lost an opportunity to dissect, but gained reputations as
skilled physicians. Reputations aside, Willis was undoubtedly an accom-
plished anatomist. The best known of his discoveries is the eponymous
Circle of Willis, a constellation of arteries at the base of the brain.
Willis was interested in mental disorders. After searching for anatomical
correlates but finding none, he speculated. In his book, The Soul of Brutes
(1683), he proposed that wayward spirits – of the kind discussed by Galen
and Malebranche – cause tiny explosions in the brain. The resulting damage
disorders brain pathways and produces mental disorders. It was a plausible
hypothesis at the time, but incorrect.
While the foregoing summaries of early speculations weigh in favor of
brain-based theories, it is difficult to gauge the degree to which they were
widespread. Persons with strong religious leanings – like Descartes, who
was a contemporary of Malebranche and Willis – would have favored soul-
based explanations. Even in the early nineteenth century, one of the most
prominent physicians in Germany held to a soul-based interpretation of
mental illness.
Johann Heinroth was a contemporary of Pinel and Esquirol. He called
the Frenchmen’s classifications “lamentable”. Heinroth was well aware of
his patients’ intellectual impairments and psychological disturbances, but
he saw them as fundamentally caused by moral corruption. The contrast
between Heinroth’s perspective and that of Pinel and Esquirol can be ex-
plained, at least in part, by their different personal backgrounds. Whereas
Pinel and Esquirol experienced the French Revolution first hand, Heinroth
grew up in quiet Leipzig. As a child, he was cuddled by a very religious
mother. According to the testimony of a contemporary biographer, “Her
religious sensibility made a lasting impression on the sensitive disposition of
her extremely vivacious son who quite early revealed the full extent of his
sanguine character.”26 At school, Heinroth’s interests oscillated between
26Quoted in Holger Steinberg, “The sin in the aetiological concept of Johann Christian
August Heinroth (1773-1843),” part 1. History of Psychiatry 15:329-344 (2004a),
p. 331.
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theology and medicine. As a humanist and a Protestant, he approached
mental illness with the same romantic passion that was then current among
German intellectuals. His appointment as professor of “psychic therapy”
at Leipzig University was the first European appointment specifically des-
ignated for psychiatric training.
Heinroth’s textbook (1818) is a frustrating read due to its frequent repe-
titions and inconsistencies, but it is nonetheless fascinating. Heinroth wrote
that “the person is more than just the mere body as well as more than the
mere soul: it is the whole human being,”27. The body and the soul each
affect the other, and both contribute to mental illness. Certain conditions,
such as hallucinations and mood disorders, originate in the body and leave
no mark on the soul. By contrast, the more serious and more interesting
illnesses develop from disturbances of the soul.
When discussing Johann Heinroth, it is correct to translate his works
using the word soul, because he clearly knew what he was doing when he
wrote Seele (soul) rather than the alternative, Geist (mind). Only Seele
was consistent with his religious orientation. He acknowledged the brain’s
role in supporting psychic functions, but he maintained that the corrupt
soul is primarily responsible for mental illness. Brain lesions and bodily
signs are simply secondary manifestations of the underlying cause. Hence
came his use of the term psychosomatic, he being the first to use it.
There is no point, Heinroth wrote, in “carving up the body after its death
to identify the causes for these degenerated states.” Psychiatrists should
“concentrate on analyzing the living individual instead of the dead torso.”28
Even if one were to find a brain correlate of mental illness, the discovery
would explain nothing because it would represent only a consequence of the
soul’s disturbance, not its cause.
If we ... make a detailed study of the past life of the patient,
prior to the complete derangement of his psyche, we would per-
haps find that the key to the organic degeneration of the brain
and of the vessels lies in this life itself, in its wrong conduction,
its excesses and debauches and that it is not these interdepen-
dent and interacting polarities which cause the soul’s illness,
but that the soul having gone astray changes the organic life.
27Quoted in H. Steinberg (2004a), p. 333.
28Holger Steinberg, “The sin in the aetiological concept of Johann Christian August
Heinroth (1773-1843),” part 2. History of Psychiatry 15:437-454 (2004b). Quote on
pp. 441-442.
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This change, however, was nothing but mere effect and not the
cause as one is inclined to assume.29
Or, as a modern professor would caution his or her student, “correlation
does not necessarily reflect causation.”
Although sin and evil are the root causes of insanity, predisposition and
experience are also relevant. Heinroth put it this way,
All disturbances of the soul life originate from two elements, the
mood of the soul and the stimulus, and since these elements are
ever active in man without, however, invariably producing soul
disturbances, it follows that ... the two elements must therefore
be in a special relationship, and it is this relationship which we
must now locate and determine.30
Here, again, Heinroth comes close to the modern view that heredity
(“the mood of the soul”) and the environment (“the stimulus”) interact to
produce mental illness.
In other passages Heinroth stresses the role of human passions.
All passion is truly a state of human disease which also attacks
bodily life and casts it down to an extent depending on the
strength or weakness of the passion... In accordance with the
directions they take and with the states of mind they produce,
passions form a very complex tissue in the human soul. For they
are as varied as the objects of desire and fear and the forms
of existence and possession can be. But all have in common
that they rob the soul which panders to them of peace and
freedom, and thus take the soul out of the sphere of higher
consciousness... the man who is fettered by passion deceives
himself about external objects and about himself. This illusion
[delusion], and the consequent error, is called madness.31
Heinroth’s psychiatry is not easily summarized, because it is a mix of reli-
gious themes, mind-body dualism and romantic notions of freedom. Work-
ing in a period of history when psychological interpretations of mental
29Johann Christian Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life; or, Disturbances
of the Soul and their Treatment, translated by J. Schmorak. Baltimore, John Hopkins
University Press (1818, 1975), §140.
30J. C. Heinroth (1818, 1975), §177.
31J. C. Heinroth (1818, 1975), §39- 41.
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illness were coming into conflict with neuroscientific interpretations, Hein-
roth contributed a useful intermediate position according to which mind
and body deserve attention. Within that theoretical context, he saw the
doctor’s role as that of a companion, accompanying the patient as he or she
tries to purify his or her soul. Although advocating this form of treatment,
historical accounts suggest that Heinroth had very little first-hand experi-
ence with patients, which could explain the paucity of clinical description
in his textbook.
Even if he had few occasions to actually interview and observe psychiatric
patients, Heinroth devoted one-half of his textbook to diagnosis and clas-
sification or, as he called it, the “science of forms”. His classification was
a complex thing organized on the hierarchical principles laid down by the
Swedish biologist, Carl Linnaeus. First, he classified illnesses according to
whether they affected the mind, the spirit, or the will. Next, following Lin-
naeus’s plan for plants and animals, he organized “the morbid conditions of
the Psyche by the systematic subdivision into orders, genera, species, and
varieties.” Altogether, he named nine genera, which were further divided
into thirty-six species. The classification includes the main illnesses identi-
fied by Pinel and Esquirol (mania, melancholia, dementia and idiocy), but
also many new ones, among which quiet rage, silliness and timidity.
–//–
Heinroth’s views notwithstanding, religious convictions, no matter how
strong, do not necessarily dictate a person’s understanding of insanity.
Take, for example, the opinions of Benjamin Rush, an American contem-
porary of Heinroth. Rush was a fervent evangelist, yet he believed that
mental illness is explained by strictly physical mechanisms. Writing in his
textbook, he first rejected earlier suggestions that placed the cause of mad-
ness in the liver, the spleen, the intestines, or the nerves. “Lastly,” he then
states, “madness has been placed exclusively in the mind. I object to this
opinion ... because the mind is incapable of any operations independently
of impressions communicated to it though the medium of the body.”32 So,
madness was not in any of the named body organs, nor in the mind, but
rather, “the cause of madness is seated primarily in the blood-vessels of the
brain.”
Moreover, Rush believed that nearly all diseases are caused by constric-
tions of blood vessels. “There is nothing specific in these actions. They
32B. Rush (1812), p. 16.
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are a part of the unity of disease, particularly of fever; of which madness
is a chronic form, affecting that part of the brain which is the seat of the
mind.”33 Like Descartes, therefore, Rush believed that the mind resides in
a particular part of the brain. He does not say whether it is in the pineal
gland, as Descartes maintained, or in some other place.
Each of the eight “reasons” that Rush offers in defense of his theory of
constricted blood vessels qualifies as either anecdotal or conjectural. Nev-
ertheless, and unfortunately, Rush’s focus on blood vessels led him to ad-
vocate bloodletting as the treatment of choice for fevers generally and for
mania especially, the latter being “the highest grade of general madness.”
It should be copious on the first attack of the disease. From 20
to 40 ounces of blood may be taken at once ... It will do most
if the patient be bled in a standing posture. The effects of this
early and copious bleeding are wonderful in calming mad people.
It often prevents the necessity of using any other remedy, and
sometimes it cures in a few hours.34
Although Rush was evidently a caring and concerned physician, what
mattered most was the efficacy of treatment. In addition to bloodletting,
he promoted use of the Gyrater, a device which rapidly spun the patient
in the horizontal plane so as to direct blood into the brain. Moreover, to
“secure obedience” prior to the implementation of these treatments, Rush
recommended “certain modes of coercion”, one of which was the Tran-
quilizer Chair, a restraining device designed to reduce sensory stimulation.
And, “if all these modes of punishment should fail of their intended effects,
it will be proper to resort to the fear of death.”35
Back in Germany, opinion on the mind-brain issue became divided be-
tween two opposing views, each represented by its own informal alliance. In
one camp were the Psychiker, or psychics, who believed that mental illness
are in the mind. Opposing the Psychiker were the Somatiker, or somati-
cists, who maintained that only the body can become sick. The Somatiker
did not deny the reality of psychological disturbance, but they argued that
such problems are only the superficial symptoms of an underlying physi-
cal illness. These two loosely organized groups engaged in hot debates for
many years.
33B. Rush (1812), pp. 17-18.
34B. Rush (1812), p. 187.
35B. Rush (1812), p. 182.
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Elsewhere in Europe, opinions were similarly divided. In England, Henry
Maudsley was the psychiatrist most listened to, perhaps because he pre-
sented himself as favoring both mental and brain-based points of view.
Very active in many roles, Maudsley was a clinical psychiatrist as well as
an entrepreneur, philosopher, philanthropist and author of numerous liter-
ary and medical works. He married the daughter of a successful alienist,
then took over the operation of his father-in-law’s private asylum. From
the fees paid to Maudsley by wealthy families, and from additional monies
earned through his forensic consultations and publications, Maudsley ac-
cumulated a large personal fortune.
He believed that madness is rooted in passion and anti-social selfishness.
Masturbation drew Maudsley’s special ire because, being anti-social in the
extreme, it posed a high risk for mental illness. Another target was alco-
hol, which he said caused problems not only for the drinker but also for
the drinker’s progeny. It was a form of hereditary insanity. Drink led to
drunkenness in the first generation, frenzied need in the second generation,
hypochondria in the third and idiocy in the fourth.
Concurrent with these views, Maudsley held other opinions of a more
modern nature. He wrote, for example, that “mental disorders are neither
more nor less than nervous diseases in which mental symptoms predom-
inate.”36 He, himself, was not a scientist but he urged others to study
the brain. Unfortunately, as the historian Edward Shorter explains, “The
Achilles’ heel, or genius if one prefers, of English psychiatry was that it was
all clinical medicine and little science. The English were known as superb
observers, clinical investigators and examiners, but their clinical findings
lacked the kind of anchor in the natural sciences at which the Germans
were so gifted.”37
Maudsley got his ideas about hereditary insanity from France, where the
proposition was widely discussed and generally endorsed. It was part of
a broader concept known as degeneration theory. This was not a theory
specifically about mental illness, but it involved mental illness. And, while
it did not speak directly to the mind-brain issue, it managed to incorpo-
rate both biological and moralistic perspectives in respect to mental distur-
bances. Supporters of degeneration theory believed that persons possessed
of either a physical disability or a weak character pass their deviance on to
a second generation. From the second, it passes to a third generation, then
36Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind. London, Macmillan (1870), p. 41.
37Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of
Prozac. New York, John Wiley & Sons (1997), p. 90.
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a fourth, and so on. With each successive generation, the severity of the
disorder increases until finally the entire family lineage is extinguished. The
primary disposing factor, the most commonly attributed initial cause, was
thought to be alcoholic intoxication, and the most typical manifestation,
mental illness.
The leading proponent of hereditary insanity was Benedict Morel, the
medical director of an asylum in Rouen, France. The majority of Morel’s
patients came from rural, working class families, and the members of such
families often drank excessive amounts of alcohol or smoked opium. Morel
saw the drug abuse, and the general life styles of these people, as evidence of
“degeneration”. The full theory was published in an influential book pub-
lished in 1857 under the exceptionally long title, Traité des dégénérescences
physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l’espèce humaine et des causes qui
produisent ces variétés maladives (Treatise on the physical, intellectual and
moral degeneracy of the human race and the causes of these sickly condi-
tions).
The actual evidence for hereditary degeneration was weak, and the mech-
anisms proposed for its transmission from generation to generation were
fuzzy. Nevertheless, the theory satisfied the need for a scientific explana-
tion of mental disorder. Moreover, its hint of biological plausibility scored
big in France, where biological causes for mental illness were favored over
psychological causes. Thus, degeneration became popular as a way of ex-
plaining insanity.
Degeneration theory met a more mixed reception In Germany. Wil-
helm Griesinger, a sage psychiatrist with generally progressive opinions
(discussed below), endorsed the idea. In the widely read second edition of
his 1861 textbook, Griesinger wrote,
The disposition (to hereditary degeneration) may disappear
by constantly renewing the blood by marriage with perfectly
healthy families; it is increased and developed to the most
degenerate forms by further intermarriages, by drunkenness of
fathers, et cetera ... The deterioration of a whole race, as well as
the special degeneration of a particular patient generally occurs
gradually and progressively ... It appears ... that hereditary
influence may be highly and quickly increased by drunkenness,
by disease, and in short, by various intercurrent disorders of
the parents at the time of procreation.38
38Quoted in W. F. Bynum, “Alcoholism and degeneration in 19th century European
medicine and psychiatry,” British Journal of Addiction 79: 59-70 (1984), p. 61.
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Another ardent supporter of degeneration was Richard Krafft-Ebing, the
Austrian whose Zwangvorstellung had led to so much confusion over the
naming of obsessive disorders. In addressing the problems of children born
of alcoholic parents, he wrote,
They come into the world as idiots, with hydrocephalous
[severely enlarged heads] or neurotic-convulsive constitutions
and perish in early years of convulsions. In those who survive,
epilepsy, hysteria, mental diseases, and weakness, and exactly
the severest forms of mental impairment are developed out the
morbid constitution of the nerve-centers.
When Krafft-Ebing came to describing the hereditary consequences of
alcoholism, the downward spiral resembled the warnings issued earlier by
Morel and Maudsley.
First generation: Moral depravity, alcoholic excess.
Second generation: Drink mania, attacks of insanity, general
paralysis.
Third generation: Hypochondria, melancholia, apathy, and ten-
dencies to murder.
Fourth generation: Imbecility, idiocy, and extinction of family.39
Krafft-Ebing later became famous for his book, Psychopathia Sexualis,
the essence of which is well summarized by Edward Shorter,
By the time [he wrote this book], Krafft-Ebing was seeing de-
generation literally under the bed. The onanists [masturbators],
homosexuals, and premature ejaculators who paraded through
its pages ... were virtually without exception stamped as ‘de-
generates’. The book remains a classic example of psychiatry
run off the rails ...40
In contrast to Griesinger and Krafft-Ebing, Emil Kraepelin and Sigmund
Freud had their doubts about degeneration, and neither promoted it as an
explanation for mental illness. They accepted that heredity plays a role in
39Both quotations from Axel Gustafson, The Foundations of Death: A Study of the
Drink-Question. Boston, Ginn Heath (1885), pp. 178-179.
40E. Shorter (1997), p. 96.
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causing certain psychiatric conditions, but not a dominant part as claimed
by the proponents of degeneration theory. Their skepticism contributed
to declining support for the theory. Also weighing in against degeneration
theory was the re-examination of some data that had supposedly proved it,
and the biological implausibility of acquired characteristics being inherited.
The theory gradually faded away, and by the end of the nineteenth century,
it had almost entirely disappeared.
Looking back, we can see that degeneration theory served to deflect pub-
lic opinion from the overcrowded asylums where patients languished with-
out hope. It also fed a growing distaste for the disadvantaged, disfigured
and deviant members of society. The theory’s dark, racial overtones grew
from a peculiar Darwinian view of human history which saw the human
species headed downward toward an ignominious end. Because it was a
way of thinking that led to eugenics and Nazi policies of racial purifica-
tion, it is easy to dismiss degeneration theory as scientifically misguided
and morally questionable. But we still believe that heredity plays a role in
the genesis of mental illness, and we still grapple, as did nineteenth century
psychiatrists, with understanding precisely what that role is.
Degeneration theory skirted, but did not deeply engage the mind-brain
issue. It came closest when emphasizing hereditary predispositions. Be-
fore the mid-1800s, heredity was a vague concept largely synonymous with
the inheritance of wealth and social standing. It had little or no connec-
tion to physiology, anatomy, or any other biological phenomenon. That
view was changing, however, at the same time as degeneration theory was
taking root. People started thinking of hereditary transmission in terms
of biological reproduction. So, some credit is due degeneration theory for
drawing attention to the body as a possible factor in mental illness, even if
the inference was weak and the hypothetical mechanism flawed.
Loose thinking about mind-brain relations led some psychiatrists into odd
places. That happened to David Skae, a physician at the Royal Edinburgh
Asylum. Publishing in the Journal of Mental Science, he offered readers
a classification of mental illnesses that was both “rational and practical.”
He believed that all insanities either originate in the body or are expressed
in the body. Different illnesses are associated with different body parts
or different bodily functions. Thus, Skae’s classification included disorders
with such names such mania of masturbation, mania of pregnancy, sun-
stroke mania and metastatic mania. Oddly, because he had a peculiar
concept of the mind as a physical entity, he even characterized idiocy and
senility as body-based mental illnesses. Skae defended his classification
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with the statement, “It has this especial merit at least, that it ever keeps
before us the all-important principle that insanity is a disease of the body,
whether it be of some remote organ sympathetically acting on the mind, or
of the material organ of the mind itself [italics original].”41 Whatever that
means.
41David Skae, “A rational and practical classification of insanity.” Journal of Mental
Science IX (47): 309-319 (1863).
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The first half of the nineteenth century saw the elimination, or at least the
lessening, of harsh practices in hospitals and asylums, but otherwise little
had changed on the ground. The doctors had no effective treatments, and
the patients little comfort. Although headway had been made in cutting
mental illness at its joints, the fundamental nature of mental disorder was
still being debated at mid-century, with moral interpretations vying with
biological interpretations, and psychological causes weighing in against neu-
rological causes. Degeneration theory seemed, at first, to provide answers,
but its light was fading. Meanwhile, the Somatiker battled the Psychiker,
hoping to score a knockout with solid evidence of neurological abnormal-
ities. Thus, while the first half of the nineteenth century occasioned a
general uptick of interest in psychiatry, at mid-century the field as a whole
looked more or less as it had fifty years earlier.
In Germany at this time, psychiatric patients were housed in about one
hundred different institutions. Most were located in rural areas and known
as asylums. They had been placed in the countryside because rural lands
were cheap, and the sparsely populated areas provided a degree of protec-
tion for patients who might otherwise be subjected to public scorn. Apart
from these benefits, asylum doctors believed that it was good for patients to
be in the countryside, because it removed them from the negative influences
of family, friends and urban stresses.
The German asylums, like those elsewhere in Europe, were still horrible
places. Patients lived in overcrowded, barrack-like buildings where relief
came only from sedation and baths. A minority of patients got better
and were released, but the majority faced long periods of confinement.
Patients suffering from acute mental breakdowns where frequently mixed
with patients lost in incurable dementias. Unruly patients were routinely
restrained, and sometimes physically punished.
Gradually, madness came to be seen not just as a social problem, but
also as a medical problem. Accordingly, it was thought desirable to place
some institutions for the insane in cities, where doctors could link up with
the local university. These urban institutions were generally smaller than
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their rural cousins. They were known as “clinics” or “hospitals”, and they
were intended primarily for short-term patient care.
Just as the daily lives of patients were beginning to improve, a serious
problem arose in the asylums. Coming unannounced and unexplained, a
rising tide of admissions swamped the facilities. Directors and administra-
tors struggled to cope with the increasing numbers, details of which scholars
later recovered. In Germany, in 1852, the ratio of asylum patients to ordi-
nary citizens was one in 5,300; by 1911 that ratio had risen to one in five
hundred. England also saw an astonishing rate of increase in its patient
population. Whereas the average English asylum held 116 patients in 1827,
that number had reached 1,072 by 1910. Similarly in the United States,
the average number of patients per asylum was 57 in 1820, but 473 in 1870.
Remarkably, patient numbers at individual asylums increased even though
there were more asylums operating than ever before. At the beginning
of the century, there were few asylums in any European country, but by
the end of the century, France had 108 asylums and the German-speaking
countries had 402.42
Why admissions increased so sharply, is not completely understood. His-
torians point to changing social attitudes as one factor. They cite a growing
trend toward casting out deviant citizens, whether mentally ill or poor or
eccentric. Thus, many persons with no actual mental illness wound up in
asylums. At the same time, some poorhouses and prisons that had previ-
ously housed mentally ill persons, stopped doing so, thus forcing nearly all
psychiatric patients into those same asylums. It is also possible that there
was an increase in the incidence of mental illness. Statistical evidence
suggests rising rates for several diagnostic types, specifically progressive
paralysis, delirium tremor (from alcoholism) and schizophrenia. If mental
illness did, in fact, become more common, it would have been due to social
factors, gene mutations, or possibly both. Regardless of the cause or causes
of the overcrowding, it put the brakes on all substantial reforms. Moreover,
even custodial care suffered a setback due to pressed infrastructures and
overwhelmed work forces.
In the midst of all of this, a twenty-eight year old German doctor with
less than six years of practice – mostly in general medicine – published a
searing criticism of mental asylums. The author was Wilhelm Griesinger.
He was born in Stuttgart and educated at universities in Tübingen and
Zurich. He was a very smart man, and he was calling for a new way of
doing psychiatry.
42Data from Shorter (1997), pp. 34, 46-48.
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Figure 3: Wilhelm Griesinger.
Griesinger launched his attack in 1845, at a time when European psy-
chiatry was squarely centered on the asylum. Alienist physicians, mostly
employed by the state, were expected to provide clean, safe accommoda-
tions for patients, but little else. Some went further, of course, striving for a
therapeutic community or experimenting with forms of moral therapy, but
the measures were largely ineffective. On the whole, misery and pessimism
prevailed in the overcrowded asylums.
Eric Engstrom, an authority on nineteenth century German asylums, has
brought to light another aspect of the alienists’ work: their reliance on a
peculiar managerial strategy.
Alienists emphasized the practical orientation of their research
and juxtaposed it to [contrasted it with] the theoretical con-
structions and cerebral hypotheses of schoolmen [university pro-
fessors]. The focal point of their work was the construction and
maintenance of a therapeutic environment within an institu-
tional setting. They spent an enormous amount of time working
up, implementing, and fine-tuning institutional rules governing
space, time, movement, diet, discipline, and hygiene... Alienists
were in many senses therapeutic choreographers for whom the
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asylum’s efficient organization and their own medical skills com-
prised the dramaturgical stuff of therapeutic practice.43
In other words, the alienists believed that they could soften the blows of
mental illness by putting on a convincing show of medical authority and
knowhow.
For Griesinger, this was not nearly enough. He blasted institutional psy-
chiatry for its use of mechanical restraints, its empty science, and its phony
standard of cures. He thought German society was capable of something
better, a new kind of psychiatry that would be based on the primacy of
neurological science. Here is the first paragraph of his textbook,
Insanity itself, an anomalous condition of the faculties of knowl-
edge and of will, is only a symptom; our classification of the
group of mental diseases proceeds upon the symptomatological
method, and by such a method, and by such a method alone can
any classification be effected. The first step towards a knowl-
edge of the symptoms is their locality – to which organ do the
indications of the disease belong? What organ must necessarily
and invariably be diseased where there is madness? ... Physio-
logical and pathological facts show us that this organ can only
be the brain; we therefore primarily, and in every case of mental
disease, recognize a morbid action of that organ.44
In another passage, Griesinger provided a concise statement of where
psychiatry should be headed. It is remarkable, not only because it turned
out to be an accurate prediction of what psychiatry later became, but also
for its pointed reference to the mind-brain issue.
Psychiatry has undergone a transformation in its relationship
to the rest of medicine. This transformation rests principally
on the realization that patients with so-called mental illnesses
are really individuals with illnesses of the nerves and brain.
[Psychiatry must therefore] emerge from its closed-off status as a
guild and become an integral part of general medicine accessible
to all medical circles.45
43Eric J. Engstrom, Clinical Psychiatry in Imperial Germany: A History of Psychiatric
Practice. Ithaca, Cornell University Press (2003), pp. 88-89.
44Wilhelm Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics, translated by C. L. Robertson
and J. Rutherford. London, The New Sydenham Society (1861, 1867), p. 1.
45Wilhelm Griesinger, Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten (1868), p. 3.
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The key sentence in the above passage is often quoted inaccurately. Be-
cause he wrote, “ ... dass die sogenannten ‘Geisteskranken’ hirn- und ner-
venkranke Individuen sind,” the passage should translate as, “patients with
so-called mental illnesses are really individuals with illnesses of the nerves
and brain.” More commonly, it is rendered as “mental illnesses are brain ill-
nesses.” The simplification distorts the meaning and undermines the intent.
The comment was directed toward the Somatiker, who had long argued for
a biological approach to mental illness. They, however, had not put any
special emphasis on the brain, suggesting instead that many different bod-
ily defects could create conditions for mental illness (recall David Skae’s
classification). Griesinger, by contrast, is suggesting here that mental ill-
nesses are exclusively illnesses of the brain. Elsewhere, he stressed that the
proposition, while probably true, had not yet been proven. He himself was
neither an anatomist nor a physiologist. He called upon those who were
practicing scientists to uncover definitive proof, by finding evidence of brain
pathologies.
Griesinger was in the right place at the right time. Following the success
of the industrial revolution, scientific inquiry had found new purposes and
new tools. It had moved from its former home among philosophers to a
new base occupied by observers and experimenters. The transformation
began in England, then spread quickly to Germany and the rest of Europe.
Its forerunners were Michael Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell (electro-
magnetism), Charles Lyell (geology) and Charles Darwin (biology).
It is not widely known that Darwin was interested in mental illness, but
he wrote about it in his book, Expression of the Emotions (1872). His
main goal in that book was to persuade readers that human expressions
are “descended with modification” from our animal ancestors. To support
the argument, Darwin studied and reported on the faces of insane people.
According to the Darwinian scholar Janet Browne, he did so because,
he believed their emotions were uncontrolled and intense, and
that, rather like children, their faces would display their feelings
in a pure, uncomplicated way, ideal for a scientific survey of
expressions. The passions would be more strongly accentuated
and easier to identify; emotions less complex than in the sane.46
Darwin obtained dozens of photographs of insane patients and included a
few in his book. While some physiognomists claimed that they could diag-
46Janet Browne, “ Darwin and the face of madness,” in The Anatomy of Madness, vol.
1, eds. W.F. Bynum, R. Porter, and M. Shepherd. London, Tavistock (1985), p. 153.
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nose a specific mental illness by examining the patient’s facial expressions,
Darwin did not see discrete “species” of madness – only generic emotions
such as distress, rage, fear and sorrow. Overall, the impact of Darwin’s writ-
ings on psychiatry was small. More influential, was the fact that Darwin
had built his whole theory of evolution on detailed, unbiased observations.
It was the very method that Griesinger was urging upon the new breed of
psychiatrists.
Griesinger’s views were shaped by the work of a number of scientists who
happened also to be doctors (but not psychiatrists). Carl von Rokitansky,
for example, was a Viennese pathologist who personally performed over
30,000 autopsies. Griesinger heard his call for objective methods in the
medical sciences, and he endorsed it. Griesinger was also influenced by the
Parisian physiologist, François Magendie, in whose laboratory Griesinger
spent several months. Magendie showed him how nervous messages travel
from the brain to the spinal cord and then out from the spinal cord into
peripheral nerves. From these observations, Griesinger developed a theory
of mental reflexes, which I describe below. It was Johannes Müller, however,
who made the biggest impression on the young Griesinger.
Müller was a licensed physician in Berlin, but he did not practice
medicine. He was, instead, a research scientist who investigated an impres-
sive range of topics using the tools of microscopy, comparative anatomy
and neurophysiology. From his neurophysiological experiments, he devel-
oped a theory of “specific nerve energies”, according to which each of the
sensory nerves imparts a special flavor to its electrical messages. The brain
then “reads” or “interprets” the specific energies, thus yielding the unique
subjective experiences of sight, hearing, taste, et cetera. The idea was
creative, and plausible at the time, but incorrect. Apart from laboratory
work, Müller was fascinated by a group of rare marine animals, which
he attempted to classify in the manner of Darwin. Griesinger took from
Müller a love of science and a deep respect for careful observation. He
also learned that it is not enough to simply gather facts – one needs to
reflect upon those facts and build theories based on them. This, instead of
speculation.
And lastly, Griesinger admired the work of Rudolf Virchow. A pupil
of Müller, Virchow was likewise a polymath. He was active as a physi-
cian, anthropologist, pathologist, prehistorian, biologist, writer, editor and
politician. Not just active, but talented too. His pioneering experiments
revealed the vital importance of biological cells in health and disease.
51
4 A New Vision for Psychiatry
Griesinger was inspired by all the science mentioned above, but the only
science that he himself did was of the armchair variety. An example of his
scientific thinking was his neurological theory of mental illness. From his
familiarity with the physiological investigations of François Magendie and
Johannes Müller, he knew that sensory signals enter the spinal cord and
motor signals (commanding actions) go out from it. Thus, the spinal cord
contains simple nervous circuits that mediate the unconscious behaviors of
animals and certain rudimentary behaviors in humans. Extrapolating from
these facts, and assuming that conscious thoughts and goals are types of
higher-order reflexes, he concluded that the brain must be host to what he
called “mental reflexes”. Modelled on spinal reflexes, Griesinger’s mental
reflexes connected one thought to another. He believed, in this context,
that any sort of extreme physiological activity – involving either too much
neural excitation or too little excitation – would adversely affect mental
functions, and that if such extreme states of activity persisted, they would
result in psychiatric illness. Griesinger’ theory was clever and based on the
latest scientific knowledge. Its only problem? It was untestable and hence
speculative, the very sort of theory that he would have denounced had it
come from anyone else.
Although Griesinger is remembered as a pioneer of modern psychiatry,
he saw himself first and foremost as a doctor of internal medicine, the field
in which he trained and in which he spent the bulk of his career. In his
early years, he held positions as either physician or professor – or both
simultaneously – at half a dozen different institutions in as many locations,
including one in Egypt where he acted as the personal physician to the
Viceroy of Cairo. He wrote a big book on Egyptian public health, estab-
lished a professional journal devoted to general medicine, and published
numerous articles on pathology and internal medicine. His seminal contri-
butions to psychiatry came later.
In 1860, Griesinger moved to Zurich, where he had studied medicine
many years earlier. He was made head of the department of internal
medicine and director of a run-down mental asylum. He must have spent
much of the first year revising his psychiatric textbook – originally pub-
lished in 1845 – because the second edition was hailed as groundbreaking
when it appeared in 1861, just one year after his arrival in Zurich.
Griesinger’s ideas on psychiatry became so widely disseminated, and so
much admired, that he was next appointed professor of psychiatry in Berlin.
It was a prestigious position that came with two directorships. One was at
the clinic for “ordinary nervous diseases”, the other at the clinic for “ner-
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vous diseases with a primary psychiatric presentation.” Griesinger switched
his teaching duties from one clinic to the other in alternating semesters.
There was talk of merging the two clinics, but that did not happen,
primarily because of Griesinger’s insistence that psychiatry and neurology
remain as separate medical fields. While he believed that all mental illnesses
are brain illnesses, he did not believe that every brain illness is necessarily
a psychiatric illness. He explained it this way,
As insanity is only a complication of symptoms of various mor-
bid states of the brain, the question might be asked, whether
its special study apart from that of the other diseases of the
brain can be justified, or whether mental pathology should not
always accompany cerebral pathology. But, although at some
more distant period this may perhaps be looked for, any at-
tempt at such a combination would at present be premature
and quite impractical.47
When it came to the relationship between mind and brain, Griesinger
was a philosophical materialist. He thought of the brain as a special kind
of machine. Nevertheless, he did not refrain from writing of “purposes”
and “aims”, both of which, he assumed, were involved in the operation
of mental reflexes. Moreover, he did not deny the existence of souls. He
offered these deep thoughts in regard to the soul,
While we are forced by facts to refer understanding and will to
the brain, still, nothing can be assumed as to the relation exist-
ing between these mental acts and the brain, the relation of soul
to material. From an empirical point of view the unity of soul
and body is indeed a fact primarily to be maintained, and the
a priori investigation of the possibility of soul apart from body,
of a bodiless soul, must be entirely dismissed ... How a material
physical act in the nerve fibers or cells can be converted into an
idea, an act of consciousness, is absolutely incomprehensible ...
[I]t is scientifically admissible ... to consider the understanding
and the will as the function, the special energy, of the brain,
just as transmission and reflex action are considered the special
function of the nerves and spinal cord, and to consider the soul
primarily and pre-eminently as the sum of all cerebral states.48
47W. Griesinger (1861, 1867), p. 9.
48W. Griesinger (1861, 1867), pp. 3-4.
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If one were to substitute the word “mind” for Griesinger’s “soul”, the
statement quoted above could pass as a commentary written by a twenty-
first century neuroscientist or philosopher.
Psychiatry was not included in the state medical examination, but it was
part of the medical curriculum in Berlin. Students wishing to practice psy-
chiatry were instructed in psychology, neuroanatomy and related academic
subjects, while the old institutional psychiatry – asylum psychiatry – was
largely ignored. Hearing of this, the asylum doctors (alienists) grew under-
standably upset. “They found themselves at once reiterating psychiatry’s
status as a legitimate branch of medicine, while at the same time insisting
that psychiatric science required asylum-based knowledge and wholly dif-
ferent diagnostic skills from those learned at the university.”49 Brushing
aside the alienists’ insistence on “asylum-based knowledge”, the medical
specialty of psychiatry moved ahead along the road cleared by Griesinger.
Griesinger died in 1868, just three years after taking charge at the
Charit é, and just seven years after publishing his major work. With psy-
chiatry now recognized as a legitimate medical discipline, mental illness
started to be researched just like any other medical condition, and uni-
versities started appointing medical school professors as much on their
qualifications in research as on their clinical experience. Professors of
psychiatry were expected to have expertise in heredity, brain anatomy
and physiology. The University of Berlin and its associated hospital, the
Charit é, led in this regard, but schools elsewhere in Europe quickly followed
suit. The result was a new intellectual framework for understanding mental
illness. It was an exciting time, especially in Germany, and especially for
men.
One man strongly affected by Griesinger’s vision was Carl Wernicke, a
talented neurologist who worked briefly at Griesinger’s Charit é. Addressing
the annual meeting of the prestigious Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher
und Ärzte (Society of German Scientists and Physicians) twelve years after
Griesinger’s death, Wernicke’s words echoed Griesinger’s progressive vision
of basic research at the service of psychiatry. And he went further, sug-
gesting that psychiatrists might apply their scientific knowledge toward an
equally worthy objective. Mental illnesses, he said, provide “natural ex-
periments” that can elucidate normal brain functions. It was a brilliant
insight and fully in line with Griesinger’s teachings.
49E. J. Engstrom (2003), pp. 68-69.
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Let us confidently distinguish psychiatry’s practical and scien-
tific goals! As laudable as it is for psychiatric practitioners
to fulfill their difficult therapeutic calling, psychiatry is also a
branch of the natural sciences. As such, it has tasks to perform
which are every bit as worthy as other great tasks of natural sci-
ence. For it must observe and explain not only deviations from
healthy mental life. It must also derive from these deviations
useful information which the diseases, as natural experiments,
tend to have for knowledge of the normal function of an organ.
Only modern physiology of the brain will enable us to perform
this task.50
50Quoted in E. J. Engstrom (2003), p. 101.
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District Mental Hospital
Bernhard Gudden was another German psychiatrist influenced by Wil-
helm Griesinger’s progressive ideas. He understood that psychiatry was
headed in a new direction. It was going to a place where patients would be
treated respectfully and the root causes of their disorders would be stud-
ied scientifically. Four years after Griesinger’s death, Gudden moved from
Zurich to Munich, where he put into practice many of the reforms urged by
Griesinger. He made no major discoveries or authored any groundbreak-
ing books, but he nurtured the new psychiatry by means of his teaching,
hospital administration and anatomical research. Gudden’s professional
activities typified the new psychiatry. They also demonstrated its recently
acquired power and prestige.
Gudden became the director of Munich’s mental hospital in 1872, just
one year after the birth of the German nation. Prior to that time, Germany
comprised a collection of independent states linked by a common language
and, in many respects, common histories. Unification came about after
several of those states fought and won the Franco-Prussian War. That war
was started by two powerful men harboring incompatible ambitions. Otto
von Bismarck was a Prussian statesman intent on creating a united German
nation under Prussian control, while Napoleon III (Charles-Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte) wanted to regain some of the prestige lost by his country in
earlier military and diplomatic adventures. Prussia’s army was stronger
than France’s, and the fate of the French side became sealed once four
other German states joined Prussia in the battle. The Germans laid siege
to Paris and captured Napoleon. Then, just prior to France’s capitulation,
the German nation – or German empire (Deutsches Reich) – was born.
Wilhelm I became the Kaiser, or king, and Otto von Bismarck, the all-
important chancellor. Germany was at last a united country, proud and
strong. Possessed of a large, well-equipped military and political acumen,
it confidently engaged in European politics and acquired its first colonies.
The empire comprised twenty-seven states, of which Prussia was by far
the largest. Bavaria was the second largest state, but also a kingdom. The
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king of Bavaria was Ludwig II. He was preceded by his father, Maximillian
II, who was a delft politician and a popular leader. Maximillian had spent
freely on infrastructure, especially in Munich, the capital city. By contrast,
Ludwig II disliked politics and did little to support public institutions.
He put his energies – and considerable monies – into building castles and
sponsoring theater performances. Nonetheless, Bavaria grew and prospered
in the early years of the German Empire. The population of Munich grew
from about 100,000 in 1852 to about 250,000 in 1883.
Figure 4: Marienplatz, Munich, about 1890. [Munich Municipal Archives]
In the spring of 1872, Bernhard Gudden (later, Bernhard von Gudden,
thanks to his gentrification) was looking for a new job. At the time, he was
working two good jobs in a lovely city, but still he wanted to move. One
job was director of the Cantonal Psychiatric Clinic in southeastern Zurich,
called the Burgholzli for the hill upon which it rested. His other job was
professor of psychiatry at the University of Zurich. Gudden, his wife and
their nine children were happy in Zurich. Their accommodations were com-
fortable, the schools good and Gudden’s income more than adequate. The
clinic building had just recently been constructed according to an architec-
tural plan designed by Wilhelm Griesinger. The problem was, Gudden and
the hospital’s chief administrator did not get along. When Gudden heard
that the director of the Upper Bavarian District Mental Hospital had died,
57
5 Bernhard Gudden at the Upper Bavarian District Mental Hospital
he saw an opportunity. He had previously worked at a mental asylum in
Bavaria, so he was familiar with the system. There was also the lure of
Munich. The large, bustling city was now part of the German Empire. As
such, it was fully capable of providing the director of its mental hospital
with all the resources that he might need or want.
Gudden was well qualified for the job in Munich. Born in the town of
Cleves in the Prussian province of Rhineland, he was the third of seven sons
in a middle class family. He studied philosophy at the University of Bonn
for a short while, but then switched to medicine. In those days, medical
students often trained at multiple schools. Gudden studied in Bonn, Halle
and Berlin. His first job was at a mental asylum in Siegburg, near Bonn,
where he worked as an assistant to the head doctor and married the boss’s
granddaughter. Next, he was appointed director of the District Mental
Hospital at Werneck in northeastern Bavaria, and after that, director at
the Burgholzli clinic in Zurich. He was a heavy-set man with a large, cube-
shaped head and a bushy beard. Professional in attitude and demeanor,
he was highly cultured and able to chat knowledgeably about literature,
music and theatre. Moreover, he had a sense of humor.
Figure 5: Bernhard Gudden, c. 1870.
It was expected that the director of the Munich hospital would also be
the professor of psychiatry at the local university, as was the arrangement
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in Zurich. However, the process of hiring for the two positions was compli-
cated, because the Ministry of the Interior for Church and School Affairs
was responsible for the hospital, while the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
was responsible for choosing its professors. As competitions for the two
positions developed, communications between the ministry and the univer-
sity broke down. Consequently, just as Gudden received notice from the
minister that he had been appointed director of the hospital, he learned
from other sources that the university was not on board. The university
was expecting that a different man, not Gudden, would be appointed di-
rector, so it appointed that person as its professor of psychiatry. Gudden
refused to accept the directorship without the professorship. Caught in
a difficult situation, partly of its own making, the university relented. It
gave Gudden’s competitor an honorary professorship, and Gudden got an
ordinary professorship to go along with his directorship.
The place where Gudden came to work was called the Oberbayerische
Kreisirrenanstalt. A literal translation of Kreisirrenanstalt yields “district
mental institution”, but English-speaking authors generally refer to the
Munich establishment as either the Upper Bavarian District Mental Asy-
lum or the Upper Bavarian District Mental Hospital. The ambiguity is
significant, because in reality the institution was an asylum when Gudden
took charge, but a hospital at the time of his premature death. I will call
it a hospital.
Munich’s mental hospital was one of the largest in all the German-
speaking lands, but it was otherwise typical. It was situated in an agricul-
tural area southeast of the city, about one mile from the Isar River and two
miles from the city center. With a location that partook of both rural and
urban qualities, and with a mandate that was both custodial and instruc-
tional, it was perched on the cusp of modernity. The building itself was an
austere looking, brown sandstone structure standing three stories tall. A
line of closely spaced windows stretched monotonously from one end of the
long building to the other, interrupted only by an ornamental central en-
trance. The symmetrical architectural plan was designed to accommodate
male and female patients in separate areas. Built in 1859, the hospital was
designed to house 280 patients, but it was holding about 500 when Gudden
arrived.
The main function of the hospital was, of course, to accommodate and
care for its patients. Nevertheless, a large space was reserved for neu-
roanatomical research. Gudden was convinced that studies of the brain
were absolutely necessary for the advancement of psychiatry, and he evi-
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Figure 6: Upper Bavarian District Mental Hospital, 1907.
dently enjoyed the hands-on activity, because he worked in the laboratory
whenever free of other obligations. He started doing research many years
earlier, while working at an asylum in the town of Werneck. Some of the
patients had damaged earlobes – probably from beatings – and Gudden
decided to examine their wounds. Thrilled by the sight of human tissues
viewed under a microscope, he redirected his curiosity from the ear to the
brain, and from that point onward, he was hooked. His infectious enthu-
siasm for neuroanatomy led many students and co-workers to lend their
hands in the laboratory, Emil Kraepelin and Franz Nissl among them.
Gudden was able to work in the laboratory as much as he did because he
had installed a well-defined hierarchy of command and a finely tuned system
of delegation. Gudden was the absolute boss. His immediate assistants
were young psychiatrists who handled most of the patient work. They, in
turn, were supported by nurses (both male and female) and students. The
unskilled laborers took care of everything else. Gudden was stern with his
subordinates – as was customary for persons in positions of authority – but
relaxed with professional colleagues. He established numerous rules and
regulations. For example, patients were allowed no more than three and
one-half liters of beer per day (yes 3.5 liters!), unless the patient’s family
had “arranged” for more.
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The patient population comprised a diverse group of individuals suffering
from a numbing variety of physical and mental disorders. They came either
from Munich itself or from nearby villages, and most were persons of modest
means. If the family had money, the sick person was sent not to Gudden’s
publically funded hospital, but to a private asylum where conditions were
marginally better. The patients seldom changed their clothing, and few
paid much attention to personal hygiene. From day to day, there was little
for them to do. Some patients wandered silently about, while others sat
and talked – often to themselves. It was not uncommon to encounter a
patient rocking back and forth, or otherwise moving his or her limbs in
repetitive, stereotyped patterns. Loud shouts were occasionally heard, as
was raucous laughter and sobbing. Contrastingly, there were patients who
never uttered a sound. The air contained a heavy mix of tobacco smoke,
body odors, vomit and the pungent scent of choral hydrate, which was the
drug of choice for calming and sedating patients.
Leading off from the main corridor of Gudden’s hospital were five rooms,
each with about thirty beds. These rooms were for sleeping, primarily at
night, but also during the day for patients who had been given a sedative.
Other patients, sedated or not, lay on floors throughout the hospital. Apart
from medicated sedation, the only other treatments – if they may be called
that – were bed rests and baths (hydrotherapy). Bed rests were ordinarily
combined with sedation. The numbing effect of the drug rendered the
patient more manageable, while the tranquility of the bed quieted his or
her inner turmoil. In this way, patients would sometimes remain in the
sleeping room for days on end.
Baths, like bed rests, had long been used throughout continental Eu-
rope as well as in Great Britain and North America. Some practitioners
preferred them hot, others cold and sudden. After first learning about
baths while working as an assistant physician in the Munich hospital, Emil
Kraepelin later employed them frequently. He wrote about the Munich
experience in his Memoirs, stating that baths were sometimes used “for
weeks and months”, but it is unclear whether he was referring to continu-
ous or intermittent submersion. In describing one particular case, however,
his meaning was unambiguous, “Once, I left a very agitated patient in the
bath for three days, because it was too great a risk to put her into the
isolation room and she could not be kept in bed.”51
Despite the liberal use of sedatives, bed rests and baths, there were al-
ways patients whose troublesome, even violent, behaviors presented a dan-
51Emil Kraepelin, Memoirs. Berlin, Springer-Verlag (1987), p. 40.
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ger to themselves and others. Verbal arguments, assaults and fights were
commonplace. Kraepelin recalled what he saw,
There were a great number of fights, the smashing of windows
or crockery. I often had to bandage or sew the wounds caused
by these fights. In those days, the wrong-doers were punished
by stopping the small amounts of beer allowed [3.5 liters per
day!]. This only led to increased outbreaks of abusive language
and attacks on the doctor.52
Hospital staff dealt with unruly patients using a variety of measures.
Punishments, for example, went beyond the denial of beer to include de-
nials of exercise, recreation and family visits. Physical restraining devices,
such as straight-jackets, iron hand-cuffs, leg-cuffs and chains, were also
employed. In one instance, according to Kraepelin, a doctor accidently
chained himself while trying to secure the legs of a patient. Sometimes
patients were bound to special chairs. And, sadly, some of the staff beat
disobedient patients.
Self-mutilation was another big concern. Psychotic patients heard voices
from inside their heads urging them to commit violent acts, and sometimes
they directed those acts towards themselves. Likewise, depressed patients
vented their emotions upon their own bodies. Men banged their heads
against walls until blood flowed from their foreheads. Patients scratched
themselves relentlessly, gnawed at their fingers and pulled out their hair.
Others injured themselves with knives, nails, or scissors, leaving wounds
that became infected. To prevent or minimize these actions, the hospital
staff had closets full of protective devices. There were leather muffs, leather
mitts and long leather sleeves – all designed to be tear-proof. A type of
straight-jacket was also used. It was a large gown that closed with screws
instead of buttons.
The most dangerous patients were put in barren, locked chambers known
as isolation rooms. A patient could be kept in an isolation room for months
or even years. Sometimes problems arose. In one such episode, as recalled
by Kraepelin, a scream was heard near one of the isolation rooms. Rushing
to the scene, Kraepelin realized that a colleague and two male nurses were
locked inside. A burly patient had freed himself, then forced the others into
the room before securing the lock. When Kraepelin attempted to open the
locked door, the patient leapt out, grabbed Kraepelin, and brought him to
the ground. Kraepelin was wearing a heavy fur coat, so he could not easily
52E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 11.
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resist. The patient grabbed Kraepelin’s throat and started to squeeze, but
just then a nearby patient heard the shouting and came to the rescue,
freeing Kraepelin and subduing the attacker.
Gudden knew of these events and he disapproved of them. They were
troublesome, but not unique to the Munich hospital. In England, an alienist
by the name of John Conolly had earlier encountered similar situations. In
the 1840s, he began advocating for reforms that would reduce the need for
harsh measures such as those described above. He asserted that “the man-
agement of a large asylum is not only practicable without the application
of bodily coercion to the patient, but ... after the total disuse of such a
method of control, the whole character of the asylum undergoes a gradual
and beneficial change.” Conolly’s book, Treatment of the Insane without
Mechanical Restraints (1856) caused quite a stir, and as a result, several
English asylums implemented his policy of “no-restraint”. It proved so
successful at the Hanwell County Lunatic Asylum in Middlesex that The
Times lauded it as “one of the greatest works that the dictates of the
human mind could suggest.”53
Thus, long before coming to Munich, Gudden had read of no restraint.
It was the kind of patient care that he hoped to adopt. As director of the
asylum in Werneck, he had written in one of his daily reports, “But we
regard as even more important than the elimination of mechanical force,
the ... strengthening of even the smallest vestiges of freedom of the mind
and the rejection of every form of spiritual oppression.”54 Later in Zurich,
Gudden took steps – evidently incomplete – towards eliminating chains and
unlocking rooms.
Thus, after tolerating all sorts of physical restraints during the first seven
years of his directorship in Munich, Gudden acted decisively to stop it.
He did so by publishing a notice that was addressed to the nurses, but
intended for the entire staff. Widely distributed within the hospital and
later elsewhere, the document formalized the modernization of patient care
within psychiatric institutions.
1. Nursing is a difficult and responsible profession. Those who
dedicate themselves to this profession, must be sympathetic
53Andrew Scull, “ A Victorian alienist: John Conolly,” in The Anatomy of Madness,
vol. 1., eds. W.F. Bynum, R. Porter, and M. Shepherd. London, Tavistock (1985),
pp. 103-150. Quotes on pp. 121, 123.
54Quoted in A. Danek, W. Gudden, and H. Distel, “The dream king’s psychiatrist Bern-
hard von Gudden (1824-1886),” Archives of Neurology 46: 1349-1353 (1989), p. 1349.
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towards the suffering of fellow human beings, and must rid
themselves of all prejudice in respect of the mentally ill.
2. No one is to blame for becoming ill and similarly, even the
best, quietest and most sensible people can become mentally ill.
No one is immune to becoming mentally ill. Mental disease is
a disease of the brain and the brain, like all other organs, can
be damaged in its activity and capacity for the most varying
reasons.
3. In most cases mental diseases eliminate one’s self-control. No
mentally ill person can be blamed for what he does or does not
do. Even if he seems to be particularly malicious and annoys
and tortures those who surround him in what seems to be an in-
tentional manner, it is indeed the forces of disease steering him.
It is not uncommon for those patients who are most difficult to
put up with, to suffer the most from their own disease.
4. It is not physical strength that counts in the nursing care of
the mentally ill. The institutions need understanding, kind and
experienced nursing staff. In most cases it is possible to calm
agitated patients with skillful diversion and it is not necessary
to resort to violence.
5. The nursing staff must be patient, friendly and accommo-
dating to each patient equally and make allowances according
to status and education. It is an easy task to behave with
kindness and patience towards patients, who are receptive and
grateful for such treatment. However, it is difficult to remain
friendly and patient towards those patients who are agitated
and disagreeable, and who reject with disdain any attempts to
improve their situation ...55
55The excerpt is taken from the “Instructions” issued by Gudden to his nursing staff at
the Upper Bavaria District Mental Asylum, in 1884. Hanns Hippius, Hans-Jürgen
Möller and Gabriele Neundörfer-Kohl (eds.), The University Department of Psychia-
try in Munich: From Kraepelin and his Predecessors to Molecular Psychiatry, chapter
4. Heidelberg, Springer (2008).
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Professor
According to Wolfgang Gudden, a fourth-generation descendant of Bern-
hard Gudden, Bernhard’s appointments in Munich were supported by, and
possibly instigated by, Bavaria’s royal family.56 In any case, just weeks
after Gudden’s arrival, the king let it be known that he had a “great de-
sire” for Gudden to “periodically visit his Royal Highness, Prince Otto.”
Otto (full name, Otto Wilhelm Luitpold Adalbert Waldemar von Wittels-
bach) was Ludwig’s brother, and sadly, Crown Prince Otto was not well.
As Ludwig explained in his note to Gudden, Otto had “for a long time ...
been suffering from nervousness as well as hallucinations.” He probably
had progressive paralysis of the insane – or simply, progressive paralysis –
a rather common illness at the time. Gudden accepted Ludwig’s request
and began looking after Otto. According to Gudden’s biographers,
Right from the beginning Gudden and some of his co-workers
regularly visited the ailing Prince Otto at the Palace of Nymphen-
burg and later at the little castle of Fürstenried. Gudden wrote
to the Queen Mother, Marie of Bavaria and mother of King
Ludwig the Second, about these visits and their correspondence
continued for the following fourteen years.57
In reality, it was not Gudden, but Gudden’s students, nicknamed the
“prince’s doctors”, who were taking turns looking after Otto. Franz Nissl,
a recent medical school graduate and one of Gudden’s favorite students,
was one of these men. Two years earlier, Gudden had awarded Nissl a
prize for the best neuroanatomical research. Now, to encourage Nissl’s
scientific interest, Gudden set up a small laboratory at Schloss Fürstenried
so that Nissl could pursue his research when off duty from his caretaking
responsibilities. Gudden himself seldom went to Fürstenried, preferring
instead to remain in Munich, close to the hospital and the university.
56A. Danek, W. Gudden, and H. Distel (1989), p. 1350.
57From H. Hippius et al. (2008), chapter 4, p. 23.
65
6 The Tragic Deaths of the King and the Professor
Gudden and his students continued looking after Otto for another four-
teen years. Then, on a June morning in the year 1886, Professor Bernhard
Gudden, head of psychiatry at Ludwig-Maximilians University and director
of the Upper Bavaria District Mental Hospital, convened a small meeting
in his office. The men had gathered at the request of the Ministry of State
of Bavaria to evaluate the mental status of their king, Ludwig the Sec-
ond. More precisely, they had been asked whether the king was fit to rule.
Gudden was the logical choice to head the inquiry because it was he who
had initially voiced concern about Ludwig’s mental health at a meeting
with ministerial officers two months previously. Moreover, Gudden was
still caring for Ludwig’s younger brother, Otto, at Schloss Fürstenried. So,
whereas it was Ludwig who had first called upon Gudden to care for his
brother, it was now Gudden who was to investigate the sanity of Ludwig
himself.
The meeting regarding the fate of Ludwig was held at the university. Be-
sides Gudden, three of Gudden’s professional colleagues attended: Dr. Hu-
bert von Grashey, professor at the University of Würzburg; Dr. Friedrich
Wilhelm Hagen, professor at the University of Erlangen; and Dr. Max
Hubrich, director of the district mental asylum at Werneck. Gudden was
well acquainted with all three men. His own university appointment had
come at the expense of Hubrich, the man whom the university had initially
appointed in the mix-up mentioned above, and Grashey was Gudden’s son-
in-law.
Gudden took his place behind the desk, while the others gathered in
front. Light from the rising sun penetrated weakly through the heavy cur-
tain draping the single window, providing a dim backdrop to the somber
occasion. The committee members lit their cigars and briefly exchanged
pleasantries before turning to the business at hand. They had before them
the king’s medical history as well as statements from eyewitnesses regarding
the king’s behavior, the latter compiled by Count Max von Holnstein, the
king’s attendant. From these documents they learned that Ludwig hated
administrative work and that he preferred chatting with laborers than ne-
gotiating with statesmen. Admired by the common man, he was regarded
as a fool by the educated classes which, unfortunately, were the only classes
that mattered. As for the king’s personal habits, his servants reported that
he dined outdoors in frigid, cold weather and wore heavy winter clothing in
mid-summer. These witnesses also recounted his crude and juvenile table
manners, his abusive treatment of servants and his extreme shyness in the
presence of unfamiliar persons.
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Most damaging of all was Ludwig’s well known penchant for building
extravagant castles, among which the magnificent Neuschwanstein castle
perched on a rocky crag in the northern Alps. The castle was inspired by
Ludwig’s musical friend, Richard Wagner, and more specifically by Wag-
ner’s operas. In one of his letters to Wagner, Ludwig wrote, “It will re-
mind you of Tannhäuser (Singers’ Hall with a view of the castle in the
background) and Lohengrin (castle courtyard, open corridor, path to the
chapel).”58 In addition to Neuschwanstein, there was a huge palace at Her-
renchiemsee and a ridiculous winter garden atop his Munich palace. For
the latter, Ludwig had instructed his workmen to provide a landscape com-
plete with a small lake, a boat, a large panoramic painting of the Himalayan
Mountains, an Indian fisherman’s hut, a Moorish kiosk and an exotic tent.
The committee also learned that Ludwig had sent an architectural advisor
and three assistants to India for the sole purpose of examining the cornice
of a palace under construction in a remote village.
Such extravagance clearly pointed to a man obsessed with daydreams and
fantasies. Moreover, as Gudden’s little committee knew all too well, these
buildings did not come cheaply. In fact, the total cost was nearly fourteen
million marks. It was understood that Ludwig’s friends and allies were
prepared to help pay off the debt, but it was equally well understood that
any request for that aid would come at the expense of Bavaria’s reputation.
It did not take long for the eminent psychiatrists to conclude that Ludwig
was mad. Nor did they waste much time in discussing which specific mental
illness he suffered from. Certainly Gudden felt neither the need nor the
desire to come up with an actual diagnosis. Keeping strictly to the terms
of the mandate, it was enough for the committee to declare the king unfit
to rule. The official report, which the men unanimously agreed upon, was
short and to the point.
1. His Majesty is in a very advanced state of mental disorder
and most probably suffering from what psychiatrists refer to as
paranoia (insanity);
2. With this type of illness, with its gradual, but advanced
development and the fact that it has been noticed for quite
some time, His Majesty is to be declared irrevocably ill, and it
is possible that his mental condition will deteriorate;
3. Due to his illness, it is clear that His Majesty no longer has
his own will and for this reason is most likely to be unable to
58Clara Tschudi, Ludwig II of Bavaria. Lulu.com (2015), p. 249.
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govern, and that this situation will most likely last not only a
year, but for the rest of his life.59
With Gudden’s report in hand, state authorities commissioned Ludwig’s
friend, Count Max von Holnstein, to raise a small posse for the purpose of
retaining Ludwig. They found him at his yet unfinished Neuschwanstein
castle. Their first attempt to capture him was thwarted when a group of
armed citizens confronted the commissioners at the castle gate. As more lo-
cal people gathered intent on protecting the king, the commissioners hustled
Ludwig into the gatehouse. Baroness Spera von Truchsess, a forty-seven
year-old woman, attacked the commissioners with her umbrella. A new
detachment of police arrived at four o’clock in the morning, and they dis-
persed the crowd. The commissioners bundled the king into a carriage and
drove him some ninety kilometers north to Berg Castle, a large but oth-
erwise unpretentious structure beside Lake Starnberg. There, Ludwig was
incarcerated. With the crown now vacant, Ludwig’s uncle, Prince Luitpold,
was appointed Prince Regent, ruler of Bavaria.
It should be noted that no member of Gudden’s committee had inter-
viewed His Majesty, and three of the four psychiatrists had never spoken
a word to him. Only Gudden had briefly encountered Ludwig, at a formal
reception some twelve years earlier. Nor had any representative of the king
been present to defend him. Nevertheless, on the word of the four com-
mittee members, King Ludwig was disposed of his throne and locked up.
Such was the power of German psychiatrists in the late nineteenth century.
Although the medical specialty of psychiatry was in its infancy, its prac-
titioners were already wielding the power long enjoyed by other medical
professionals.
Gudden was assigned to manage Ludwig’s psychiatric needs, so he spent
the night at the castle. With the stressful events of the preceding days now
behind him, Gudden looked forward to a short period of relaxation. Lake
Starnberg was – and still is – a beautiful place. With Munich within easy
reach by horse carriage, Gudden planned on dividing his time between Berg,
where he would look after Ludwig, and Munich, where he would attend to
his responsibilities at the university and the hospital.
On the morning following Gudden and Ludwig’s arrival at Berg castle,
the two men agreed to take a walk along the banks of the lake. Did the
doctor ask the patient, or was it the other way around? No one knows
59From the report, “Medical expertise on the mental condition of His Majesty the King,
Ludwig the Second of Bavaria,” June 8, 1886.
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for sure. Regardless, Gudden summoned one of his assistants, Dr. Franz
Müller, and told him of the plan. Müller asked Gudden if he could join
them, but Gudden said no, explaining that their patient was unstable and
fearful, possibly even paranoid. Since Ludwig did not know Müller, Gudden
thought it prudent to leave Müller behind. He told Müller that he and
Ludwig would return within two hours. Dr. Müller wished the professor
and the disposed king a pleasant walk, then watched as they disappeared
behind a strand of spruce trees.
Figure 7: Contemporary postcard depicting King Ludwig II and Bernhard
Gudden on their fateful walk beside Berg Castle. [Wolfgang
Sauber (Xenophon)]
A full two hours later, Ludwig and Gudden had not yet returned. When
four more hours had passed with still no sign of them, a search party was
dispatched. In heavy rain and howling wind, the men carried torches along
the dark shores of Lake Starnberg. They searched in vain for several hours
until one of the men found something interesting.
Rushing into the waist-deep water, they found the motionless bodies of
Dr. Bernhard Gudden and King Ludwig II. Autopsies performed a few days
later showed that Gudden had suffered a blow to the head, and there were
marks around his throat suggesting strangulation. Ludwig had no marks
and, strangely, no water in his lungs. What happened?
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The autopsy report led people to believe that Ludwig died of natural
causes, perhaps from a heart attack. But that was obviously not the case
with Gudden. Questions were raised. Was there a struggle? Did someone
murder Gudden? Did they murder Ludwig? Did Gudden die while trying
to stop his patient from committing suicide? In Munich, the cafes buzzed
with rumors and conspiracy theories. Some people said that Ludwig was
not actually dead but had fled to America with a large sum of money. A
local fisherman, who claimed to have witnessed the events, left a note before
his death describing the king’s attempt to escape, followed by gunshots fired
from the shore. According to this scenario, Gudden was killed because he
was a witness to the king’s murder. It is widely assumed that the autopsy
was fraudulent and the authorities tried to cover up evidence. True or not,
the cause of the tragedy at Lake Starnberg remains unknown to this day.
–//–
The ordinary citizens of Bavaria knew nothing of Gudden, but they
mourned the loss of their king. The psychiatrists, on the other hand,
were deeply affected by Gudden’s sudden death. Not only was Gudden a
respected leader, he was also well liked personally. His efficient hospital
management and humane treatment of patients were widely admired and
emulated. However, it was his mentorship of students that most affected
the development of psychiatry. He influenced them by what he taught as
well as by what he intentionally did not teach – as I will explain below.
Gudden worked at a time when the notion of mental illness as a brain
disorder was being hotly debated. It was a scientific hypothesis that Gud-
den believed to be true, and he demonstrated his commitment to it by
conducting his own neuroanatomical research. Although he was not alone
in doing so, few professors of psychiatry trained as many students and as-
sistants as did Gudden. Several of Gudden’s research collaborators became
prominent neuroanatomists in their own right. The flip side of Gudden’s de-
votion to anatomical science was that he ignored certain clinical issues that
weighed heavily on the minds of his fellow psychiatrists. Foremost among
these issues was the problem of diagnosis. Hospital wards everywhere held
a bewildering variety of psychiatric patients. It was no longer acceptable
to simply call them “mad”. In the medical climate of the late nineteenth
century, it was considered desirable (but not always necessary) to attach
a disease name to each patient’s suffering. Practicing psychiatrists found
this a daunting task because there were no good guides for distinguish-
ing between different mental disorders, especially since the disorders were
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poorly defined. The problem of disease identification was also linked to an-
other problem – how to represent all known mental illnesses in an orderly
classification that reflected their fundamental similarities and differences.
These two problems occupied the minds of many scholarly psychiatrists,
but Gudden blinded his eyes and shut his mouth to both. It would be
fair to assume that Kraepelin’s own passion for clinical psychiatry grew, at
least in part, from Gudden’s unapologetic disinterest.
As I have explained, Gudden is important for reasons other than discov-
ering new diseases or inventing better treatments. He did none of that.
Nor did he get involved in contemporary discussions about diagnosis and
classification He was a smart, capable man who could have done any of
that, but he chose not to. Instead, he concentrated on anatomical research.
His disregard for the intellectual challenges of clinical practice highlights
the disconnect between clinical and biological approaches that prevailed in
his day and that persists to a large extent today.
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Emil Kraepelin and Franz Nissl first met in Munich, probably in Gudden’s
neuroanatomy laboratory. Kraepelin was there examining reptilian brains,
but he soon gave it up in favor of clinical work. Nissl, on the other hand,
never left the lab. They tackled the mysteries of mental illness from different
directions and had little in common at the personal level, yet they bonded
strongly as colleagues and friends. Each found success in his own manner.
Nissl was born in Frankenthal on the banks of the Rhine River, in 1860.
A quiet town in the Grand Duchy of Baden, Frankenthal was renowned
for its elegant porcelain works – figurines, table wares, and the like. Baby
Franz came into the world with a large, purple-pink mark on the left side
of his face, and it never disappeared. It probably embarrassed him, and it
was possibly the key to Nissl’s awkward, sometimes brooding, personality.
The mark might even have been a factor in the family’s move to Freising,
close to Munich, when Franz was just two years old. As an adult, Nissl
habitually tilted his head in such a manner as to present the unblemished
side toward interlocutors and photographers.
Franz’s father, Theodor, worked as a middle school teacher. He was a
religious man with intellectual pretentions. Franz’s mother, Maria, had no
such fancy interests. She was a soft-spoken woman devoted to her children.
Theodor, however, was in full control, governing the family with a stern
hand, even wielding the hand in a disciplinary manner at times. Because
there was a chronic shortage of money, there was also friction and unhap-
piness, and that eventually brought Maria down with a case of “nervous
illness”. It was a nebulous diagnosis, often employed euphemistically to
mask a case of suspected insanity. Maria was sent to the mental asylum at
Illenau. Franz, then a young boy, visited her at the asylum on several oc-
casions, accompanied by his aunt. It was his first contact with psychiatry,
and likely formative. After several weeks of treatment with baths, Maria’s
condition improved, and she was released. However, when she later died,
Franz was left with no protector. Theodore’s new wife fared no better than
Maria, and she took out her frustrations on the children, treating them
coldly and singling out Franz’s younger sister, Susanna, for physical abuse.
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Figure 9: Emil Kraepelin, 1884.
Throughout these troubles, Theodor kept a close watch on Franz’s school-
ing. He insisted that Franz read widely in both the classical and con-
temporary literatures. He hounded Franz about his unruly behavior and
his disappointing school performances. Theodor was preparing Franz for
priesthood, but Franz resisted, countering that he wanted to be a doctor
and that he wanted to study in Berlin. An argument ensued, after which
Theodor consented to medicine, but emphatically protested against Berlin,
because Prussia was Protestant and the Nissls were Catholics. In the end,
Franz enrolled as a medical student at Munich’s Ludwig-Maximilians Uni-
versity.
Emil Kraepelin was four years older than Nissl. He came from a proudly
Prussian, bourgeois family that celebrated every Prussian military victory
and every expression of political influence. Kraepelin’s father, Karl, was a
music teacher, actor and occasional opera singer. Unlike Nissl’s father, Karl
left his youngest son to his own devises. After schooling in his hometown
of Neustrelitz, Emil did his compulsory military service. He then studied
medicine in Leipzig and Würzburg before taking his first professional job at
Gudden’s hospital. He was a robust-looking man with penetrating brown
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eyes, thick eyebrows and a furrowed brow. In manners, he was cool and
reserved.
Growing up as a young boy, Kraepelin spent many happy days together
with his brother Karl, who bore the same name as their father. Karl was
ten years older than Emil and set on becoming a botanist. He already knew
the names of all the plants and trees in the nearby woods, and he delighted
in showing off his knowledge to his younger brother. At home, Karl fired
Emil’s imagination by telling him stories of wild animals in faraway places.
He also performed tricks with chemicals, such as changing the color of
crushed buckthorn berries from dark purple to red by adding lemon juice
or, alternatively, changing the color to green by adding baking soda. Karl
even tried to explain Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. In sum, Karl
showed Emil how to view nature through the lens of science. Seeing the
natural world as orderly and understandable was to become the guiding
principle of Kraepelin’s psychiatry.
Nissl was a southerner, a Bavarian Catholic. Kraepelin was a Protes-
tant from northeastern Prussia. Nissl and Kraepelin were close colleagues,
but they had very different personalities. Kraepelin was confident, strong-
willed and decisive; Nissl was playful, self-doubting and lacking in polished
manners. Kraepelin was also consistently well dressed, whereas Nissl was
indifferent to fashion. Unlike in so many respects, one thing they had in
common was the pain of estrangement from their fathers. In each case, it
happened near the start of their medical studies. Kraepelin’s father left
his family to indulge in theatre and booze, while Nissl’s father abandoned
Franz on account of what he perceived as Franz’s incorrigible liberality.
Another thing they shared was the habit of hard work.
Kraepelin and Nissl met sometime in 1881. Kraepelin was an assistant
physician at the Upper Bavaria District Mental Hospital, and Nissl was a
medical student. In the following year, Kraepelin went to Leipzig, but he
returned to Munich one year later. By that time, Nissl was in his final year
of medical studies, but spending most of his time at Schloss Fürstenried
looking after Otto, the king’s insane brother.
Kraepelin became keenly aware of his younger acquaintance when it was
announced that Nissl had won a prize for the best student thesis. It was
a prize awarded by Gudden, who was now Dean of Medicine. Although
Nissl was to continue his anatomical research for another thirty-five years,
scientists know him today mostly for the work described in that student
paper. It was research on the brain, but it stemmed directly from Robert
Koch’s research on bacteria. Why that was the case, requires explanation.
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Koch was a physician who served as a surgeon in the Franco-Prussian war.
After the war, while working in the German province of Posen (now part
of Poland), he set up a research laboratory and taught himself how to grow
colonies of bacteria. As a result, he was able to isolate the bacterium that
causes tuberculosis. It was a breakthrough discovery, because tuberculosis
was a major health concern at the time, responsible for one of every seven
deaths in Germany. Koch announced his discovery at a meeting of the
German Physiological Society in Berlin, on March 24, 1882. It was attended
by thirty-six men, including the esteemed Rudolf Virchow, master of cell
biology. Koch’s lecture was published seventeen days later in the Berliner
Klinische Wochenschrift (Berlin Clinical Weekly).
I began my investigations, using material in which the infec-
tive organism would surely be expected, as for example in fresh
growing grey tubercles from the lungs of animals which had died
three to four weeks after infection ... Earlier observations hav-
ing shown that in certain cases the deepest staining and clearest
differentiation of bacteria from surrounding tissues were yielded
by the use of the alkaline reaction, advantage was taken of this
fact.60
Koch’s description of his methods pointed to the “alkaline reaction” as
the key to his success, and it would likewise become the key to Nissl’s suc-
cess. The chemical process to which Koch referred was a chance discovery,
made three decades earlier by an English teenager named William Perkin.
The boy had been encouraged by his teacher at the Royal College of Chem-
istry to experiment with coal tar to see if he could use it to make quinine.
Perkins took up the challenge in his own laboratory located in the family
home. Since quinine was needed for the treatment of malaria, there was
money to be made from a cheap source. Making it from coal tar, however,
was a dangerous business, because Perkin needed a substance called aniline,
which had to be separated from benzene, a known explosive.
At one point, while working to obtain aniline, Perkin found that he had
produced a black goo. Trying to purify it - or perhaps just trying to clean
up - he added some “spirits of wine”, which turned the substance a purplish
color. Perkin dipped a piece of silk into the thick liquid and watched as the
cloth turned brilliantly purple. Remarkably, the color did not wash out,
60Alex Sakula, “Robert Koch: Centenary of the discovery of the tubercle Bacillus, 1882,”
Canadian Veterinary Journal 24:127-131 (1983), p. 128.
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nor did it fade in sunlight. In short, Perkin’s experiments had yielded a
synthetic dye that was attractive, easy to make and cheap. Moreover, it
turned out that dyes of many different colors could be produced by making
small changes in the chemical process. From that day forward, clothing
manufacturers no longer had to rely on plant and animal dyes.
Robert Koch realized that aniline dyes might be useful for staining bi-
ological tissues, so he purchased a small quantity of methylene blue from
Friedrich Bayer, the owner of a small chemical company that later sold
billions of aspirin pills. The results were spectacular. Since the dyes are al-
kaline, they stick to acidic bacteria, and Koch’s tubercular bacteria showed
up blue. Shortly after Koch’s discovery, his talented assistant, Paul Ehrlich,
used a different aniline dye, magenta, and got even better results. Magenta
gave the bacteria a bright purple-pink color. Ehrlich enhanced the effect by
staining the non-bacterial tissue with aniline yellow and heating the slides.
Learning of Koch’s and Ehrlich’s successes in staining bacterial cells,
Nissl realized that those same aniline dyes might work equally well with
brain cells. He chose to experiment first with Ehrlich’s magenta dye. In
the beginning he used animal brains, but later, during an eight-month
period of intensive work, he stained more than one hundred human brains.
Results from initial trials were disappointing. The nerve cells were only
faintly colored, and they faded with time. A legend tells of Nissl watching
a colleague throw microscope slides into a sink full of soapy water before
cleaning them. Somehow, Nissl got the idea of adding Venetian soap to
his staining solution et voila! – those slides did not fade. The results were
stunning and unprecedented. In contrast to other methods, which stained
only slightly, Nissl’s method left every nerve cell vividly colored. Moreover,
Nissl’s method revealed certain structures lying inside the cells that no
anatomist had ever seen before.
Nissl immediately recognized the nucleus and, within it, the smaller,
darkly stained nucleolus. Looking more closely, he noticed something un-
usual. Clustered around the nucleus, in every cell, were many tiny parti-
cles. At first, Nissl did not know what to make of them. He was skeptical,
thinking they could be artifacts, but what he saw was real. Today, we
know these particles as the rough endoplasmic reticulum, also called Nissl
bodies or Nissl granules. These organelles contain large amounts of RNA,
the substance that directs the making of proteins. Similarly, the nucleo-
lus contains large amounts of DNA, which holds the body’s genetic code.
Since RNA and DNA are both acidic, and aniline dyes react strongly with
acidic structures, Nissl’s method worked especially well for highlighting the
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Figure 10: Nerve cells stained and photographed by Franz Nissl. Image no.
1 is a healthy cell, all others are from a patient with progressive
paralysis of the insane. [Kraepelin’s textbook, 1899]
endoplasmic reticulum and the nucleolus. Nissl knew nothing about RNA
or DNA, but he did imagine that the small structures now visible in his
microscope might hold clues to the cause of mental illness.
Kraepelin, along with everyone else, thought Nissl’s slides were mar-
velous. He surely noticed, though, that the pink color of the stained nerve
cells perfectly matched the color of the blemish on the left side of his friend’s
face.
Nissl, of course, was delighted with Gudden’s prize. It was the ticket to
his future career as a neuroanatomist. And yet, he could not quench his
doubts. Did the cells really look like that in the living brain? Could he be
certain that the much-talked about clusters of particles were not artifacts
of the chemical technique? Also concerning were comments that he had
overhead referring to poor writing in his report. Some people thought it
unreadable. Others found fault with his methods. Whether he anticipated
such a reaction, or whether he was simply expressing his own doubts, he
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proclaimed at the very beginning of the report, that “the stamp of incom-
pleteness, of unfinishedness, is present on every page.”
Nissl’s thesis was titled, Results and Experience in the Investigation of
Pathological Changes in Nerve Cells of the Cerebral Cortex. Regardless,
most of the pathology described in the thesis related not to nerve cells,
but to blood vessels and glia cells, the latter being a type of non-neuronal,
supportive cell common in the brain. As well, nothing was clearly linked
to mental illness, because Nissl provided no information about the patients
whose brains he examined. While most of the specimens probably came
from patients who had died with progressive paralysis, but there must have
been brains from patients with other mental illness, and possibly some who
had died of physical illnesses or old age.
Nissl became fixated on aniline dyes and used them almost exclusively
for the remainder of his career. Sadly, though, he never found what he
was looking for – abnormalities in the structure of nerve cells that could be
definitively associated with mental illness. Modern neuroanatomists still
use aniline dyes, or “Nissl stains” as they are called. They also have newer
stains and sophisticated techniques for examining cellular inclusions. How-
ever, neither Nissl bodies nor any other intracellular structure has yet been
found to correlate with any mental illness. The neuroanatomical correlates
of psychiatric illness lie more in the structure of neuronal fibers, which were
invisible with Nissl’s stain.
Robert Koch and Paul Ehrlich won Nobel Prizes (at different times and
for different works), but Franz Nissl won no more prizes after the one given
to him by his mentor, Bernhard Gudden. Viewed in their totality, Nissl’s
anatomical accomplishments were not nearly as important as Emil Krae-
pelin’s clinical insights, but Nissl’s story is also the story of neuroscience in
its early days, and neuroscience ultimately became as relevant to psychiatry
as clinical observation.
–//–
While Nissl was settling into his career as an anatomically-minded psychia-
trist, Kraepelin was headed down a different path. His was a broader, more
intellectual vision of psychiatry. Keenly aware of the scientific revolution
happening around him, he wanted to be part of it – not as a laboratory
researcher, but as a clinician and an academic. Already at age twenty-two,
he set himself the goal of becoming a professor by the age of thirty. As
things turned out, he was two months late.
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Kraepelin states in his Memoirs that he stopped studying reptile brains
because he had a visual defect that prevented him from seeing clearly
through a microscope. Whatever the reason, it was a wise decision, the
proper one for a man with ambition. Kraepelin tackled some of the biggest
issues then besetting psychiatry, and he brought them to ground, even if
he did not forever quiet them.
He prepared for his life’s work by reading the textbooks of Pinel, Esquirol
and Heinroth. He bought into Griesinger’s argument that mental illnesses
must, somehow, be brain illnesses, but he doubted that neuroanatomy could
provide all the answers. He reckoned that there was more to mental illness
than brain pathology alone. Consequently, he thought a lot about the mind
(der Geist); he thought much less about either the soul (die Seele) or the
brain.
One can only imagine Kraepelin’s excitement in the early days of his
work at the Munich hospital. Walking through the wards accompanied
by his supervisor Gudden, he would have encountered the full gamut of
psychiatric illness. Many years later, Kraepelin recounted the experience,
The confusing throng of demented, sometimes unapproachable,
sometimes obtrusive patients, with their ridiculous or repellent,
pitiable or dangerous oddities, the futility of the medical treat-
ment, which was usually limited to salutations and the clumsiest
bodily care, the complete helplessness against these types of in-
sanity, for which there is no scientific explanation, made me feel
the entire rigor of my chosen profession.61
These vivid impressions inspired a desire to learn more about individual
patients, to gain insights into their bizarre behaviors, and to understand
their differences. Although it may have seemed at times that every pa-
tient was unique, Kraepelin knew that there were names for some of the
conditions – mania, melancholia, dementia and so on – even if he did not
really understand what those terms meant. The descriptions, or diagnoses
as some would call them, were imprecise and inconsistent from author to
author. Were they fundamentally different disorders, even actual diseases,
or were they just shorthand summaries of signs and symptoms? Kraepelin,
the psychiatrist, retained the teachings of his brother regarding all the dif-
ferent plant and animal species dwelling in the forest. He realized that
psychiatry had a long ways to go before joining botany and zoology as a
61E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 11.
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scientific discipline. Whereas those other fields had long ago identified their
types, psychiatry had yet to do so.
Not only did he fail to find guidance in the older textbooks, he was
also disappointed to learn that Gudden had little interest in matters per-
taining to diagnosis. Apart from administering the hospital and providing
basic medical training, Gudden’s attentions were focused on neuroanatomy.
Maybe he found clinical issues too fuzzy. Maybe he preferred working with
his hands over delving into arcane texts. Whatever was the case, his disre-
gard for diagnosis, let alone classification, was obvious in the way that he
taught his students. Kraepelin captured the essence of Gudden’s attitude
in this memory,
The doctors from the wards were often quite surprised about the
disclosures their patients made during the clinical instruction.
However, after explaining the individual case, Gudden made
no attempt to make any general clinical observations. He only
really made one single diagnosis with certainty, namely that of
paralysis [progressive paralysis of the insane], which he based on
physical symptoms. He doubted and did not accept attempts
to define other clinical syndromes or to trace the fine differences
in the mental behavior; he avoided any questions in this context
and repeated the answer, ‘I do not know’. He preferred to leave
such problems to the ‘sublime beings’.62
Kraepelin must have found Gudden’s attitude puzzling, but equally, as
an ambitious man of science, he must have recognized the opportunity.
If not Gudden, then why not himself to untangle the mess of psychiatric
diagnosis? For that purpose, however, he needed to become a professor,
for only as a professor could he hope to obtain resources sufficient for his
purposes. Every university in Germany had but one professor of psychiatry,
and he (always a man) automatically became director of the university’s
clinic. The twin positions provided a constant supply of patients, student
researchers and professional assistants, all of whom Kraepelin would need
to achieve his goals.
When Kraepelin finally did get his first professorship, at Dorpat (now
the city of Tartu in Estonia), he was asked to give an inaugural speech. It
was, for him, a special occasion and he took the opportunity to speak freely
about the kind of psychiatry that he wanted to pursue as a doctor-scientist.
62E. Kraepelin (1987), pp. 13-14.
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He began with an honest appraisal of psychiatry’s current status. “If
one surveys the various medical disciplines,” he said, “it is surprising to
find that nowhere are the directions of research so many and so varied
as in psychiatry – a discipline which doubtless has the lowest academic
standing.”63 In his opinion, the main difficulty lay in the “impossibility of a
satisfactory solution to the fundamental psycho-physical problem.” He said
that mental illnesses are not brain diseases in the sense that physiological
events cause mental events. Rather, in his view, physiological events and
mental events occur independently, in parallel, with no causation in either
direction.
He denounced “näıve materialism” and declared that a full understand-
ing of psychological phenomena would never be achieved by investigations
limited to anatomy, physiology and pathology. And, he bluntly stated that
no significant advances in understanding mental illness had yet come from
any of those approaches. “Although we are able to make at least some
sense of the disease processes in the brains of paralytics, we most certainly
lack hard facts about insanity, and no less about melancholy and mania.”
While agreeing that brain science might someday be useful to psychiatry,
he stressed the need for a “proven relationship between a simple and un-
equivocal observation of anatomical pathology and an equally simple and
unequivocal observation of psychological pathology.”
In this last assertion, Kraepelin echoed the skepticism of Karl Kahlbaum,
an asylum psychiatrist from an earlier generation. Kahlbaum was a solemn,
pedantic man whose theoretical contributions were not fully appreciated
until long after his death. Kraepelin, in particular, borrowed many ideas
from him. Around the time that Gudden and Griesinger were beating their
drums for brain anatomy, Kahlbaum wrote these cautionary words about
the potential of neuropathology,
This work has produced much valuable material but contributed
nothing to the basic views on the origin of mental illness or
on the anatomical locus of their diverse and significant mani-
festations; the view is now spreading that only comprehensive
clinical observation of cases can bring order and clarity into
the material ... It has now been recognized that it is futile to
search for an anatomy of melancholy or mania, etc. because
each of these forms occurs under the most varied relationships
63The quoted passages are taken, with minor editing, from the English translation of
Kraepelin’s lecture. Eric J. Engstrom, History of Psychiatry 16:350-364 (2005).
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and combinations with other states, and they are just as little
the expressions of an inner pathological process as the complex
of symptoms called fever.64
Kraepelin concurred in Kahlbaum’s tempered view of neuroscience. How-
ever, he was fudging his bets, because he would soon hire Franz Nissl to
work on precisely the same problems that Kahlbaum had denounced.
After finishing his introductory remarks, Kraepelin spoke at length about
his self-declared main interest, clinical diagnosis. He pointed out what
must have been obvious to at least some in the audience, namely, that the
categories of disease currently in use were inexact and confusing. Then,
in a statement that straight went to the heart of his approach, he said,
“Psychiatrists are unable to locate the essential and characteristic aspects of
an individual case because they are lost in a labyrinth of clinical symptoms.”
His use of the phrase, “essential and characteristic aspects”, is significant
and was no doubt intentional. Ever since Plato and Aristotle, western
philosophy had entertained the proposition that every kind of thing has its
essence, a set of properties that make that thing what it is. For example, one
can say that the essence of silver lies in its molecular structure. Knowing
this, we can predict the temperature at which silver melts, its hardness, et
cetera. The same can be said for giraffes. Their essence is long legs, a long
neck and patchy coat coloring. Any individual animal that one would wish
to call a giraffe, must possess these essential features. Kraepelin believed
that mental illnesses also had their essences, and that they lay deeper than
superficial symptoms.
Next, Kraepelin again dismissed what he called the auxiliary disciplines
of psychiatry, namely, chemistry, neuroanatomy and pathology. “None of
them,“ he said, ”is directed at what should be the common goal, namely
the clinical study of mental disorders, or the empirical determination of in-
dividual forms of madness according to their cause, course and conclusion
[italics in original].” He urged his fellow physicians to seek out and identify
those “natural symptom clusters” which are the true pathological expres-
sions of psychological processes. “Psychiatrists should not be allowed to
duck the responsibility of describing mental processes and conditions in a
manner consistent with the science of psychology.”
By these statements, Kraepelin voiced his conviction that psychological
insights, rather than anatomical or physiological data, would provide the
64Karl. K. Kahlbaum, Catatonia. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University (1874, 1973),
p. 2.
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keys to clinical diagnosis. From that day forward, he put aside not only
neuroanatomy, but also skull measurements, blood pressure measurements,
biochemistry and other conventional medical tools. He did not completely
neglect them, but they became of secondary importance. For, Kraepelin,
the key to a deeper psychiatry lay in clinical observation and psychological
research.
At the close of the Dorpat lecture, Kraepelin put all his comments into
perspective and ended on an optimistic note,
For the time being, it will be clinical observation in the strict
sense of the word from which we can expect tangible progress in
our scientific knowledge. But over the subsequent course of our
development there will come a point in time when clinical obser-
vation alone will no longer satisfy our scientific aspirations. At
that point, the ephemeral disputes between individual research
directions will dissolve into mutual support and assistance, and
all the divergent paths will again converge on one another in




Kraepelin described himself as a “pure psychiatrist with psychological ten-
dencies,” which is apt in light of the projects that he undertook in the early
years of his professional life. First, there was clinical work to discover the
“essences” of mental diseases, and second, psychological research to expose
the “inner pathological processes” characteristic of those diseases. These
were ambitious projects even for a man of prodigious energy, and success
was not assured.
Kraepelin used an interesting phrase in his Dorpat lecture, when he men-
tioned the “science of psychology”. The word psychology, like psychiatry,
comes from the Latin Psyche, which corresponds to mind. Psychology,
then, is the study of mind. In speaking of the “science of psychology”,
Kraepelin was literally talking about “the science of the study of the mind.”
He no doubt felt it necessary to emphasize that psychology is a science.
Speaking as he did in the year 1886, psychology had been scientific for less
than ten years.
People must have studied minds – their own as well as other people’s
– ever since the origin of the human species, or at least since we got our
minds. The reason we got them in the first place was for self-reflection
and to aid us in navigating our social environments. Intellectuals have
written about the mind for centuries. It was called philosophy. Psychology
as a distinct field entered the picture only in the early nineteenth century,
when commentators began using such terms as “lawful” and “scientific” in
relation to mental events. Some authors put forth serious proposals about
how experience shapes thoughts. But psychology was still being done while
sitting in a soft chair, curved tobacco pipe in hand. It lacked two essential
features of scientific activity: experiments and numbers. Emmanuel Kant,
probably the most influential philosopher of the eighteenth century, had
insisted that the mind could not possibly be studied with mathematics.
Pushing Kant aside, physiologists (not psychologists) around the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century started using quantitative methods in their
investigations of vision, hearing and other senses. Psychologists were inter-
ested in that work, but they claimed a distinction between sensations and
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perceptions. Sensations are immediate and raw, they said, products of the
physical brain. Therefore, sensations could be studied physiologically. Per-
ceptions, on the other hand, are interpretive and come from the intangible
mind. Since the mind functions in a manner totally unlike the brain, it is
beyond the reach of any experimentalist.
A discovery by the physiologist, Hermann von Helmholtz, a former stu-
dent of Johannes Müller, changed all of that. In 1849, Helmholtz startled
everyone by announcing that he had measured the speed at which electrical
signals (action potentials) travel in the nervous system. It was not absurdly
fast, as many had believed, but rather, at the comfortable rate of about
thirty meters per second (in the frog’s sciatic nerve). Suddenly, it became
imaginable that perception, and perhaps other psychological phenomena,
might be measurable after all.
Next came Ernst Weber and Gustav Fechner, a teacher-student pair
working at the University of Leipzig. They wondered if it would be possible
to measure perceptions. They set up experiments in which, for example,
several stones of known weights were successively placed in a subject’s hand.
Suppose the first stone weighed one pound. The subject might say that it
felt light, and when pressed to give the perception a numerical value, she
might say (arbitrarily), “two”. Now, a weight of four pounds was placed in
her hand. After comparing the second weight with the first – in her head
– she described the second weight as two and one-half times heavier than
the first, or five on the arbitrary scale. The surprising result came when
she was presented with a sixteen pound stone and reported that this third
stone again seemed two and one-half times heavier than the second stone.
Thus, despite the fact that the third stone was physically sixteen times
heavier than first stone (16 pounds versus 1 pound), the subjective weight
had increased only six and a quarter times (12.5 versus 2.0).
From experiments like the foregoing, Weber and Fechner devised a
psycho-physical law which says that the strength of a subjective sensation
is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus intensity, not the linear ra-
tio, as one might naively assume. The Weber-Fechner law has been tested
numerous times and it is remarkably accurate, not just for weights but
also for sounds and lights. Suddenly, psychology had become quantitative.
Moreover, it had been demonstrated that genuine experiments were as
doable in psychology as in any other scientific discipline.
Although Weber and Fechner get credit for those milestone experiments,
the man most responsible for establishing the “science of psychology” was
Wilhelm Wundt, and it was to Wundt’s laboratory that Emil Kraepelin
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went to learn about psychological experimentation. Going there was a
bold decision. It would have been bold for any man at the beginning of his
career, because the future of experimental psychology was uncertain, but
for a psychiatrist, it was unprecedented.
Kraepelin had been working in Munich as assistant physician under Bern-
hard Gudden. In 1882, he left to be tutored by Wilhelm Wundt. It was a
dream come true for Kraepelin, who had first learned of Wundt’s work while
in university. There, he had read a series of articles published under the
title, “On the Souls of Humans and Animals”. Later, after reading Wundt’s
Principles of Physiological Psychology, published in 1874, Kraepelin knew
that he would eventually study with him.
Wundt was a professor at the University of Leipzig. Born into an aca-
demic family, he presumably learned from his parents the two keys to a
successful academic career: write well and publish often. In both respects
Wundt lived up to his parents’ expectations. By the end of his long ca-
reer he had written at least twenty-five books, many of which came out
in multiple volumes and successive editions. He was a soft-spoken, kindly
man possessed of enormous energy and creativity. In photographs, his long
beard, wire-rimmed spectacles and soft eyes speak of a quiet dignity.
Figure 11: Wilhelm Wundt, 1902.
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Wundt’s Principles of Physiological Psychology is a large, impressive
work that contains much description of nervous system structure and func-
tion. More interesting for the modern reader is the Introduction, in which
Wundt spells out his overall agenda. Lacking neither hesitation nor mod-
esty, he declares in the very first sentence, “The work which I here present
to the public is an attempt to mark out a new domain of science.”65 He goes
on to say that “psychology ... seeks to give an account of the interconnexion
of processes which are evinced by our own consciousness.”
Although interested in consciousness, Wundt rejected introspection, the
investigative method favored by most of his fellow psychologists. Introspec-
tion, he said, leads to distorted conclusions because the observer and the
observed are united in the same person. By contrast, “The great impor-
tance of the experimental method ... lies not simply in the fact that ... it
enables us arbitrarily to vary the conditions of our observations, but also
and essentially in the further fact that it makes observation itself possible.”
Wundt also rejected the faculties of mind concept advanced by Aristo-
tle and Kant. For him, “The uselessness of the faculty-concepts is almost
universally conceded.” Instead, he thought of the mind as a collection
of “processes”, where each process is responsible for performing a specific
task. “There is, to be sure, no special faculty of ideation or feeling or vo-
lition; but the individual idea, the individual affective [emotional] process,
and the individual voluntary act are looked upon as independent processes,
connecting with one another and separating from one another as circum-
stances determine.” The job of the experimental psychologist was to study
the processes one by one, each in isolation from the others. Inspired by
the physiologists, he chose to study the processes involved in sensation and
perception.
Wundt established the Institute for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig
University in 1879. Equipped with the very best instruments and headed
by a charismatic leader, it quickly drew young men from around the world.
There were philosophers, school teachers, managers and psychologists from
many different backgrounds, but only one doctor, Kraepelin.
Kraepelin’s decision to move to Leipzig was all the more impressive for
the precarious circumstances of his career at that time. He was attracted
almost equally to psychiatry and psychology. In which field should he
specialize? His decision to leave Munich for Leipzig sprang from a notion
65Quotes here and below from Wilhelm Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology ,
5th ed., translated by E. B. Titchener. London, Swan Sonnenschein (1902, 1910), pp.
v, 1, 5, 19-20.
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of what might be an ideal professional life. He would work as a psychiatrist
to earn a comfortable income, but concurrently work as a professor at a
university so that he could pursue his scientific work. For the plan to
succeed, however, he would need the Habilitation, an advanced certification
required of all high-level university appointees.
Candidates for the Habilitation had to submit a lengthy research-based
dissertation, evidence of additional scholarly works and letters of recom-
mendation. The final test was an oral presentation. Kraepelin wrote to
Wundt asking him if he would supervise research that could form the basis
of his Habilitation. Wundt wrote back saying that he would be happy to do
so, but he could only provide a half-salary. Fortunately for Kraepelin, one
of Wundt’s colleagues, a doctor named Paul Flechsig, offered Kraepelin a
part time job as his medical assistant. It looked like the perfect situation
– allowing Kraepelin to pursue his psychiatric work and his scientific work
– but it ended badly.
In the period of Kraepelin’s stay at the Institute, Wundt was busy mea-
suring sensory reaction times, meaning the minimum time required for a
subject to press a button after seeing something or hearing something. Ear-
lier, he had discovered that the delay for a simple reaction is longer than
the time required for a nervous impulse to travel “up” from a sense organ
to the brain and then “down” to a reacting muscle. He concluded from
this fact that a large portion of the total reaction time must be due to
processes occurring within the central nervous system – mental processes,
as he understood them.
Meanwhile, a Dutchman, Franciscus Donders, had come up with a clever
way of determining exactly how much time is consumed by a single mental
process, specifically with respect to those processes active during reactions.
In one such experiment, Donders had his subjects perform two types of
reactions, one in which the subject was instructed to respond as quickly
as possible after seeing or hearing a stimulus, and a second type in which
the subject had to choose between different stimuli before responding. By
subtracting the time for the simple reaction from the time for the more
complex reaction, Donders was able to measure the time elapsed during
the mental process of sensory discrimination. The method became known
as “mental chronometry”.
Wundt thought that the instrument Donders was using for recording
reaction times was clumsy and maybe inaccurate, so he asked a master
craftsman to build a better one. Soon he had an instrument that was
accurate to one thousandth of a second; he called it the chronoscope. With
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Figure 12: Wundt’s reaction time apparatus. F, auditory stimulus; W, see-
saw switch; C, Kontrollhammer; H, Hipp chronoscope; R, rheo-
stat; U, response key. [W. Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologi-
schen Psychologie, 5th ed., v. 3, 1902-03]
this excellent instrument in hand, and cognizant of Donders’ successes,
Wundt designed experiments to study various mental processes, including
sensory recognition, acts of will and decision making.
In one such experiment, he determined the time required for completing
tasks that varied in their complexity. For this, he had his subjects listen to
recognizable sounds. In early trials, they listened to just one sound, later a
few, and eventually many sounds. After the sound(s) stopped, Wundt asked
the subjects to identify the sound(s) that they had heard. Not surprisingly,
the more sounds the subject heard, the longer the time required to name
them. He also studied word associations. After pronouncing a single word,
he asked his subjects to signal the moment when he or she thought of
a second word that was somehow associated with the first word. One
student at the institute tested a large number of subjects, finding that the
time required to make an association ranged between 707 thousandths of a
second and 874 thousandths of a second.
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While Wundt instructed Kraepelin in the goals and methods of experi-
mental psychology, he also spoke to his student about the nature of mind
and its relation to the brain. Most Europeans accepted Descartes’ con-
cept of the mind as a kind of “substance”. They also followed Descartes in
believed that the mind and the brain interact in a reciprocal, causative man-
ner. Some intellectuals, however, held to other concepts of mind. Wundt
believed in parallelism, a mind-body philosophy adopted, with modifica-
tions, from earlier German philosophers. In Wundt’s philosophy, there is
always a correlation between mental phenomena and physical (brain) phe-
nomena, but not necessarily a causation, either from brain to mind or vice
versa. Wundt did not discuss whether the mind is spiritual, substantive,
or something else. His philosophy was intended only as an aid to the inter-
pretation of his experimental results. Kraepelin bought into this point of
view, but unlike Wundt, who did not hesitate to expound on “psychophysi-
cal parallelism”, Kraepelin seldom wandered far from the laboratory or the
clinic.
Wundt asked Kraepelin what kinds of experiments he would like to do.
Given Kraepelin’s dual interests in psychology and psychiatry, and know-
ing that he believed in psychological pathology, Wundt no doubt expected
Kraepelin to conduct experiments comparing reaction times in patients and
healthy subjects. As it turned out, Kraepelin did not do any experiments
of that type until several years later, and the results were disappointing.
He found that the reaction times of manic patients and aphasic (language
impaired) patients were longer and more variable than those of healthy sub-
jects. From those results, he drew the fuzzy conclusion that “the flight of
ideas [characteristic of manic patients] was not the accelerated consequence
of mental images, but of volatile and unstable emerging processes in the
conscience.”66
Rather than looking at patient reaction times, Kraepelin told Wundt that
he wanted to study how drugs affect reaction times in healthy subjects. The
idea was to simulate the mental processes of psychiatric illness. He spoke
about the possibility of model psychoses, mental states similar to those of a
psychiatric illness, but pharmacologically induced in healthy subjects. He
would measure the drug effects under controlled conditions using Wundt’s
scientific methods. Wundt consented to Kraepelin’s proposal. Aware of
the novelty of his plan, which was indeed a new field of medical/scientific
investigation, Kraepelin coined the term, pharmacopsychology. It is known
today by the same term, but in reverse: psychopharmacology.
66E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 44.
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Kraepelin chose to begin with alcohol. Later, after moving to Dorpat,
he would test other drugs including tea, amyl nitrite, chloral hydrate, chlo-
roform, ethyl ether and morphine. His subjects performed simple visual
and auditory reactions, first before they had drunk any alcohol, and then
again after drinking alcohol in different concentrations. The experimental
design was simple, but the results were inconsistent. As the experiments
proceeded, Kraepelin became concerned about possible problems. He re-
alized, for example, that he might be biasing the results by testing the
subjects with drinks that were progressively stronger, so he mixed up the
order of the alcoholic solutions. He also added raspberry syrup to the so-
lutions to improve their taste. And, curious as to whether the reaction
times might be affected by the carbonic acid present in the drinks or by
the feeling of a full-stomach, he performed a few experiments substitut-
ing carbonated water for alcohol. This last innovation may have marked
the first use of a placebo control in pharmacological research. In total,
he completed forty-seven experiments using four subjects, one of whom
was himself. Summarizing these experiments, Kraepelin wrote that alcohol
produced
... a slowing of intellectual processes with very fast onset and
relatively slow remission ... a simultaneous facilitation of move-
ment initiation appeared that lasted for a maximum of 20-30
min and was followed by an aggravation in the same domain.
Higher doses caused an earlier onset and more extended occur-
rence of impairment, also in the motor domain. The [author]
deduces from these experimental experiences the well-known
picture of acute alcohol intoxication in all details and demon-
strates how alterations in associative processes, the occurrence
of stereotypes, sound associations, and insinuations of flight of
ideas can be interpreted as motor excitements.67
Forsaking quantitative analysis almost entirely, Kraepelin based his con-
clusions mostly on his own experiences as one of the subjects. He was
honest enough to acknowledge the extremely high variability of reaction
times, writing,
I was then not yet aware of the amount and irregularity of nor-
mal fluctuations in long-lasting psychometric experiments and
67U. Müller, P.C. Fletcher and H. Steinberg, “The origin of pharmacopsychology: Emil
Kraepelin’s experiments in Leipzig, Dorpat and Heidelberg (1882-1892),” Psychophar-
macology 184:131-138 (2006), p. 133.
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therefore did not take the necessary precaution. Consequently,
we have to admit that some alterations of reaction times related
to alcohol might be independent from the drug and caused by
different influences.68
All things considered, it would be fair to conclude that nothing of lasting
value came from these particular experiments.
After finishing with alcohol, Kraepelin prepared to move on to other
drugs that might better mimic the effects of psychiatric illness, but one of
his employers intervened before he could get started. Evidently Professor
Flechsig, who was paying one-half of Kraepelin’s salary, had a history with
Professor Gudden. A few years earlier, Flechsig had visited Gudden’s neu-
roanatomy laboratory in Munich. Following the visit, Gudden learned that
Flechsig had published a paper using some of Gudden’s microscope slides,
but without obtaining Gudden’s permission. They were slides showing the
precise origins of the corticospinal tract, and it was Gudden’s discovery, not
Flechsig’s. Gudden expressed his displeasure at the time, and now Flechsig
acted as though he was taking out his bitterness over the incident by fir-
ing Gudden’s student, Kraepelin. After telling Kraepelin that he would be
away for a fortnight, he remarked that he was leaving the lab in someone
else’s hands because he found Kraepelin unreliable. Ouch! Besides hold-
ing a grudge against Gudden, Flechsig may also have resented Kraepelin
spending so much time in Wundt’s psychology laboratory, when he should
have been working in Flechsig’s medical clinic.
The situation might have proven disastrous for Kraepelin had he not
been determined to get his Habilitation. He dipped into his savings, ob-
tained a part-time job in a neurology clinic, and persuaded Wundt to offer
a larger stipend. With his financial security restored, Kraepelin completed
the dissertation based on his experimental research. As well, he put to-
gether a collection of scholarly essays that he had written on topics as
diverse as criminal psychology, ethics, aesthetics and humor. All he needed
now for the Habilitation was letters of recommendation. Fearing Flechsig,
he instead asked Wilhelm Wundt and Bernhard Gudden to vouch for him,
and they submitted sterling endorsements. In due course, the Minister
of Culture announced that Kraepelin had been granted the Habilitation.
Everyone – with the possible exception of Flechsig – was pleased to hear it.
Once again, Kraepelin confronted a difficult career choice. He had en-
visaged a dual career as professor of psychology and head of an asylum
68U. Müller, P.C. Fletcher and H. Steinberg (2006), p. 135.
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or clinic, but he now realized the impracticality of that plan. So, again
the question, psychology or psychiatry? He was enthralled with experi-
mental psychology and happy in the university environment. But, the low
salaries paid to young professors would hardly allow him to marry and
start a family. Psychiatrists were handsomely paid by comparison, and the
jobs were generally secure, but the drawback here was that jobs in psy-
chiatry were hard to find. In the midst of this personal dilemma, Wundt
opportunely stepped in to offer advice as scientific mentor and surrogate
father. He told Kraepelin that experimental psychology had not yet taken
hold in academia, and that jobs in that particular field were, in fact, quite
scarce. Arguing that psychiatry offered better opportunities, Wundt urged
Kraepelin to look for a suitable position in that field.
Thrust into professional limbo, Kraepelin returned to Munich and again
worked as an assistant physician in Gudden’s hospital. (It was then that he
learned of Nissl’s prize for anatomical research.) After one year in Munich,
he went to the city of Leubus, in the province of Silesia, now part of Poland.
There, he worked as senior physician at a small asylum. The clinical work
was light enough for him to complete some psychological experiments, so he
extended his work on word associations and studied reaction times at dif-
ferent times of day. Confident now with respect to his finances, he married
his childhood sweetheart, Ina. The ceremony took place in the Prussian vil-
lage of Stavenslust near his hometown of Neustrelitz. It was time for them
to build their family. Before they could do so, however, he was offered a
position in Dresden. The pay was less than in Leubus, and he was not
allowed to do any scientific work, but the job came with the opportunity
to direct a department of psychiatry in a general hospital. This stop, too,
turned out to be short lived, for he and Ina soon moved on. Just as well,
because within a month of arriving in Dresden, the couple’s first child, a
daughter, was strangled to death by a twisted umbilical cord.
–//–
In the summer of 1886, the Kraepelins were vacationing in Switzerland
when they heard the news of Wilhelm Gudden’s death at Lake Starnberg. A
few days later, they took a train to the German seaport of Stettin, followed
by a steamboat to Reval (now Tallinn in Estonia), and then another train
to Dorpat, where Emil had found a job as professor at the local university
and, simultaneously, head of a mental hospital. At the train station in
Dorpat, the Kraepelins hired a carriage to take them to the hospital. It
was a short trip that nonetheless taught them much about the situation
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that they had gotten themselves into, because they found themselves unable
to communicate with the carriage driver. Since they were both ignorant
of the Estonian language, they had to ask a bystander to translate their
instructions from German into Estonian.
The Hospital for the Mentally and Nervously Ill — Kraepelin called it
the clinic — was constructed of wood. It comprised two floors and had a
stone cellar. As in Germany, the structural plan was symmetrical: one-half
of the building was reserved for women, the other half for men. Within
each wing, one ward was reserved for “quiet” patients, a second ward for
“agitated” patients, and a third ward for “raving mad” patients. Designed
for fifty-six patients, there were about one hundred patients resident in the
clinic when Kraepelin arrived. The high fees were usually paid for by the
patients’ families.
Figure 13: The psychiatric clinic at Dorpat, c. 1887.
Emil and Ina resided in a house adjacent to the clinic. The balcony
of their new home afforded a view of a thick spruce forest and beyond
that, across the Embach River, a cathedral tower standing tall above the
town. Dorpat was a strange, multilingual town.69 For centuries, it had
been fought over and governed by several foreign peoples, including Swedes,
Poles, Danes, Russians and Germans. It was now part of the Russian Em-
69For a full account of the linguistic situation in Dorpat, see M. Rotzoll and F. Grüner,
“Emil Kraepelin and German psychiatry in multicultural Dorpat/Tartu,” Trames
20(70/65): 351-367 (2016).
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pire, but the German nationals, who made up less than six percent of the
Estonian population, were effectively the ruling class. Times were changing,
however, as the Russians pushed for greater control and, simultaneously,
the Estonians sought to express their nationality. There was a struggle
for language primacy. The majority of Dorpat residents spoke only Esto-
nian. A few of Kraepelin’s patients spoke Russian, Latvian or German, but
Kraepelin spoke only German, so he was forced to use a translator in most
cases. The translators were themselves Germans – Kraepelin’s assistant
physicians – whose knowledge of other languages was fragmentary. Hence,
the vital business of interviewing patients took a great deal of Kraepelin’s
precious time, and it frustrated him no end.
Given the circumstances, Kraepelin felt more comfortable at the univer-
sity, where all but six of the forty-six professors were Germans. The medical
school was the largest, and by some accounts the most prestigious, in the
entire Russian Empire. After delivering his inaugural lecture, the one in
which he outlined his vision of a scientific psychiatry based on psychology
and clinical observation, he settled into his work.
He made friends with Alexander Schmidt, a professor of physiology who
also served as president of the university. Suspecting that Schmidt had
little time for research, Kraepelin asked him if he would give up one of the
rooms allotted to him so that Kraepelin and his students could use it for
their experiments. Schmidt consented, Kraepelin ordered new apparatus,
and soon the experiments were up and running. Kraepelin was overjoyed to
finally have his very own research program. Excitedly, he wrote to Wundt,
[The study] on the effects of exercise and tiredness has pro-
gressed the most. Here I had several processes which occur in
daily life (reading, writing, counting, arithmetic skills, et cetera)
systematically investigated. The aim was to obtain normal fig-
ures, to be used as the basis for investigations on sick people,
for whom the more precise methods of time measurement [re-
action times] were too difficult. It seems that coefficients for
adaptation, exercise and tiredness can be calculated for every
field and every individual, in which his recent state of mind as
well as his energy in general will be reflected.70
70Quoted in Holger Steinberg and Matthias Angermeyer, “Emil Kraepelin’s years at
Dorpat as professor of psychiatry in nineteenth-century Russia,” History of Psychiatry
xii: 297-327 (2001), p. 306.
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Kraepelin was now exploring new research grounds. Sensing that there
was more to experimental psychology than reaction times and discrimina-
tion experiments, he looked for psychological processes that might be more
relevant to psychiatry. With this goal in mind, he decided to study work, or
more specifically, psychological work. How, exactly, work relates to mental
illness is unclear, but apparently Kraepelin saw a connection. He devised
a simple task for his experimental subjects that required them to execute
a succession of simple arithmetic calculations, usually additions, within a
preset time limit. Upon completion of the task, Kraepelin quantified the
efficiency of the work by counting the number of calculations performed.
Kraepelin expected that completion rates would vary between subjects, de-
pend on the time of day, change during the course of testing, and be affected
by personal factors. It was a pared down task suited to scientific analysis
and capable, he thought, of revealing hidden psychological processes.
Kraepelin was anxious to share initial results with his fellow scientists.
He wanted feedback (hopefully positive) and he wanted to promote the
field of experimental psychology to a community that knew very little, if
anything, about it. After all, it was an exciting, new field of science. By
attracting other researchers to the field, he would not only help it grow, he
would establish himself as one of its leaders. With these purposes in mind,
Kraepelin founded the Dorpat Psychological Society.
In the beginning, the Society was quite small, consisting of perhaps a
dozen men drawn from the German-speaking academic and medical com-
munities. The first meeting was likely held in a café. There, the gathered
men would have ordered beers and lit their cigars while waiting for their
president to speak. After welcoming the members and making a few re-
marks on behalf of the Society, Kraepelin would have talked about his
recent research.71
He probably started by explaining why he decided to study mental work,
and why he decided to examine a very simple form of it. He would then
have described the task that his subjects were asked to perform and, to
make things easier for the audience, he may have shown them an example
of the worksheets given to the subjects. It would have looked something
like this, except much longer:
71My description of Kraepelin’s work curves is based on his article, “Die Arbeitscurve,”
Philosophische Studien 19:459-507 (1902). Many of the experiments described therein
were conducted in Dorpat, but others were conducted earlier in Leipzig, or later, in
Heidelberg.
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His subjects started at the top of the sheet, adding the numbers 6 and
4 in columns A and B, and entering the sum 10 into column C. They were
told to proceed down the sheet row by row, adding and entering the sums
on each line as quickly as they could. Most sessions lasted one hour, but
some went longer. At the end of each session, Kraepelin constructed an
Arbeitscurve, or work curve. For this, he calculated the total number of
items completed in successive five minute segments throughout the session.
The work curve was a measure of the subject’s mental performance over
time. For members of the Dorpat Psychological Society, he might have
passed around a second paper showing one or more work curves. Each
curve formed a different pattern, but in every case the lines jumped up and
down as they moved from left to right.
Figure 14: A typical work curve, reconstructed from examples illustrated
in Kraepelin’s monograph (1902).
Kraepelin was interested in the temporal fluctuations of performance dur-
ing a single test session, that is, the up and down movements of individual
work curves. He assumed that the shape of the curve was determined by
interactions between multiple mental processes, and he analyzed the data
in the hope of identifying the responsible processes. Most obvious were
the effects of practice and fatigue. Naturally, practice improved perfor-
mance (increasing the number of completed additions ), whereas fatigue
had a negative effect (reducing the number of additions). Kraepelin real-
ized that practice and fatigue would act simultaneously, but with different
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time courses. Performances typically improved at the beginning of a ses-
sion, due to practice, but then declined toward the end of the session when
fatigue set in.
With further study, he found other influences on performance and, as
with practice and fatigue, he assumed that each influence had its own time
course. Initially, the subjects were uncomfortable, finding themselves in a
novel situation. Hence, they began their work hesitatingly, and rates of
performance were low. Adaptation to the task allowed their performances
to gradually improve. Incentive also helped in the early stages, but it
quickly faded, causing a downward movement in the curves. The fifth and
final factor was motivation, which had a positive influence like incentive,
but was longer lasting.
Looking at any single Arbeitscurve, such as the one shown in Figure 14,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to detect the play of Kraepelin’s five factors.
Even if he were correct in claiming that these five factors – and only these
factors – accounted for the shape of the curves, the simultaneity of their
actions obscured their individual contributions. Kraepelin needed a method
to separate the factors and delineate their unique time courses. He decided
to introduce pauses during the tests, reasoning that a brief pause would
relieve fatigue, but not greatly change the practice effect, and that other
factors could be differentiated in a similar manner. He thought that by
introducing pauses of various durations, he could isolate and characterize
all five factors.
When presenting his work to the Dorpat Psychological Society, Kraepelin
might well have held up yet another sheet of paper, showed it briefly, and
allowed it to be passed around the audience. It would have been a table
summarizing the results in from a single pause experiment (Figure 15).
Segment Number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Practice 0 56 96 133 167 199
Fatigue 0 41 82 123 164 205
Motivation 0 35 40 45 45 45
Adaptation 0 30 35 40 45 50
Incentive 90 0 -4 -15 0 -8
Figure 15: Results from the first thirty minutes of a pause experiment, re-
constructed from Kraepelin’s monograph (1902).
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The thirty minute session was divided into five-minute segments. The
numbers in each row show the strength of influence for each named factor
in each five-minute segment. The trends are consistent with expectations.
Practice and fatigue both have large effects that gradually accumulate,
whereas motivation and adaptation have lesser, more steady influences.
Incentive has the most dramatic effect, with a strong initial influence fol-
lowed by a rapidly declining influence. Kraepelin would have emphasized
his conclusion that the performance score for any given subject in any given
five-minute segment depended on the particular combination of influences
operating during that time. But questions would have been asked.
What, exactly, do the numbers in the table represent? How did he cal-
culate them? How well does the analysis account for the shape of the
Arbeitscurve? Why did he not use differential equations, a mathematical
tool that was available at the time and that is ideally suited to sorting
out the time courses of the individual factors? And, crucially, what is the
relevance of any of this for psychiatry? Addressing this last question in his
Memoirs, Kraepelin wrote only that, “They shed light on the traumatic
neuroses and certain psychopathic conditions.”72
Apparently oblivious to the flaws in his methodology, Kraepelin ex-
panded his studies of work curves to include such mental tasks as reading,
number learning and syllable learning. He continued these experiments un-
til at least 1902, at which time he published a 50-page review of the work,
which was dedicated to his mentor, Wilhelm Wundt (note 72).
The truth of the matter is that the Arbeitscurve added nothing to our
understanding of either mental illness or psychology generally. It was an in-
novative research strategy, but fundamentally flawed in its conception and
ineptly practiced. Max Weber, an influential social scientist and one-time
patient of Kraepelin, roundly criticized the Arbeitscurve for its irrelevance
and technical shortcomings. Among other comments, he noted the absence
of incentives (especially economic incentives), and the fact that the labo-
ratory environment in which the experiments were conducted was unlike
real-life school and work environments.
The inconsequential results of Kraepelin’s psychological experiments –
encompassing reaction times, association tests, psychopharmacology and
Arbeitscurven – does not detract from their historical significance. They
marked Kraepelin’s passage from traditional psychiatry to modern psychi-
atry, from the anecdotal consideration of individual cases to the scientific
study of underlying causes.
72E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 45.
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Kraepelin kept busy in Dorpat with work curves, scholarly writing and
hospital duties. Nevertheless, he was unhappy. First of all, he hated the
long winters, which were much harsher than in Germany. The freezing
temperatures and frequent snowfalls darkened his days. Besides that, there
were the work-related frustrations. He struggled with money concerns,
infrastructure issues, and the complications of caring for more patients than
the small clinic could comfortably accommodate. Adding to his discontent
was his wife’s homesickness and their shared sadness over baby Marie’s
death in Dresden. Even after Ina delivered a healthy daughter, Antonie, in
Dorpat, Emil’s mood scarcely lifted. Hoping to refresh himself, Emil left
Ina with the baby and took off on a long trip, visiting friends and colleagues
in Austria, Switzerland, Italy and Germany. One highlight of the trip –
noted in his Memoirs – was when he spotted a colorful frog near Vienna,
picked it up and brought it back as a present for his brother Karl.
Upon returning to Dorpat, Kraepelin found that little had changed. He
tried to get the government to help solve problems at the clinic, but com-
munications between him and the bureaucrats were difficult, owing to the
language barrier and thick layers of red tape. The Ministry of Education
regularly balked at Kraepelin’s urgent requests for additional funding, yet
demanded report after report. Bad feelings went both ways. On one oc-
casion, when the Ministry insisted that he submit certain documents in
Cyrillic script (which he did not know), he flatly refused. That action so
incensed the governor of Livonia that he sent Kraepelin an official order
demanding that he obey the law.
Kraepelin was further crippled by cultural and linguistic incompatibili-
ties. They interfered with his management of the clinic and, more signifi-
cantly, they frustrated his attempts to interview patients. By imposing a
distance between himself and his patients, they stymied his efforts to en-
gage in the kind of psychiatry that he had promised in his inaugural lecture.
He was anxious to tackle the problem of diagnosis, but he could not.
Ina gave birth to a third daughter, Vera. However, with the memory of
Marie’s death still fresh in their memories, tragedy struck again when Vera
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died on the last day of February, 1890. She was not yet two years old. And
then, just twenty days after Vera’s death, further disturbing news came
from Germany. Otto von Bismarck, Kraepelin’s lifelong hero, had been
forced to resign his posts as Chancellor of Germany and Minister President
of Prussia. Evidently the new Emperor, Wilhelm II, did not like Bismarck’s
politics. Numb from the cold and generally fed up with everything in
Dorpat, the Kraepelins decided to go back to Germany. Unfortunately,
Emil had no job to return to.
Kraepelin yearned for a well-funded, easily-governed clinic where he could
pursue his scientific and medical interests. Of all the psychiatric institutions
in Germany, only those affiliated with universities in the largest and most
progressive cities fit the bill. If he were lucky enough to get an appointment
at one of these universities, he would have the freedom and power to achieve
his goals. Apart from the fact that he knew of no current openings, there
was also the matter of qualifications. Would the German authorities look
with favor upon his modest successes in Dorpat under trying conditions, or
would they dismiss his work there as irrelevant?
One thing that Kraepelin had going for him was his publication record.
Regardless of where he was living and what duties he had to perform,
he always seemed to find time for writing. Adding to his output from
Leipzig, when he was bulking up his credentials for the Habituation, he had
since written articles on hypnotism, migraine headaches, false memories
and pharmacopsychology, among other things. Some publications featured
his own research results, whereas others provided timely reviews of contro-
versial subjects. He even published a pamphlet on research methods for
experimental psychologists.
Moreover, he had recently completed the manuscript for a third edition
of his textbook. The original version was written while working in Leipzig
at Wundt’s Institute. A publisher approached him asking if he would be
willing to write a small book on psychiatry. At the time, Kraepelin’s post-
school experience in clinical psychiatry amounted to just four years at the
Munich hospital, plus his part-time work with Flechsig in Leipzig. Never-
theless, because he was short of money, he agreed to write the book. The
Compendium der Psychiatrie (Compendium of Psychiatry) was a concise
statement of current knowledge, rather than a guide to clinical practice.
Nevertheless, it sold well, and Kraepelin was encouraged to publish an up-
dated edition, which he did four years later, in Dorpat. This second edition
was given a new title, Psychiatrie: Ein kurzes Lehrbuch für Studierende
und Ärzte (Psychiatry: A Short Textbook for Students and Physicians).
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Two years after that, while still in Dorpat, the third edition appeared un-
der the same title, except that the word kurzes (short) had been deleted.
In the end, there would be eight editions of the popular textbook published
during Kraepelin’s lifetime, plus a posthumous ninth edition.
Surely, he thought, no academic critic could complain about his scholarly
production. Moreover, he figured that his recent trip to central Europe
would help, since he had intentionally visited several influential German
psychiatrists. Those contacts finally bore fruit just as the Kraepelins were
facing the prospect of yet another winter in Dorpat. On the ninth of Novem-
ber, 1890, good fortune came not once, but twice. First, Ina delivered Hans,
the couple’s first son. And second, Emil received a telegram from Wilhelm
Nokk, Minister of Education for the state of Baden, in which he informed
Kraepelin that he would be the new professor of psychiatry at the Univer-
sity of Heidelberg. Nokk wrote that he wanted to free Kraepelin from the
claws of the Russian bear.
The Kraepelins did spend a final winter in Dorpat. But the following
spring, when their the train came to a stop at the Heidelberg station,
they could not have been happier. Looking upwards, their eyes would
have been immediately drawn to the crumbling walls of the ancient Schloss
(castle), which stood watchful above the city. On the opposite side of the
Neckar River lay the gentle, green slopes of Heiligenberg Hill. Situated in a
magnificent natural setting and benefitting from a mild climate, Heidelberg
was a thriving town of thirty thousand residents. It owed its wealth in part
to tourism (on account of the castle), but mostly to its fine university.
Although small in comparison with the University of Berlin, the University
of Heidelberg was a proud institution with a history dating back to 1386.
Its medical school was considered by many to be the best in Germany, and
the psychiatric clinic, to which Kraepelin had come, had earned its fair
share of that high reputation.
The town spread out along the southern bank of the Neckar River. Its
Haupstraße (high street), was a grand passage that led from the town
center directly to its main attractions, the Schloss, the Heiliggeistkirche
(Church of the Holy Spirit), the Marktplatz (marketplace) and the Rathaus
(town hall). Along this street, a constant stream of smartly dressed men
and women paraded and shopped.
Eastward from the town center, continuing on the line established by
Hauptstraße, ran Bergheimer Straße (mountain home street), where the
Kraepelin family found its new home. The house was the official residence of
the clinic director, and it was but a short walk from there to the psychiatric
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clinic. Kraepelin’s clinic, together with the adjacent neurology clinic and
the women’s clinic, formed part of the university’s medical campus. The
rest of the university lay further east amidst the greater bustle of Haupt-
straße. With the Neckar River flowing serenely just across the road at the
rear of the clinic, and little commerce nearby, it was the ideal ambiance in
which to mix academic science and clinical medicine.
Persons employed by the psychiatric clinic helped the family settle in.
Unfortunately, while Emil and Ina were still unpacking a few days later,
their son Hans died. Suffering from an illness that he had brought with him
from Dorpat, he died at the age of exactly six months. The tragic event
marred an otherwise joyous occasion, and it was especially grievous coming
as it did only slightly more than one year after Vera’s death. Altogether,
Ina had by this time given birth to four babies, of which only four-year old
Antonie was still alive.
One of Kraepelin’s first tasks, and maybe his most important, was to
hire his assistant physicians. Unfortunately, the psychiatrist who had been
an assistant to Kraepelin’s predecessor, committed suicide; it was said that
he was afraid of becoming mentally ill. Kraepelin’s first choice was a young
psychiatrist named Gustav Aschaffenburg. Originally from Cologne, As-
chaffenburg was very well educated, having studied at universities in Hei-
delberg, Würzburg, Freiburg, Berlin and Strasbourg. His father was an
astute business man and Talmudic scholar. Aschaffenburg had a wide aca-
demic knowledge, but he also enjoyed working on the wards. His specialties
were psychiatric diagnosis and classification, the very subjects that inter-
ested Kraepelin. Moreover, Kraepelin suspected that Aschaffenburg’s dis-
sertation on delirium tremens might prove useful for his nascent campaign
against alcoholism.
Next, Kraepelin thought of Franz Nissl, his friend from Munich. Since
it was mandatory for any clinic with high aspirations to have an active
neuroanatomy laboratory, Nissl, an enthusiastic researcher, was the obvious
choice. While clinical work was a secondary concern for Nissl, he was known
to have a kindly manner in dealing with patients, so he could certainly
help out in that regard. And finally, Nissl was a jolly fellow. It could
not have escaped Kraepelin’s attention that having Nissl near him could
help balance his sometimes excessive seriousness. Kraepelin thought that
Nissl would jump at the chance of leaving Frankfurt, where he now worked,
for Heidelberg, which was close to Nissl’s birthplace in the Grand Duchy of
Baden. But, as Kraepelin was soon to learn, the situation was complicated.
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Nissl moved to Frankfurt shortly after graduating from medical school.
The job suited him well because his responsibilities were about equally
divided between neuroanatomical research and patient care. Unmarried,
he lived with his younger sister and his aunt. Since the sister managed
the household and some of Franz’s personal needs, Franz was free to work
as much as he pleased. He made enough money in Frankfurt to support
himself, his sister and his aunt. He even gave monies to his step-mother
and step-siblings.
Moreover, Nissl had found in Frankfurt a psychiatrist whose passion for
neuroanatomy was as great as his own. Alois Alzheimer had been working
at the asylum as an assistant psychiatrist since the previous year. He, like
Nissl, was a Bavarian and a bachelor. They got along exceedingly well, so
much so that when Alzheimer married, he asked Nissl to be his best man
at the wedding. The son of a notary, Alzheimer was large and tall and
had a personality to match. Bowed over a microscope with his pince-nez
hanging loosely from his neck and his ever-present cigar waiting patiently
on the table top, he was the very picture of a nineteenth century anatomist.
Being a good-natured fellow, he quickly learned to reciprocate Nissl’s wry
sense of humor. After marrying, he became a devoted family man, but
that did not prevent him from spending plenty of time in the laboratory.
It was the essential glue that bound him and Nissl. Working together,
they investigated brain pathologies relevant to neurological and psychiatric
disorders, principally progressive paralysis.
Considering all that he had going for him in Frankfurt, Nissl was natu-
rally reluctant to leave. On the other hand, he knew the beauty of Heidel-
berg and he had great respect for Kraepelin. For these reasons, and others,
he agonized about accepting Kraepelin’s offer. Kraepelin wrote several let-
ters to Nissl spelling out his offer, but only after several weeks had passed
did Nissl reply.
In a single remarkable letter spilling out over sixty handwritten pages,
Nissl rambled on about his circumstances and explained in repetitious detail
the reasons for his hesitation.73 Why should I, he wrote, exchange my safe
position in Frankfurt for an uncertain one in Heidelberg? He laments the
fact that he is thirty-five years old. Maybe it would be too risky to take
a job that may not result in a professorship. If it were only a matter of
effort, of energy, he might succeed, but other factors could intercede. His
73Nissl’s letter is dated August 15, 1895. It is reproduced in full in W. Burgmair, E.J.
Engstrom, and M.M. Weber (eds.), Kraepelin in Heidelberg. München, Belleville
(2005), pp. 195-217.
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boss suggested that his own ambitions might suffer from competing with
Aschaffenburg. And what would happen in the event that he did not get
a professorship? His dear sister, who so depends on him, would be left
vulnerable. He would have to return to an asylum and probably remain
there forever as a second class doctor. Or worse, he might have to work as
a prison doctor.
If he did choose to go to Heidelberg, he continued, it would be so that
he could continue working as a scientist. Even though he came into the
world without much money, he would not accept Kraepelin’s offer just for
the money, or even for the prestige of a professorship. It would be because
he was convinced that nerve cell research held the key to understanding
mental illness. In one long aside, he expounded on the idea that each
neuron has a function that is linked to its structure. He also expressed
concerns over technical problems, and expounded on his persistent worry
that living neurons might not have the same structures as dead neurons.
Near the end of the long letter, Nissl proposed to Kraepelin that they
cooperate in creating a photographic atlas of the entire human cerebral
cortex. It would show every individual nerve cell, whether healthy or in a
pathological state. Researchers would be able to determine which regions
of the brain are most susceptible to mental illness, and possibly discover
specific types of cell anomalies associated with specific types of mental
disorder, for example idiocy, psychosis, catatonia, et cetera. “Naturally,”
he wrote, “I would undertake this project only as a side-job [underlying as
in the original]!”
On the whole, Nissl’s letter was more a plea for sympathy than a strategy
designed to improve the offer. Nissl had a complex mind that Kraepelin
did not fully understand. He waited patiently while Nissl continued to
negotiate, deliberate and fret. In the end, Nissl did go to Heidelberg, and
he never looked back. Gustav Aschaffenburg came too, and any fears that
Nissl and Kraepelin might have harbored over a possible rivalry between
Aschaffenburg and Nissl quickly dissolved. His boss must have invented
the rivalry as a device to retain Nissl in Frankfurt because, in reality, there
was no basis for competition. Whereas Aschaffenburg liked working directly
with patients and was fascinated by clinical issues, Nissl truly liked (loved?)
only laboratory research.
Kraepelin arrived in Heidelberg after confidently transiting from Würz-
burg, where he attended medical school, to Munich, then Leipzig, back
again to Munich, then Leubus, Dresden and lastly, Dorpat. Nissl, by
contrast had remained in Frankfurt since graduating from medical school.
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Kraepelin moved whenever he was presented with a better opportunity,
whereas Nissl always acted with caution, carefully weighing his scientific
ambitions against his personal security. Fortunately, when the balance of
Nissl’s interests tipped in favor of science, a special partnership was formed
between him and Kraepelin. The period from 1886 – when Nissl came to
Heidelberg – and 1903, when Kraepelin left Heidelberg for Munich, was
especially productive for both men.
With only two floors of occupied space, the Heidelberg clinic was smaller
and less imposing than the Munich hospital, but otherwise similar. It had
several gardens behind the main building in which patients and staff could
enjoy fresh air. Kraepelin reorganized the floor space by combining a few
small rooms into two large “surveillance” wards, one for males and one for
females. With these special wards, doctors could observe small groups of
patients under controlled conditions. Each day, the clinic director and his
assistants chose the patients that would be put in the surveillance wards.
The selected patients received highly attentive care. In return, albeit un-
knowingly, they provided Kraepelin with the observational material that
he needed for assessing the diagnostic categories of mental illness.
Figure 16: The psychiatric clinic at Heidelberg, about 1900. [Heidelberg
University Library, Graph. Slg. A 0775]
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Kraepelin quickly developed a fondness for Heidelberg, especially on ac-
count of its natural endowments. One of his greatest pleasures was walking
on the sun-bathed southern slopes of Heiligenberg mountain. According to
legend, it was a path that had been used by ancient poets and philosophers,
who were inspired by its beauty. It was especially glorious in the spring,
with the trees and flowers blooming, and the hairy stems of Pellitory-of-the-
wall poking out from the brickwork along its borders. Just on the other side
of the wall, lay productive vineyards, some dating from the seventeenth cen-
tury. Walking accompanied by his Great Dane, Ramses, Kraepelin would
stop at certain vantage points from which he could see the psychiatric clinic
across the river.
–//–
Kraepelin came to Heidelberg with his goals intact but largely unattained.
It was time to buckle down and tackle the related problems of how mental
illnesses should be defined and they could be diagnosed. He was not ready
to completely abandon the Arbeitscurve, but he started spending more
time on the wards than in the psychology laboratory. With much relief, he
was once again able to converse with patients in his native tongue. Still
convinced that mental illnesses are “real things”, like plants and animals,
he set himself the task of sorting out what was true and what was false in
the extant classifications.
According to his estimation, Pinel, Esquirol, Heinroth and all previous
classifiers had met with only limited success. Collectively, they had named
a plethora of disorders, but the usefulness of those names was compromised
by the vagueness of the definitions and the lack of agreement among psychi-
atrists. Kraepelin saw a common method behind all earlier classifications,
and it was faulty. Certain symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions,
were both obvious and common. Earlier authors, therefore, had either
distinguished different forms of the dominant symptom – for example, in-
tellectual mania versus emotional mania – or assumed connections between
certain symptoms, naming them “symptom complexes” and likening them
to illnesses.
Kraepelin rejected these classifications because they were based almost
entirely on symptoms and unfounded speculations. Causes, courses and
outcomes were for the most part ignored. Physical signs and biological
markers were likewise rarely mentioned. Moreover, Kraepelin knew that
some of the authors had only limited hands-on experience, whether in asy-
lums or other institutions. Heinroth, for example, had little direct contact
107
9 Kraepelin and Nissl in Heidelberg
with patients, and Pinel, although he may have had in-depth familiarity
with a few patients, probably had only patchy knowledge of the rest. Only
Esquirol seems to have had substantial personal experience with the full
gamut of cases.
Although Kraepelin’s experimental work prior to coming to Heidelberg
had been inconclusive, it gave him an acquaintance with scientific methods.
He knew the value of data obtained by objective means. And, he realized
that he needed more data from more patients. Anecdotal information of the
kind collected by earlier psychiatrists would not suffice; he needed hard facts
documented by trained observers. Nor was it enough to briefly interview
a patient upon admission and then observe him or her only haphazardly
afterwards. It was for this reason that he built surveillance rooms.
He also understood the need to sample the full range of psychiatric disor-
ders, not just the most common types, or those manifested by individuals
from a particular region, or of a particular social class. Unfortunately, most
of the beds in the clinic were occupied by patients who had been there for
a long time and who were destined to remain there, in some cases for the
rest of their lives. Kraepelin knew that he could do little to relieve their
suffering, and equally, that there was little more to be learned from them.
He was frustrated by the fact that their dominant presence meant fewer
opportunities for studying the less common disorders. Also, while he and
his staff had ample access to late stage illnesses, they did not see enough
of the early stages. For both of these problems, the obvious solution was
to increase turnover by moving patients in and out of the clinic as quickly
as possible. It was tricky, because it had to be done without overcrowding
the clinic or jeopardizing the wellbeing of the patients.
Kraepelin set himself the goal of doubling the rate of admissions. Rather
than simply taking patients when ordered to do so by state authorities, he
began accepting voluntary admissions. He also arranged for transfers from
jails when he learned of prisoners who might be especially interesting. No
sooner had Kraepelin started implementing these changes, however, when
he encountered resistance from government administrators. The clinic was
governed by two authorities: the Ministry of the Interior, which was respon-
sible for health care, and the Ministry of Education, which was responsible
for medical training. His troubles with both ministries grew with time and
eventually caused him to leave Heidelberg. The situation resembled Dor-
pat, and in both places the turmoil was fueled by Kraepelin’s ambitions.
Friction between Kraepelin and the Ministry of Education first arose
in connection with the transfer of patients from the Heidelberg clinic to
108
The Making of Modern Psychiatry
the asylum at Emmendingen, a facility designed for the long-term care of
chronically ill patients. Each transfer required a pile of paper work and then
a long delay while bureaucrats reviewed the files. What really infuriated
Kraepelin was the Ministry’s insistence that they, not he, keep the patients’
files. It was a matter of considerable importance because there was only
a single copy of the files, and Kraepelin wanted to retain it so that he
could track whether the patient improved or deteriorated. It was partly in
response to this battle over government files that Kraepelin came up with
his own plan for case documentation, one which proved to be very useful –
perhaps indispensable – for his research into disease entities.
During his medical training, Kraepelin had worked at a psychiatric clinic
in Würzburg, where one of his responsibilities had been to fill out a kind
of census card for the government. The forms were called Zählkarten, or
counting cards. They recorded the number of resident patients, their home
locations, symptoms, duration of stay, curability, and if deceased, the cause
of death. Collected from every asylum in Bavaria, the cards enabled the
government to determine the geographical distribution of its patients and
calculate statistics pertinent to planning and financing.
In Heidelberg, Kraepelin modified the cards to serve as research tools. He
saw them as a means of documenting, and eventually categorizing, all the
pertinent details of every patient’s condition. In particular, he wanted them
to contain information relevant to the diagnosis and subsequent course of
the patient’s disorder. Earlier psychiatrists, going back to Pinel and Es-
quirol, kept notes on selected patients, but Kraepelin’s innovation was to
standardize the procedure and collect key data on all patients, so far as
possible. By going beyond the superficially “interesting” cases, he avoided
biasing the observations. Also, to ensure scientific integrity, Kraepelin in-
structed his assistants and his students to focus on data of an objective
nature, that is, to avoid subjective interpretations. Like an ornithologist
intent on identifying and classifying all the birds present in a particular
region, Kraepelin intended to use the Zählkarten for identifying and clas-
sifying psychiatric illnesses. In practice, however, it proved impossible to
exclude all subjective judgments. One filled-out card from the Heidelberg
clinic is shown Figure 17.
109
9 Kraepelin and Nissl in Heidelberg
Figure 17: A page from one of Kraepelin’s Zählkarten. [Archive Max-
Planck Institute of Psychiatry MPIP-K20/SK VI]
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Although most of the doctor’s handwritten entries are illegible, the




Birthplace/Last place of residence
Marital status (here, married)
Occupation/Religion
Date of admission/date of discharge
Type of discharge (here, incurable)/Transfer to (here, Pforzheim)




Course of the illness
Peculiar symptoms
Anatomical diagnosis
False (alternative) diagnosis/Forensic diagnosis
During the period 1887-1904, Kraepelin collected thousands of cards,
corresponding to an equal number of patients. Whenever possible, he con-
tinued recording information even after the patient had been transferred
elsewhere. For this purpose, he sent his assistants to neighboring asylums
where they either interviewed the patient or simply read the updated file.
Historians debate the extent to which Kraepelin actually relied on the cards
for his definitions and classifications of mental illness. Later in this book,
I will discuss the evidence.
–//–
Franz Nissl did not share his friend’s fascination with the Zählkarten. His
particular challenge was nothing less than understanding the human brain.
He occasionally interviewed patients and thus filled out his share of cards,
but given the choice, he preferred looking at microscope slides. Since his
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residence, laboratory and photographic studio were all located in the clinic’s
main building, he had little need to go elsewhere and he seldom did.
Nissl came to Heidelberg with no wife and no family. By choosing to
live in an apartment located just above the neuroanatomy laboratory, he
avoided any problems arising from working late nights in the laboratory.
The apartment’s large anteroom held Nissl’s single treasure, a fine piano,
which he played well. The bedroom doubled as a study. Someone had
placed a crucifix on the wall above the bed, but Nissl was not very religious,
so he removed the crucifix and replaced it with a framed text of his own
composition. The text read, EĆRASEZ, and underneath, ROTTET SIE
AUS. The top line was taken from Voltaire, the eighteenth century French
author. It referred to the command, ećrasez l’infame, meaning “crush the
infamous”, an expression used by Voltaire when speaking of clergymen and
royalty. The German expression rottet sie aus translates as “exterminate
them”, thus underscoring the sentiment expressed by Voltaire.74
Nissl’s laboratory was a small, narrow room. It was furnished with three
tables near the windows for students, and a separate work station for Nissl.
Sharing space with the microscopes on the long tables were various tools
and a scattering of glass slides. Chemicals, some powdered and some in
solution, were neatly arranged in wooden cabinets. The range of color in
the solutions (black, orange, yellow, red) produced a rainbow effect that
brightened the otherwise drab decor. Larger jars stood on the open shelv-
ing. They held various body organs, both animal and human, some whole,
some in pieces, but mostly brains. The air in the lab smelled strongly of
acetic acid, carbolic acid, alcohol, kerosene, turpentine and other harsh
substances. Throughout the day, and often at night too, the laboratory
was a busy place, crowded with visiting scientists from England, France,
Poland, Italy, Norway and America.
Because Nissl had promised Kraepelin a photographic atlas of the cere-
bral cortex, he set up a second research space in the clinic’s basement that
was specifically for photography. Kraepelin had been encouraging Nissl’s
use of photography ever since he saw pictures of nerve cells shown to him by
a professor of zoology. No camera at the time could match the clarity, let
alone the immediacy, of a brain slice viewed directly through a microscope,
but brain slices were prone to drying out, becoming damaged, or fading so
badly that it was difficult to see anything clearly. By contrast, photographs
provided permanent records. The images were black-and-white and fuzzy,
74The description of Nissl’s room, along with other personal details, is contained in C.B.
Farrar, “I remember Nissl,” American Journal of Psychiatry 110:621-624 (1954).
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but what wonders they revealed! Furthermore, photographs could be sent
to an interested colleague or even published in a scientific journal with
worldwide readership, thus accelerating the dissemination of knowledge
and, equally important, advancing the reputation of the anatomist.
Nissl’s photographic lab was nothing more than a simple chamber of
pasteboard walls placed inside a larger room. With the door of the chamber
closed tight and the single lamp extinguished, the chamber was totally
dark. The larger room outside the photographic chamber was occupied by
a pharmacy and assorted medical devices.
In the center of the room was a long table upon which lay Nissl’s micro-
scope, a camera and associated optical devices. At the far end of the table
stood a gas-fed lantern. Light from the lantern was shaped and focused
by three condenser lenses positioned between the source and the micro-
scope, the latter turned on its side. The light passed through the brain
section, through the magnifying lens, and then through an eye piece lens at
the far end of the microscope before entering the camera, which consisted
of yet another lens, an expandable bellows and a glass plate coated with
light-sensitive emulsion.
Figure 18: Photographic apparatus of the type used by Nissl. [Richard
Neuhauss, Lehrbuch der Mikrophotographie, 2nd ed., 1898]
To take a photograph, Nissl worked alone in the basement, usually at
night, fiddling with the often cranky apparatus. He first cleaned all the
lenses with a chamois dampened with alcohol. Next, he ignited the light
source by sparking a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen. The gases had to be
mixed just right and turned on slowly, because there was a real danger of
explosion. Once lit, the hot gas flame was directed to the base of a calcium
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oxide cylinder, which glowed with a pure white light, a limelight. Nissl
shaped the limelight by adjusting the positions of the condenser lenses.
Once he saw that the brain section was illuminated brightly and uniformly,
he precisely position it and focused it. When satisfied with the preparations,
he released the shutter. Depending on the thickness of the tissue section,
the intensity of the light and other factors, the shutter would be kept open
for as long as several minutes. It occasionally happened that men came
to deliver coal during a photographic exposure. Since the furnace was
situated near the photography lab, the coal, tumbling into its bin, rattled
the timbers and shook Nissl’s apparatus, thereby ruining his picture.
When one of his photographic exposures was interrupted by a delivery
of coal, or something else went wrong in the laboratory, Nissl would shout
out, “Die Röhre ist gemotzt!”. It was a verbal concoction with no literal
meaning. Nissl liked playing with words, and the quoted expression con-
tained two of his favorites, die Röhre and die Motzung. Both had multiple
meanings depending on the context. Die Röhre translates as “the tube”,
and probably refers to a prominent part of Nissl’s microscope. (His students
called the cigars that he smoked, Nissl-Röhren). Gemotzt is a corruption
of the verb motzen, to complain. So, roughly translated, Die Röhre ist
gemotzt meant, “The tube is garbage.”
An American visitor to the lab reported another application of Nissl’s
linguistic creativity.75 Once, when snacking at a café with colleagues, Nissl
pointed to the salt container and asked his neighbor, “Die Röhre, bitte
[Please pass the tube].“ After receiving the salt, and with no further point-
ing, he said, “Jetzt, die Motzung,” meaning “Now pass the pepper.” Nissl’s
friends and colleagues became so accustomed to hearing die Röhre and die
Motzung that they understood the intended meanings. Strangers, mean-
while, were befuddled.
The plan to produce a photographic atlas of the human cerebral cortex
ultimately failed, not for lack of effort, but for technical reasons. The
problem was, each photograph had to clearly depict every individual nerve
cell while also encompassing the entire lateral extent of one-half of the
brain. This would have required special lenses, finely grained emulsions and
very large print sizes, none of which were available at the time. Although
Nissl and Kraepelin were both disappointed, neither suffered from a lack
of alternative projects. Moreover, one can speculate that the very idea of
the atlas was only a ploy employed by Nissl during his negotiations with
Kraepelin over the Heidelberg appointment.
75C. B. Farrar (1954), p. 623.
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It has been claimed that the human brain is the most complex thing in
the universe. The point could be argued, but certainly the brain is a very
complex organ. You would hardly guess as much, looking at a brain col-
lected at death. For starters, the actual brain would be buried beneath
three layers of connective tissue and thus, invisible. Only if you carefully
removed the connective tissue, would you see the creamy white brain. In
this state, its most obvious feature would be the deep grooves, or fissures,
that weave around its surface and define its lobes: frontal, temporal, occip-
ital, et cetera. Its color and texture might bring tofu to mind, either soft
tofu or hard tofu depending on how long the brain had been soaking in sev-
enty percent alcohol. Although heavy in the hand, the brain’s appearance
would provide not the slightest hint of its complexity.
Réne Descartes was one of the smartest and best-informed intellectuals
of the seventeenth century. In mid-life, he pondered the brain. He believed,
from intuition, that the mind and the brain are different and separate. He
thought, however, that they interact in the pineal gland. There, somehow,
the mind governs the brain. For his description of how the brain works, he
followed the example of the English physician, William Harvey, who had
earlier described how the heart circulates blood. Descartes disagreed with
Harvey’s conclusions, but he was impressed with Harvey’s focus on mech-
anisms. Thus, his take on the brain took the form of a hydro-mechanical
model. Whereas Harvey got it right in explaining how the heart works,
Descartes was woefully mistaken in explaining how the brain works.
We see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and similar machines
which, though made entirely by man, lack not the power to
move of themselves, in various ways ... Similarly, you may have
observed in the grottoes and fountains in the gardens of our
kings that the force that makes water leap from its source is
able of itself to move diverse machines and even to make them
play instruments or pronounce certain words according to the
various arrangements of the tubes through which the water is
conducted ... And truly one can well compare the nerves of the
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machine that I am describing to the tubes of the mechanisms of
these fountains, its muscles and tendons to divers other engines
and springs which serve to move these machines.76
Descartes, like his contemporary Nicholas Malebranche and nearly ev-
eryone else at the time, believed that nerves were filled with animal spirits.
A century and a half later, Luigi Galvani was dissecting a frog in Bologna,
Italy. According to legend, he touched the exposed sciatic nerve with a
metal scalpel that had inadvertently acquired an electrical charge – per-
haps when Galvani brushed it across his woolen jacket. Immediately after
touching the nerve with the charged scalpel, he noticed a jerking move-
ment in the frog’s leg. Galvani had discovered that it is electricity, not
animal spirits, that animates nerves. After Emil Du Bois-Reymond dis-
covered electrical pulses (action potentials), and his friend, Hermann von
Helmholtz, measured the speed of their conduction in nerves, the problem
of how nervous signals are transmitted over long distances was basically
solved. Notwithstanding these advances, neuroscientists had not even be-
gun to answer the really big questions.
The question that psychiatrists asked of the scientists was, What is wrong
with my patient’s brain? They expected to hear of lesions and structural
abnormalities, but none were found. In the face of this fact, the more astute
scientists realized that they had better look for more subtle aberrations.
That endeavor required them to learn how the brain actually works, not
necessarily in psychiatric patients, but in everyone. They reasoned that
once they knew what the brain was supposed to be doing, they could go
on to consider what it was not doing in the brains of patients. It was the
correct approach, and it is the same approach taken today.
Neuroscience researchers at the time knew that the brain contains count-
less numbers of nerve cells and large masses of nerve fibers, but they had
no real answers for how it controls even the simplest behaviors. The rela-
tionship between brain activity and normal mental activity was as much a
matter of speculation in the nineteenth century as it had been for centuries
past. Whereas neuroscientists today pursue such problems armed with ge-
netic, molecular and whole-brain imaging tools, scientists in Nissl’s day
had relatively simple tools. A handful of scientists was experimenting with
electrophysiological methods, but the majority stuck to their microscopes.
What they lacked in instrumentation, they made up for in imagination.
76Réne Descartes, L’Homme, 1664 (posthumous).
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Karl Wernicke – whose comments on the role of brain research I quoted
earlier – was a psychiatrist, neuroanatomist and neurologist (a combina-
tion not uncommon in the day). A Prussian, he studied medicine at the
University of Breslau (now the city of Wroc law in Poland), then worked in
Vienna and Berlin before returning to Breslau as a professor. Extrapolating
from earlier research, he came up with an idea that offered a framework for
understanding how the brain works. Simply put, he proposed that each of
the brain’s functions is governed from a different region. It became known
as the theory of cerebral localization. The idea was roughly similar to the
phrenologists’ concept of functional localization, but much more sophisti-
cated because it was based on valid anatomy and realistic mental terminol-
ogy. Wernicke was particularly interested in perception, intelligence and
memory, each of which is affected by mental illness. Going further, Wer-
nicke thought it would be possible to link specific psychiatric conditions
(he called them symptom complexes) with specific areas of the brain. The
proposal, and Wernicke’s attempt to prove it, became the subject of much
controversy.
Wernicke based his theory on the fact that the brain has parts. Viewed
from the outside, the cortex, or cerebrum, lies above almost everything
else. It is divided into left and right hemispheres. Each hemisphere is
further partitioned into several large lobes including the distinctive frontal
and temporal lobes. Other obvious structures include the cerebellum and
the brainstem. Inside the brain, the hippocampus and the amygdala are
distinctive.
Early in the nineteenth century, the Frenchman Jean Pierre Flourens
sought to discover the functions of these parts. Experimenting on pigeons
and rabbits, he systematically removed one or another structure and found
that some did, indeed, have distinctive functions. When the cerebrum was
removed, for example, the animals became blind, deaf and immobile. Con-
trastingly, when the cerebellum was removed, they lost their equilibrium
and their movements became uncoordinated. If the brainstem was removed,
the animals died.
Eduard Hitzig conducted further tests of localized function, particularly
on the cerebral cortex. At the time, he was working as a physician with the
Prussian army, and he was responsible for treating the wounds of soldiers
who had been shot in the head. The bullets fractured the men’s skulls,
leaving Hitzig with the opportunity to experiment. He applied a weak
electrical current at the points of fracture and discovered that stimulation
elicited movements of the eyes and certain muscles. Upon returning to
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his laboratory in Berlin, Hitzig replicated and extended these results using
dogs and applying currents directly to the brain. He was surprised to
find that stimulation produced movements only when applied to a narrow
strip of the cerebral cortex located at the posterior edge of the frontal
lobe, an area now known as the “motor strip”. He noted that the muscle
movements occurred on the opposite side of the body to where the stimulus
was delivered, implying a crossing of the motor fibers.
Hitzig became a psychiatrist only late in his career. He had been trained
in internal medicine and knew little about psychiatry until he worked briefly
at two asylums. Nevertheless, he was appointed head of a large hospital in
Halle that had been built for the sole purpose of psychiatric research and
education. Thus, Hitzig began as an internist, transformed himself into an
electrophysiologist, and ended up as a powerful (but despised) psychiatrist.
His career path encapsulates the late nineteenth century shift from asylum
psychiatry to academic psychiatry.
Hitzig’s experiments were repeated and extended a few years later by
David Ferrier, a Scottish neurologist. Working with monkeys, he used
weaker electrical currents than Hitzig, and he applied them with greater
precision. These technical refinements led Ferrier to notice that movements
occurred in different parts of the body depending on where, exactly, the
motor strip was stimulated. For example, when the upper part of the mo-
tor strip was stimulated, the buttocks twitched; a little further down, the
shoulder contracted. Towards the bottom of the motor strip lay the com-
mand centers for the elbow, wrist and fingers. This, at last, was convincing
proof of localization, at least for motor control.
More information relevant to localization came from autopsies. Psychia-
trists looked to autopsies not just to test broad theories of localization, but
also for evidence of pathology, that is, damage or abnormalities in the brain
that could explain their patients’ symptoms. Already in the late 1850s, the
deputy chief of psychiatry at the Charité in Berlin, Karl Westphal, was
urging his younger colleagues to spend as much time at the autopsy table
and the microscope as in the interview room. He cautioned them not to
become discouraged if at first they found nothing of interest. Surely, if they
looked more carefully, they would find evidence of localization.
If during [the patient’s] life we have observed a series of symp-
toms which can only be attributed to a disease of the brain
and if upon death we find no macroscopic [large] sign of dam-
age, then we shall always consider it desirable, that the entire
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brain slice by slice, be subject to systematic microscopic inves-
tigation. This is because in spite of the integrity of its mass
the most severe symptoms can potentially be the result of very
circumscribed [minute] alterations.77
As more and more anatomist-psychiatrists began searching for neuropa-
thy, the demand for brains increased. Soon, there were not enough brains
for all the researchers who wanted them. After all, the supply was lim-
ited. Individual clinics started reserving beds for terminally ill patients
and prohibiting their transfers elsewhere, for fear that they might lose the
opportunity to perform an autopsy. Making matters worse, experimental
physiologists also wanted cadavers, and they needed “fresh material”. Ac-
cording to one report, a professor of ophthalmology informed an audience
of psychiatrists and neurologists that he had found a way to elicit contrac-
tions of the eye pupil by applying electrical stimuli to the spinal cord. The
report stated that the experiments were conducted on “two persons put
to death by decapitation twenty-five and twenty-seven seconds respectively
after the sentence had been carried out.”78
A celebrated turning point in localization work came when the French
neurologist Paul Broca examined the brains of two stroke victims who had
lost the ability to speak. Remarkably, in each case he found damage limited
to the bottom part of the left frontal lobe. Not long afterwards, Karl Wer-
nicke, the outspoken champion of localization, confirmed Broca’s findings
in some of his own patients. He also found something quite different and
very interesting. When he examined the brains of patients whose speech
had been normal before death, but whose abilities to understand spoken
words was severely impaired, he saw damage not in the frontal lobe, but in
the upper portion of the left temporal lobe. Wernicke was naturally struck
by the consistent relationship between the nature of the language deficit
and the site of the lesion. These observations of Wernicke and Broca have
since been replicated many times. It is a fact that language functions are
mostly controlled from the left side of the brain, with speech production lo-
cated in the frontal lobe and speech comprehension located in the temporal
lobe.
Starting from these findings on language function, Wernicke proceeded
to build a broad theory of cerebral localization that posited, among other
things, specific locations for specific mental illnesses. However, some neu-
77Quoted in E. J. Engstrom (2003), p. 100.
78Quoted in E. J. Engstrom (2003), p. 103.
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rologists pointed out that, even with respect to language dysfunctions, some
deficits could not be explained by damage to either Broca’s area (in the
frontal lobe) or Wernicke’s area (in the temporal lobe). A particular con-
troversy arose over a rare condition involving patients who speak and com-
prehend normally but have difficulty in repeating phrases spoken to them
by another person. Wernicke called the syndrome “conduction aphasia”,
and said that it was caused by a disconnect between Broca’s area and
Wernicke’s area.
A young Viennese doctor by the name of Sigmund Freud took issue with
Wernicke’s interpretations. In 1891, he published a short monograph ti-
tled “On Aphasia: A Critical Study”. Despite the fact that Freud was
then Privatdozent (equivalent to associate professor) in the Department of
Neuropathology at the University of Vienna, there is no evidence of him
having examined any aphasic patient or even a brain taken from an aphasic
patient after death. The book is based entirely on the published works of
other authors. Although Freud was not completely opposed to the notion
of localized functions, he rejected the Broca-Wernicke scheme for language
dysfunctions, arguing instead for a more integrated model. In specific re-
gard to conduction aphasia, he expressed doubt about Wernicke’s claim
that speech repetition could be lost while speech and auditory comprehen-
sion remained unaffected and, in any case, he refused to believe that it could
be caused by the disruption of a fiber pathway, as proposed by Wernicke.
Wernicke did not give in to Freud’s criticism. On the contrary, he seemed
to feed upon it, spinning out even more detailed notions of localization. He
wrote about a “sensory projection field”, a “motor projection field” and
a center of ideas. Further, he speculated that psychoses are caused by
alterations of electrical activity in pathways connecting one or another of
the projection fields with the center of ideas. Emil Kraepelin was initially
attracted to Wernicke’s theories but, when Wernicke failed to produce con-
crete evidence, Kraepelin turned against him. Nissl, too, rejected localiza-
tion, at least with respect to mental illness. He believed that nerve cells,
regardless of their locations, held the clues to mental illness. Critics began
referring to Wernicke’s ideas as “brain mythology”.
Notwithstanding Wernicke’s shortcomings, modern neuroscience has con-
firmed that in many respects function is localized in the brain. There is
even evidence for partial localization of some mental illnesses. For example,
brain correlates of schizophrenia seem especially prominent in the frontal
lobe. Wernicke’s theory of cerebral localization of function is still alive
today, but it bears the scars of past battles.
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Nerve cells, or neurons, were first seen in 1836. They were discovered
by scientists practicing a particular sort of anatomy, that which concerns
the structure of biological cells. These scientists are known as histologists.
They slice up organic tissues, stain them, affix the sections to glass slides
and examine them under microscopes. Gudden was an histologist, and so
too was Nissl. The very early histologists had primitive microscopes and
no means of coloring the tissues, so they saw only the largest cells, and
these dimly. A breakthrough came when the histologists started staining
their tissues with carmine, a powdery substance obtained from the female
larvae of a scaly insect. It gave nerve cells a reddish color and made them
and their nuclei stand out from the background.
A German histologist named Otto Deiters wanted to see even more, so he
innovated. First, he used a special chemical solution that slightly hardened
the brain. He sliced a thin section with a hand-held blade and stained the
tissue with carmine dye. Finally, using a pair of fine needles, he gently
teased out a single neuron from the surrounding tissue. It was micro-
dissection, a tedious procedure that often failed, but when successful it en-
abled remarkably clear images of isolated neurons. Dieters had just enough
time to draw a few highly accurate representations of those images before
he died of typhoid fever at age twenty-nine. The drawings were published
posthumously by his brother, in 1865.
Deiters’ drawings show two types of delicate processes attached to the
neuronal cell body (a particularly beautiful example adorns the cover of this
book). The shorter processes, which he called protoplasmic extensions, are
today known as dendrites, and they typically branch like a tree. Dendrites
are specialized appendages that receive signals emitted by other neurons.
Deiters called the longer, thicker processes axis cylinders, now known as
axons. Usually each neuron has a single axon. Axons conduct electrical
pulses from one neuron to another. They often gather together in the
thousands or millions to form fiber bundles. Some bundles remain within
the brain, while others become nerves, leaving the brain to connect with
muscles and endocrine glands. Axons can be as short as a few micrometers
or, in the case of axons that cause the toes to wriggle, about one meter long
in an adult person of average height; the corresponding axons of a giraffe
are much longer.
Deiters was not a psychiatrist, but a medical doctor with a small private
practice. Most of his time was spent in the anatomy laboratory. Bern-
hard Gudden, by contrast was heavily involved in psychiatry, yet managed
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to conduct a substantial amount of neuroanatomical research “in his spare
time”, as the saying goes. Gudden’s serious engagement with neuroanatom-
ical research was directly inspired by Griesinger’s call for a science-based
psychiatry, so it is reasonable to ask, what was the nature of this research,
and what were its results?
Anatomists had only a basic knowledge of the brain when Gudden began
his research. They knew that it contained neurons, fibers and blood vessels.
The neurons had various shapes. Some were roundish, some star-like, and
still others pyramidal. Regardless of their types, the neurons tended to
mass together in countless numbers, but never so tightly that individuals
could not be discerned when using a high powered lens. The fibers were
long and very thin and looked nothing like neurons. Individual fibers could
be seen scattered around neurons, but they were most impressive when
massed together in bundles, also known as tracts.
Finding cells in the brain did not surprise Gudden and colleagues, be-
cause Rudolf Virchow, student of Johannes Müller, had shown that cells
are present everywhere in all plants and animals. But, their overwhelming
numbers in the brain puzzled the neuroanatomists and raised many ques-
tions. Why are they unevenly distributed throughout the brain? Why do
they appear in different sizes and different shapes? And, most obviously,
what exactly do brain cells do, and how do they do it?
The fibrous structures raised other questions. The largest tracts, such as
those crossing between the left and right hemispheres and those descending
from the top of the brain down into the spinal cord, glisten white in freshly
cut brains. They are obvious even to the naked eye. Because they span
large distances and look much like nerves, they were understood to link
different parts of the nervous system. More perplexing were the smaller
fiber tracts. These, too, were thought to connect different parts of the
brain, but it could not be determined which parts were connected to which
other parts, because it was very difficult to trace them from their origins
to their destinations. It was this problem of fiber pathways that Gudden
tackled.
Sigmund Freud was one of the few histologists who had actually seen long
fiber tracts in histological sections. He managed to do so by staining them
with gold chloride. Other histologists used variants of Freud’s gold chloride
stain. The gold stains sometimes left fibers nicely colored in pink, purple, or
blue, but more commonly they did not work at all. Later, it was discovered
that hematoxylin, a substance obtained from logwood trees, worked much
better. It stained nerve bundles darkly purple.
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Gudden began his nerve fiber research in Zurich. He made his first dis-
covery by examining brains with a simple magnifying glass. He noticed a
fiber bundle running close to the optic tract at the back of the eye, but along
the external surface of the brain. It diverges from the optic tract, crosses
to the opposite side of the brain, and terminates at sites not visited by
the optic tract. He called it the tractus peduncularis transversus. It forms
part of what anatomists refer to as the accessory optic system, a group of
fiber tracts that detects jittery visual images and helps to stabilize them
in the “mind’s eye”. Gudden discovered the tractus peduncularis transver-
sus while examining brains taken from rabbits. He subsequently found it
in twelve more animal species as well as in humans. He also discovered
another fiber tract, the supraoptic commissure, known today as Gudden’s
Commissure. Commissure is the anatomical term for a fiber tract that
bridges the two halves of the brain. Gudden’s Commissure passes directly
over the optic nerves, but it has no function related to vision.
Also in Zurich, Gudden did an experiment with young rabbits demon-
strating an important connection between the thalamus, a region near the
center of the brain, and the cerebral cortex, the outermost shell of the brain.
Gudden cut away part of the cortex and waited several weeks. When he
then examined the brain, he noticed that some areas within the thalamus
had shrunk. Looking more closely, he saw many dead or dying nerve cells.
He correctly surmised that the damage he had inflicted on the cortex had
spread to the thalamus along bands of fibers. It was the first evidence for
what has since become a well-established fact, namely, that the thalamus
relays motor and sensory signals to the cortex.
In Munich, Gudden put one of his assistant physicians, Dr. Sigbert
Ganser, in charge of the neuroanatomy laboratory. Only a few of the
research projects conducted there concerned human brains. Fewer still
utilized the brains of psychiatric patients, and it was not for a lack of post-
mortem material. The men were trying to learn about the basic composi-
tion and organization of vertebrate brains and, for this purpose, non-human
animals offered certain advantages. Because they were smaller, they were
easier to work with. Also, young animals could be used, and the histologists
quickly found that staining was optimized in the immature nervous system.
Fish, chickens, snakes, hedgehogs, moles and cats — all involuntarily gave
up their brains for the advancement of science.
Gudden was fortunate in having easy access to the best microscopes in
the world. They were manufactured by Ernst Leica in Wetzlar and Carl
Zeiss in Jena, two companies that remain at the forefront of optical instru-
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mentation today. He also had the latest photographic equipment. Still,
Gudden faced formidable technical challenges. Even preparing brain tis-
sues for microscopic examination was far from routine. Histologists needed
to slice the brain into very thin sections. The slices had to be thin enough
for light to penetrate through them, but not so thin as to wrinkle or break
apart. As an approximation, they needed to be about fifty micrometers
thick, or one-half the width of a human hair. It is impossible to slice a
mushy brain so thinly.
To get around the problem, anatomists submersed the brain (or small
pieces taken from it) into a solution of picric acid. After several days in
the acid, the brain turned yellow, but the color was of no consequence.
What mattered was that it was now hard enough to be cut with a sharp
blade. The next problem was how to maneuver the blade so that it would
cleanly slice off fifty micrometers, no more and no less. A mechanical device
was needed, a sturdy instrument that could hold both the blade and the
brain piece, then bring the two objects precisely together. In 1875, Gudden
designed an instrument, a microtome, that was able to do that.
Gudden’s microtome consisted of two moveable parts. The brain was
affixed atop a metallic cylinder that could be moved up and down. A
second device held the knife blade in such a manner that it could be slid
through the brain. After cleaning the knife with alcohol, the microscopist
submerged both the brain and the knife in water. He then raised, or lowered
the brain piece until it appeared just slightly above the level of the knife;
this was accomplished by turning a screw beneath the cylinder. Crucially,
the thickness of the section could be finely and repeatedly adjusted, thanks
to the precision of the screw mechanism. To cut sections, the knife was
pushed along a rail until it passed through the tissue, allowing the detached
section to float safely away. The section was picked up with a fine brush
and placed on a glass microscope slide.
With the microtome now providing Gudden with a steady supply of high
quality brain sections (he collected more than 50,000), he tackled the prob-
lem of fiber pathways within the brain. In principle, one could stain all
the fibers with hematoxylin and then track a selected bundle as it moved
through successive (serial) sections. Unfortunately, tracing a bundle of
interest through a large number of brain sections can be a tedious and
unrewarding task, because fibers typically traverse a dense jungle of cell
bodies, dendrites and incidental nerve fibers en route to their destinations.
Gudden invented a far more efficient method, based on his earlier work on
thalamus-cortex connections. Now, instead of cutting away large areas of
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the cortex, he damaged the nerves associated with selected sense organs.
After waiting for several weeks or months, he looked in the brain for degen-
erating axons, which had a very different appearance than intact, healthy
fibers. Following these degenerating fibers, Gudden was able to reconstruct
the pathways taken by the sensory nerves as they entered the brain.
Gudden used his new method to study the pathways taken by the optic
nerves, a subject that had been debated for at least two hundred years.
Each eye gives rise to its own optic nerve. There is a spot behind the
eyes and centered between them where the two nerves appear to cross one
another; it is called the optic chiasm. Some commentators interpreted
this to mean that each eye sends its visual information to the opposite, or
contralateral, side of the brain. To see if this was true, Gudden removed one
eye from each of several young rabbits and young dogs. In every animal, he
found that the optic nerves crossed partially, that is, some of the individual
fibers in the each nerve went to the contralateral side while others stayed
on the ipsilateral side. Later studies in humans demonstrated that about
one-half of the fibers cross over. We get our binocular and stereoscopic
vision from the partial crossing of the optic nerves.
Gudden made all of these discoveries, and more, while overseeing three
hundred patients, a nursing staff and medical trainees at Munich’s only
mental hospital. Did his research benefit any of his patients? No, but
his improvements to the microtome and his dogged pursuit of fiber path-
ways set an example for future psychiatrists determined to lay bare the
brain’s intricate structures. Although Gudden suffered an early death at
Lake Starnberg, his neuroanatomical research remains alive in the scientific
literature. Moreover, by putting into practice the hopeful message of Wil-
helm Griesinger, Gudden made sure that his talented students would carry
it even further.
After Gudden’s death at Lake Starnberg, Franz Nissl followed up on
his professor’s work. Gudden had found – in his experiment linking the
thalamus to the cortex – that nerve cell bodies shrivel up and die after
their axons are damaged. He relied on the phenomenon to find the cells
that give rise to the axon bundles that interested him. The cells died very
slowly, however, after their axons were cut. Often the cell deaths could not
be detected until weeks or months had passed. Nissl thought he might find
a quicker, more reliable method.
There is a nerve, called the facial nerve, that runs from the brain to the
face. Within this nerve lie thousands of axons, or fibers. They come from
cells located somewhere in the brain. Where, exactly, are those cells?
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Working with rabbits, Nissl located the facial nerve under the skin on its
way from the brain to the face. He intentionally damaged it, then patched
up the wound and waited a few days before killing the animal. He cut brain
sections and stained them with methylene blue, an aniline dye. Next, Nissl
scanned slide after slide until he found what he was looking for. Deep in
the brainstem, near the spinal cord, he noticed a group of neurons whose
nuclei were exceptionally dark and displaced to the edges of the cell. Also,
the granules that he had discovered during his student days in Munich were
broken up and barely recognizable, in contrast to nearby neurons in which
the granules looked normal. Nissl surmised that the cells with the dark,
displaced nuclei and the broken-up granules had axons in the nerve that he
damaged. These axons, from those cells, formed the facial nerve.
Here was a method for tracing fiber pathways that was quicker and easier
than Gudden’s. It would be used not just for finding the origins of nerves,
but also for discovering connections between one area of the brain and
another. Knowledge of that sort was needed to resolve issues around the
hypothesized localization of function. For example, it had been proposed
that conduction aphasia might be caused by a disconnection between the
brain area responsible for speech comprehension (Wernicke’s area) and the
area responsible for speech production (Broca’s area). Obviously, for there
to be such a disconnection, the connection itself must first be confirmed in
undamaged brains. Later research demonstrated that, in fact, there is no
such connection.
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Nissl and his fellow histologists were familiar with the various sizes and
shapes of neurons. What they did not understand, and what puzzled
them, was the anatomical relationship between individual neurons. It was
a daunting problem. Does each neuron stand as an independent unit or
do neurons connect to one another through their axons? The fiber bundles
studied by Gudden and Nissl are made of axons. They originate at neu-
ronal cell bodies, but what becomes of them at their endings? Does the
axon of one neuron fuse with the axon of another neuron? Does it fuse
with another cell body, with dendrites, or with nothing at all? Histologists
needed to know whether or not neurons are connected through fibrous link-
ages, and to find out, they needed a method that would clearly reveal axon
endings. But there were none. In the eyes of some microscopists, looking at
some examples, the axons appeared to contact cell dendrites. Other axons
appeared to contact cell bodies. The microscopic images were too fuzzy for
anyone to be sure.
In the absence of hard facts, neuroanatomists throughout Europe took
sides. Those who thought that the nervous system is a collection of individ-
ual cells standing alone, in other words, not fusing, were called neuronists.
In the opposite camp were the reticularists, named after the reticulum, or
web, that they thought connected the neurons. Albert von Kölliker was
a respected anatomist and also a reticularist. His drawing, published in
1867, illustrates a reticularist’s conception of the nervous system (Figure
19). Note that all the structures are shown fused together. It must be em-
phasized that the drawing is schematic; it depicts what Kölliker imagined,
not what he actually saw.
The controversy about neurons and nerve nets had no direct bearing on
mental illness, yet many of the anatomists participating in the debate were
psychiatrists. Why? Because they understood that knowing whether the
brain is a reticulum or a collection of individual cells is essential to under-
standing how the brain works, and knowing how it works is a precondition
for knowing how it malfunctions.
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Figure 19: The nervous system depicted as a web of connected structures.
The labelled structures b, b’, c and c’ are nerve cells; a and d
are axons. The unlabeled, branched structures are dendrites.
[Albert von Kölliker, 1867]
One of the histologists competing to resolve the issue of reticulum versus
neuronism was Joseph von Gerlach, who invented a staining method for just
that purpose. After viewing sections stained with the new method, Gerlach
declared, “I have been able to show with the gold method the continuity
[italics added] of the network [axons] with the protoplasmic prolongations
[dendrites] of the nerve cells.”79 In other words, he had found evidence to
support the reticular theory – or so he believed.
In Italy, Camillo Golgi from the University of Pavia, was also working
on a new staining method. His method was much better than Gerlach’s,
and good enough for a Nobel Prize. Golgi hardened his sections in a solu-
tion made of potassium bichromate and osmic acid. He then immersed the
sections in a dilute solution of silver nitrate. The resulting silver-chromate
precipitate made the neurons appear black. Whereas the carmine and ani-
line dyes used by Nissl and his German colleagues stained the nerve cell
79Quoted in Gordon M. Shepherd, Foundations of the Neuron Doctrine, 25th anniversary
ed., New York, Oxford University Press (2016), p. 57.
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bodies, and only the bodies, the silver method revealed all parts of the
neurons. Crucially, the silver stain showed the delicate dendritic branches
and the fine fibers in exquisite detail. Only about one in ten neurons took
up the silver –for unknown reasons – but this was actually a good thing,
because it allowed every stained neuron to be viewed in its entirety. If
all neurons were stained equally well, the whole slide would be blackened,
making it impossible to see anything well.
In a report published in 1873, Golgi claimed that he saw fused fibers. In
his words, “It being demonstrated ... that a nervous fibre is in relation with
extensive groups of ganglia cells [neurons], and that the gangliar elements of
entire provinces, and also of various neighboring provinces, are conjoined
by means of a diffuse network ... it is naturally difficult [in light of the
foregoing] to understand a rigorous functional localization, as many would
have it.”80 Golgi was thinking of Wernicke, whose localization theory Golgi
disliked.
Franz Nissl was also in the reticularist camp, even though the staining
techniques at his disposal (aniline dyes) precluded him from personally
confirming (or refuting) their claims. He, Golgi and many others, felt that
the reticular idea must be right because localization was wrong. If functions
are distributed rather than localized, then the brain must be a continuous
web rather than a collection of solitary neurons.
Lining up on the side of the neuronists were Otto Deiters, August Forel
(an accomplished anatomist and former student of Wilhelm Gudden) and
several other reputable German microscopists. Deiters had reported cer-
tain observations that seemed to show gaps between axons and dendrites –
rather than the continuity claimed by Gerlach and Golgi – but the evidence
remained inconclusive at the time of his early death.
Also weighing in on the issue was Sigmund Freud, in Vienna. Before
practicing psychotherapy – even before working as a neuropathologist (and
writing about aphasia) – he did neuroanatomical research at the Physio-
logical Institute in Vienna. The work ranged from studies of invertebrate
nervous systems to studies of the human brain. He published several pa-
pers on staining methods and another on the structure of neurons and nerve
fibers in crayfish. In 1884, he gave a lecture before the Viennese Psychiatric
Society in which he addressed, among other things, the question of cellular
organization in the nervous system. Freud said (as it was later reported),
80G. M. Shepherd (2016), p. 94.
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[I]f ... the fibrils of the nerve fiber have the function of isolated
conductive pathways [which] are confluent in the nerve cell, the
nerve cell becomes the beginning of all those nerve fibers which
are anatomically connected to it ... Then we could consider the
possibility that the nerve as a unit conducts the excitation.81
In stating that nerve fibers (axons) are “confluent in” (emanate from)
nerve cells, and in suggesting that nerve cells act as units, Freud’s thoughts
echoed those of the neuronists.
In October of 1889, neuronists and reticularists gathered in Berlin for
a meeting of the German Anatomical Society. The event was hosted by
Wilhelm von Waldeyer-Hartz, then head of the Anatomy Department at the
University of Berlin. His distinguished reputation, along with the prestige
of the Anatomical Society, ensured a good attendance. Men (again, only
men) from Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Spain and all parts of Germany came
to the event. In comparison to modern neuroscience conventions at which
attendances can reach over 30,000, the total number of attendees at the
Berlin meeting was miniscule. Nevertheless, in the two rooms given over
to the meeting, the air was hot with anticipation and thick with cigar
smoke. The meeting marked a turning point in the history of neuroscience
because, for the first time, the microscope slides of a previously obscure
Spanish anatomist were seen by scientists outside his home country.
Santiago Ramón y Cajal, the anatomist with the splendid slides, provided
a vivid description of the Berlin conference in his delightful autobiogra-
phy.82 The young scientist prepared for his first trip to Germany knowing
full well that he would find in Berlin many of the anatomists whose work
he had read about and emulated. “I gathered together for the purpose
all my scanty savings and set out, full of hope for the capital of the Ger-
man Empire.” Upon arriving in Berlin, he was pleased by the “courteous”
reception accorded him by his colleagues. As for the colleagues’ reaction
to him – the stranger from afar – he wrote, “It was a shock for them,
no doubt, to meet a Spaniard who cultivated science and had of his own
volition entered upon the paths of research.” Not only had the Germans
never encountered a Spaniard at any of their meetings, Cajal was a differ-
ent sort of scientist. Born of humble origins in the district of Aragon in
81Quote from L. C. Triarhou and M. del Cerro, “Freud’s contribution to neuroanatomy,”
Archives of Neurology 42:282-287 (1985).
82Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Recollections of My Life, translated by E. Horne Craigie,
Cambridge, MA, M.I.T Press (1937). The account of the Berlin conference is on
pages 355-359.
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northeastern Spain, he had labored for years in nearly complete isolation.
His passion for neuroanatomy, however, was no less intense than that of his
northern counterparts. Only thirty-seven years of age at the time of the
Berlin meeting, he had penetrating eyes, a long straight nose and a neatly
trimmed, dark beard. He neither smoked nor drank alcohol. No one could
have mistaken him for a German.
Figure 20: Santiago Ramón y Cajal, 1887.
Cajal sat impatiently through the first event of the conference, the oral
presentations. He knew little German and was, in any case anxiously await-
ing the start of the next event, the demonstrations. Traveling by train from
Barcelona, he had brought with him his precious Zeiss microscope. Dur-
ing a break between the oral presentations and the demonstrations, Cajal
placed the microscope on a table in the demonstration room, and he set
up three locally requisitioned microscopes in a similar manner. Next, he
removed his four best glass slides from a small, well cushioned box and put
one slide under each microscope. Finally, he precisely positioned each slide
so that the microscope lens bore directly down on its best features.
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With these four slides, and others retained in the small box, Cajal meant
to demonstrate the power of Golgi’s silver staining method. He had mod-
ified the method by cutting thicker sections and adding a second round of
hardening followed by a second immersion in silver. The thicker sections
allowed a microscopist to see all parts of the stained neurons by focusing up
and down within the section. The added cycles of hardening and staining
produced a darker stain. As well, Cajal used very young animals for his
studies, again because the stain worked best in these animals. The slides
that he brought to Berlin showcased neurons and fibers from many differ-
ent areas of the nervous system including the cerebrum, the cerebellum,
the retina and the spinal cord.
Figure 21: Cajal’s drawing of neuron types in the mammalian cerebellum,
from silver stained tissue sections. Schematic presentation com-
bining observations from numerous individual sections.
Never before had Cajal’s northern colleagues seen silver-stained neurons.
“[T]hese savants, then world celebrities, began their examination with more
skepticism than curiosity. Undoubtedly, they expected a fiasco. However,
when there had been paraded before their eyes in a procession of irreproach-
able images of the utmost clearness ... the supercilious frowns disappeared.”
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Obviously, Cajal had moved beyond his humble beginnings by the time of
writing his autobiography.
Along with his slides, Cajal brought strong reasons for rejecting reticular-
ism and accepting neuronism. The general argument was three-fold. First,
where the slides showed immature neurons growing in embryonic brains,
no part of any neuron was seen touching any other neuron or any fiber.
Second, damaged neurons were seen degenerating as single units, leaving
neighboring cells unaffected. Third, where axons approached a neuronal
cell body or one of its dendrites, small gaps could be seen between the fiber
endings and the cell body or dendrite. Ironically, the last mentioned obser-
vation turned out to be an artifact of Cajal’s staining procedure, but in the
end it did not matter, because synapses, which are the definitive proof of
the gaps between neurons, were discovered in 1955 using an electron micro-
scope. While Cajal’s arguments were mostly technical, he also noted the
distressing implications of the reticular theory, “To affirm that everything
communicates with everything else is equivalent to declaring the absolute
unsearchability of the organ of the soul.”83
There can be no doubt about the effects of Cajal’s demonstrations on
the “savants”. Albert von Kölliker, whom Cajal described as the “vener-
able patriarch of German histology”, took special notice. As noted above,
Kölliker was a backer of reticularism, or at least he was until he met Cajal
and viewed his slides. He befriended Cajal, taught himself Spanish so he
could read Cajal’s papers, and persuaded Cajal to give him detailed instruc-
tions for silver-staining. In the ensuing years, Kölliker replicated many of
Cajal’s most controversial findings. He rejected net theory and joined the
neuronist camp. Wilhelm Waldeyer-Hartz, host of the Berlin conference,
also learned Spanish so that he could fully absorb Cajal’s arguments. Al-
though he did not contribute new histological work, Waldeyer-Hartz wrote
a lengthy defense of the neuron theory that brought many anatomists to
Cajal’s side. In the course of writing the article, Waldeyer-Hartz coined
the term “neuron”.
Santiago Ramón y Cajal and Camillo Golgi were jointly awarded Nobel
prizes in 1906 for their ground breaking work, even though Golgi was not yet
convinced of the neuron theory. To this day, Cajal’s drawings continue to
draw admiration from practicing neuroscientists, and his life story serves
as an inspiration for all kinds of scientists. Buried in the middle of his
autobiography is a short paragraph, written in his inimitable style, that
speaks to the passionate character of this remarkable man,
83S. R. Y. Cajal (1937), p. 338.
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It is an actual fact that, leaving aside the flatteries of self-love,
the garden of neurology holds out to the investigator captivat-
ing spectacles and incomparable artistic emotions. In it my
aesthetic instincts found full satisfaction at last. Like the ento-
mologist in pursuit of brightly colored butterflies, my attention
hunted, in the flower garden of the gray matter [the cerebrum],
cells with delicate and elegant forms, the mysterious butterflies
of the soul the beating of whose wings may some day – who
knows? – clarify the secret of mental life.84
Franz Nissl probably attended the Berlin conference in 1889, although
no record confirms it. Assuming that he did attend, we can further assume
that he presented his recent work on progressive paralysis, research that
was conducted in collaboration with Alois Alzheimer. He probably gave
a talk about the work, wearing his customarily disheveled clothing and
speaking in his rambling, ungrammatical manner. After the talk, he would
have demonstrated slides showing the cellular deformations and blood ves-
sel aberrations characteristic of the illness. His colleagues, who generally
appreciated his open personality and quirky sense of humor, would have ap-
plauded politely. Nevertheless, Nissl must have felt sidelined at the Berlin
conference (assuming his presence), because the buzz was about Cajal’s
gorgeous black neurons and their important implications. Nissl had little
to contribute to the debate over reticularism and neuronism because he was
a specialist in the use of aniline dyes, and they did not stain fibers. If he
ever tried using the Golgi-Cajal silver stain, there is nothing in his writings
to suggest that it worked for him.
–//–
Because Nissl was an anatomist and a psychiatrist he appreciated the fact
that the brain is not just an organ for controlling facial movements, it is
also – most probably – home to the mind. Or was it the soul? He struggled
to understand how the soul differs from the mind, and where the brain
fits in. Although his father had tried to steer him into the priesthood,
Nissl was not a religious man. In spite of that, he occasionally welcomed
into his Heidelberg apartment the parish priest from his hometown, whom
he had known since his youth. There is no record of what was said in
those meetings, but one can imagine Nissl inquiring about the soul. What,
84S. R. Y. Cajal (1937), p. 363.
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exactly, is it? And where, exactly, does it reside? Philosophers have tripped
over the same questions for millennia. Indeed, we all do. Maybe the priest
suggested some answers that Nissl found useful. But Nissl, the scientist,
must have wanted more. Understandably, therefore, he grew feverish with
excitement when he learned of an anatomical finding that possibly held the
key to all of this.
Nissl’s interest was aroused by research that was being done at the Zoo-
logical Laboratory in Naples, Italy, by a Hungarian scientist named Stephan
von Apáthy. Histologists were always hoping to find structures never seen
before and, as readers of this book may have gathered by now, the most
common route to a new observation was the invention of a better stain. In
Apáthy’s case, his breakthrough discovery came after he incorporated gold
chloride into the hardening solution, similar to what Freud and Gerlach
had done.
The novel structures revealed by Apáthy’s stain were very thin fibers,
known as fibrils. They were violet in color and much finer than any of the
axons or dendrites seen by other histologists. According to Apáthy’s de-
scription, the fibrils formed a diffuse web all around the neurons, and some
passed right through cells. Apáthy interpreted the fibrils as conducting ele-
ments, meaning he thought they conveyed information from one neuron to
another. In effect, he was reporting new evidence in favor of the reticulum
theory of cellular organization.
Nissl was initially skeptical. After all, the fibrils had only been observed
in a marine leech, not in any animal possessed of a backbone. While he
subscribed to Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, he was not prepared to
accept findings from a leech as evidence that fibrils are present in the human
brain. But then Nissl read that Albrecht Bethe, a German physiologist and
anatomist, had found fibrils in vertebrate brains. The news persuaded Nissl
that fibrils were real – and very interesting.
Nissl’s own work was still focused on nerve cell bodies, they being the
objects best stained by aniline dyes. He had enjoyed early success with the
discovery of tiny granules (the eponymous Nissl bodies), and his work with
Alzheimer on progressive paralysis had been well received. So, too, was
he getting credit from peers for his method of tracing fiber pathways by
examining cell body structures. Other projects, however had not turned
out so well. With the exception of progressive paralysis, he had not found
strong evidence of neuropathology in any mental illness. Now, the reports
of Apáthy and Bethe gave him pause to reconsider. Perhaps nerve cells,
that is nerve cell bodies, were not really so important. Maybe they were
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not responsible for the brain’s functions. Maybe Apáthy’s fibrils held the
key to understanding the brain.
As Nissl arrived in Baden for the twenty-third meeting of the Association
of Southwest German Neurologists and Psychiatrists (commonly known as
the Hiking Meeting), he anticipated that his colleagues would want to hear
about his most recent research. That work, on using drugs to model mental
illness, had not gone well, as will become apparent below. So, when it
came time for Nissl to speak, he briefly summarized that failed research
and then quickly turned to the work of Apáthy and Bethe. Because he
was speaking before a sympathetic audience comprised mostly of friends
and collaborators, he felt no restraint in presenting the unconventional
conclusions that he had drawn from Apáthy’s discovery. As he warmed to
the task, his voice grew louder, his speech more rapid, and his sense more
muddled.85
He asked his esteemed colleagues to imagine two components in the ner-
vous system. First, he said, the familiar nerve cell. Second, a substance
fundamentally different from any cell, fiber, or other structure in the brain,
but present everywhere. He called this substance “gray matter”, and he ac-
knowledged Apáthy’s role in discovering the interwoven mass of fine fibrils
from which his concept derived. He repeatedly stated that the true nature
of the gray matter is unknown. Regardless, he asserted that the real work
of the nervous system is done not by nerve cells, but by gray matter.
As proof of his contention, Nissl offered two lines of evidence. The first
came from work done by Albrecht Bethe at the Naples Zoological Labora-
tory. Bethe’s attention had been drawn to the antennae of some local crabs.
The antennae are long, paired appendages that move about in the water
sensing chemicals and hard surfaces. When Bethe found fibrils inside the
antennae, he decided to conduct an experiment. He painstakingly removed
all the nerve cells – but none of the fibrils – from the antennae of several
crabs. After the animals recovered from the surgery, he tested their reflexes
by touching their antennae. Healthy crabs rapidly withdraw their antennae
at the slightest touch, and the experimental animals did that too. Since
all the nerve cells had been removed from the antenna of the experimental
crabs, it was clearly the fibrils, not the nerve cells, that were responsible
for the movements.
85Nissl’s address at the meeting of the Versammlung der Südwestdetuschen Neurologen
und Irrenärtze, in Baden, was published in the Münchener Medicinische Wochen-
schrift, pp. 988-1063 (1898).
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The second proof came from Nissl’s own examination of the cerebrum in
three mammalian species: moles, dogs and humans. In this investigation,
he looked only at the spaces between nerve cells, guided by the following
reasoning. Assuming that gray matter – invisible with his methods – was
filling the space between the cells, he expected to see the largest spaces
in humans, somewhat smaller spaces in dogs, and the smallest in moles,
because the more “advanced” the species, the more gray matter it should
have. Sure enough, that is exactly what he found. The anatomical results,
he told his audience in Baden, correlated perfectly with the intelligence of
the species. Hearing this, the neurologists and psychiatrists of southwestern
Germany may have squirmed and fiddled in their seats, but they waited to
hear more.
Nissl’s voice became even more animated, his language more fractured,
as he broadened his message. He stated his belief that the advanced animal
species need something more than nerve cells – more, indeed, than all types
of cells – to support their functions. That additional something was gray
matter. He explained,
From this point of view, the idea, somewhat strange to our usual
thought, becomes intelligible, that the highest functions of the
vertebrate body are not directly attached to cells, but to a living
substance, the morphological arrangement of which reminds one
much rather of anything else than of cells. We need only look
carefully into our body to convince ourselves readily that the
most differentiated sense-organs, or the voluntary muscles, offer
similar relations.
What, then, is the function of nerve cells?
The cells play a role in the nervous system, but they are not re-
sponsible for its functions. Rather, it is the gray matter, distinct
from the cells, that controls our thoughts and actions. Although
we do not yet know the true essence of the gray matter, it is the
most highly evolved protoplasm86 in the entire body. For these
86Protoplasm is an older term roughly corresponding to the modern term, cytoplasm.
In the late nineteenth century, it was widely believed that protoplasm was the fun-
damental substance of life.
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reasons, you will surely agree with me that the neuron theory
cannot be correct.87
So there it was, Nissl’s ultimate refutation of neuronism. The presen-
tation drew a mixed reception from the assembled doctors. Some men
were impressed, but most were simply confused. The American psychia-
trist Adolph Meyer later wrote that the speech was “long and not lucid.”
Meyer had recently spent six weeks visiting Kraepelin and Nissl in Heidel-
berg. Upon returning to America, Meyer became (for a short while) an
enthusiastic supporter of Kraepelin’s brand of psychiatry. Nevertheless, his
criticism of Nissl’s radical ideas was scathing.
Many expressions [were] given meanings which seem to be the
fountain-head of confusion; I mention only his use of the term
‘cell’. Nissl’s cell is a decidedly expurgated affair, a sponge
through the holes of which the ‘real nervous substance’ grows
quite irrespective of the fact that the fibrils and expurgated
cell-concept are together that which we are accustomed to call
cell for reasons too simple to be offered to Dr. Nissl. The same
holds for ‘gray matter’ of which nobody would ever think that
it meant what Nissl wants it to mean. Perhaps this terminology
is necessary to produce the degree of obscurity so popular for
certain kinds of demonstrations.88
Moreover, many persons in attendance at the Baden meeting firmly be-
lieved in the neuron theory. They knew and respected Albert von Kölliker,
who was by now championing that theory, and some had even read Ramón
y Cajal’s articles. One imagines that the men gave Nissl a round of ap-
plause for his provocative presentation, and immediately filed out of the
lecture hall for supper. Gray matter had had its day, but it was a short
day.
Nissl made a big deal out of fibrils, and it turned out that he was wrong
to do so. That does not make him a bad scientist. It only means that in this
particular instance, his enthusiasm was misplaced. As a rule, science needs
87The quoted passages from Nissl’s lecture were translated into English by Adolph Meyer,
“Critical review of recent publications of Bethe and Nissl,” Journal of Comparative
Neurology 9:38-45 (1899).
88A. Meyer (1898), p. 43. Nissl’s concept of gray matter differs from current usage, where
gray matter refers to the cell-rich regions of the cerebral cortex, contrasting to the
fiber-rich regions known as white matter.
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bold ideas. If proven false, they can be forgotten, but when proven true,
they jumpstart new inventions and new medical advances. As for the fibrils
first described by Apáthy and Bethe, they are now known to constitute
the neuron’s cytoskeleton, a network of protein filaments that maintains
the cell’s structural integrity. All types of cells, not just neurons, have
cytoskeletons. Unfortunately, Nissl thought they had an entirely different
function.
139
12 Mind-Altering Drugs and
Disease-Causing Poisons
Drugs were everywhere, it seems, in nineteenth century psychiatry. Ubiqui-
tous in clinical wards, they were also present in research laboratories. Like
now, they were usually beneficial when taken for medical purposes, and
generally benign when used cautiously for recreational purposes, but toxic
or poisonous when taken in high dosages. Nineteenth century psychiatrists
were well aware of this dual character. They both feared it and exploited
it.
Psychiatrists knew that certain drugs are mentally destabilizing, and
can cause serious mental derangements in susceptible individuals. Based
on those observations, they hypothesized that at least some mental illnesses
might be caused by unidentified substances acting as poisons in the human
body. Both ingested poisons and internally produced substances were sus-
pect. During the last half of the nineteenth century, marijuana was hardly
known, cocaine was rare, and few of the prescription drugs familiar to us
today existed. The dominate drug, by far, was alcohol, and it is the perfect
example of a drug that was capable of multiple effects, both good and bad.
It was at once a social lubricant, a medication and a deadly poison. As
such, it will be given special treatment later in this chapter.
The drug most commonly used in asylums and clinics was chloral hy-
drate. It was one of several compounds known as “hypnotics” due to their
ability to sedate patients and put them to sleep. Chloral hydrate was par-
ticularly effective, but also addictive and toxic. First synthesized in 1832
(by the chlorination of alcohol), it was not used as a medicine until 1869.
Thereafter, chloral hydrate quickly found a place in psychiatric practice.
Two additional synthetic drugs, sulphonal and the faster-acting trional,
came on the scene somewhat later. Hyoscyamine and hyoscine were both
extracted from nightshade plants; they were cheaper than choral hydrate,
but less potent. Potassium bromide was the cheapest of all the hypnotic
drugs, but it had to used cautiously because it induced nausea, vomiting
and even seizures. The main non-sedating medications were urethane (ethyl
carbamate) and alcohol, the latter used primarily with depressed or mildly
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agitated patients. Highly agitated patients were given morphine. The drug
of choice for any particular patient depended on its availability and cost,
in addition to the experience of the prescribing doctor.
Long before the use of sedatives became commonplace, Hippocrates and
his fellow physicians treated mentally disturbed patients with purgatives.
Hippocrates believed that all disorders, both physical and mental, were
caused by the excessive accumulation of certain substances in the human
body, which he called humors. Therefore, to purge his patients of a harmful
humor, he gave them powders made from the roots of the black Hellebore
plant. Hippocrates observed that Hellebore induces a kind of hysterical
suffocation in women, along with menstruation and vomiting. He imagined
that the blood and vomit removed the offending humor from the body.
Bloodletting was another way of ridding the body of poisonous sub-
stances. Already used by physicians in ancient Greece, its popularity in-
creased even more after the highly reputed Galen promoted it in the second
century AD. In the late seventeenth century, Thomas Willis, the otherwise
wise physician and accomplished neuroanatomist, practiced bloodletting.
Even at the end of the eighteenth century, venesection, or the cutting of
veins, was commonly employed in French asylums, although Phillipe Pinel
denounced it. And finally, doctors applied leeches to the patients’ skin so
that the animals could suck out the bad blood.
The notion that bad things happen after bad things enter the body be-
came all the more real after Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch discovered
those microscopic organisms called germs. Psychiatrists combined the new
germ theory of physical disease with the earlier notion of drug toxicity to
forge a new hypothesis for mental diseases. They imagined bacteria break-
ing down tissue proteins, which would then release toxic residues into the
blood. The toxins were thought to affect mental health indirectly by dis-
rupting the secretion of natural substances, primarily hormones. In the
final step, the hormonal imbalance affected brain activity. It was an idea
built in part on Griesinger’s theory of mental reflexes, wherein mental ill-
ness were caused by either insufficient activity or excessive activity.
Evidence for the role of hormonal imbalance came from the example of
myxedema, which is a serious disease manifested by multiple symptoms.
Of particular interest, is its association with a form of psychosis known as
myxedema madness. Myxedema was thought to be caused by a deficiency
of thyroid hormone, and an English physician proved that to be true by
successfully treating a patient with an extract made from a sheep’s thyroid
gland.
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Spurred by these developments, Nissl became interested in studying the
cerebrospinal fluid, which is a clear, colorless fluid that bathes the brain
and spinal cord. Although the cerebrospinal fluid is now understood to act
primarily as a physical cushion, little was known about it in Nissl’s time.
His mind was drawn to the possibility that the cerebrospinal fluid could
become contaminated. If so, it might hold clues to mental illness. So Nissl
started thinking that there might be something of interest in the chemistry
of the cerebrospinal fluid. When word of a new medical procedure come to
his attention, he saw his opportunity to test the idea. He learned of the
procedure from the published report of a medical meeting held in the town
of Wiesbaden in 1891.
A local doctor named Heinrich Quincke had been studying the circulation
of the cerebrospinal fluid in dogs. His method consisted of releasing a bit of
dye into the cerebrospinal fluid from a needle inserted between two spinal
bones. This allowed him to watch as the colored patch of cerebrospinal
fluid moved its way through the nervous system. At around the same time
as Quincke was conducting these experiments, he became aware of some
cases of childhood hydrocephalus, a serious medical condition caused by
excessive fluids in the brain. The worst affected children suffered terrible
headaches and had noticeably swollen heads. Quincke thought that if he
could relieve pressure in the brain by withdrawing cerebrospinal fluid, he
might cure the condition. Experimenting with one patient, he inserted a
long needle between two of the child’s spinal bones – as he had done with
his dogs – but instead of injecting dye, he withdrew fluid. The treatment
did not work, but it drew the attention of Nissl, who soon became smitten
with spinal puncture.
At Heidelberg, Nissl copied Quincke’s techniques. Over the course of
many years, he withdrew cerebrospinal fluid from hundreds of patients. He
did not find any substances in the fluid relevant to psychiatric illness, but he
did develop a method for quantifying the fluid’s protein content, and mod-
ern versions of that method are used today in psychiatric research. Nissl’s
students were so impressed with his frequent demonstrations of spinal punc-
ture, they gave him the nickname, Punctator Maximus.
–//–
We do not know what particular substances Nissl was looking for in the
cerebrospinal fluid, but he most likely viewed them as poisons, because he
believed that it was poisons of one sort or another that cause mental illness.
In further pursuit of the hypothesis, he launched an experimental test. He
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did it in a roundabout way by studying brain cells instead of mental illness,
and using rabbits instead of humans as his subjects. The rationale linking
poisons, rabbit brain cells and mental illness is a bit complicated, so I will
explain.
Nissl thought that there were five types of neurons in the cerebral cortex,
based on the structures seen within their cell bodies. (Today, hundreds of
neuron types are recognized, based mostly on biochemical, electrophysiolog-
ical and anatomical criteria. See Figure 21 on page 132.) Nissl identified
one type in which the cytoplasm (the non-nuclear portion the cell inte-
rior) was completely unstained, while the nucleus was heavily stained and
unusually large. Another type had a small, lightly stained nucleus. The
remaining types were distinguished by the size and arrangement of the dark
granules that he had discovered in Munich.
Neuron types were important for Nissl, and he believed that each type
had a unique function. He did not elaborate on these functions, but one can
imagine that they might govern such things as movement, mood, volition
and intelligence.
The relationship between neuron types and mental illness, according to
Nissl, was quite simple. He assumed, first of all, that nerve cell abnormal-
ities could explain all forms of mental illness. Further, he assumed that
the type of illness depended on which type of neuron was abnormal. So,
for example, mental disorder type A might be caused by abnormalities in
neuron type Y whereas mental disorder type B would be due to abnor-
malities in neuron type Z. It was the hypothesis that drove his work with
Alzheimer on progressive paralysis. That research was successful in that
neuronal pathologies were found, but it also disappointed Nissl because
those pathologies were present not in any single cell type, but rather, in all
cell types.
Still, Nissl was not ready to give up on the idea. Maybe progressive
paralysis was special, or maybe he and Alzheimer had not carried out the
investigation in the best possible manner. He thought about poisons. If
poisons were responsible for mental illnesses, then different poisons should
cause different mental disorders by affecting different types of neurons. This
cell-based theory was Nissl’s answer to Wernicke’s location-based theory.
To test the theory, Nissl injected rabbits with a single strong dose of a
commonly available drug such as morphine, tetanus toxin, or strychnine.
After waiting several weeks, he killed the animals, cut their brains into
sections and stained with methylene blue dye. As anticipated, he found
odd-appearing structures inside some of the neurons. However, he had to
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look hard to find good examples, and he could not determine whether each
poison produced a specific type of change in a specific type of cell. So,
he altered the experiment. Instead of administering just a single dose of
the poison, he injected many weaker doses over the course of several weeks
or months. One particular rabbit received a small dose of morphine every
day for nine months. When Nissl looked at these brains, he saw more
instances of cellular pathology, but to his dismay, there were absolutely no
correlations between poisons and affected cell types.
Experiments fail for many reasons. The research animals can be sick, the
equipment defective, the sampling biased, or the environment surrounding
the experiment uncontrolled. It is also possible for an investigator to err in
his execution of the experiment or in the analysis of its results. Nissl had
many research disappointments, and he usually attributed his failures to
the last mentioned cause. In the case of the poisoning experiments, how-
ever, he had to admit that the ideas that motivated the experiments were
wrong. He was forced to abandon the twined hypotheses of toxic causes
and function-specific neuron types. It was with these disappointments still
fresh in his mind that he traveled to Baden for the meeting of neurologists
and psychiatrists, the meeting at which he spoke so passionately about gray
matter.
Fortunately, the self-doubt and self-incrimination so characteristic of
Nissl’s personality was matched by an ability to rebound from failures.
Time and time again, he was saved from despair by a wellspring of fresh
ideas. After conceding defeat with the poisoning experiments, for example,
he managed to move forward thanks to the epiphany on gray matter. And
even after that disaster, there were still more ideas yet to be tested.
–//–
Alcohol is a drug of special interest. In the beginning, when societies were
rural and mostly agrarian, it was woven into the normal fabric of life.
Then industrialization created a disadvantaged social class that tended to
drink excessively. The problem arose first in England, then spread to the
continent. When politicians and social commentators became concerned, so
too did Benedict Morel and Henry Maudsley, who promptly came up with
degeneration theory to explain the association between class and alcohol
(see Chapter 3).
In reality, the relationship between alcohol and industrialization was com-
plex. Certainly, alcohol aggravated labor-management relations in the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century. Workers were being asked to perform
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unaccustomed tasks and give up entrenched habits. Many responded to the
pressure by taking to the bottle. According to one contemporary account,
alcohol was a constant feature at German construction sites in the 1870s,
Schnaps [a fruit-flavored alcoholic drink] had to be fetched on
every occasion; when a new journeyman started work, for ex-
ample, he was obliged first to provide a liter of Schnaps as his
initiation. When an apprentice completed his first corner or
curve, he too had to produce a liter of Schnaps for others. And
so it went.89
Management, on the other hand, demanded efficiency and compliance.
A German economist and philanthropist reported that
drinkers are useless for industrial purposes: they quickly become
sluggish, are slow on the job, unreliable, contentious, prone
to frequent illness and, in the long run, impossible to protect
against the dangers of machine production ... They must be
dismissed from the job and replaced by sober hands [note 90].
All the problems surrounding alcohol got wrapped up in what became
known as the “drink question”. Actually, there were numerous questions.
Is drinking ruining the economy? Is drinking good – or bad – for peoples’
health? Is it natural or is it immoral? And, does it mix well with politics?
Only the last question was easily answered. European socialists, including
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, defended the workers’ right to drink,
claiming it as a necessary response to capitalist pressures. Others, turned
off by what they perceived as the offensive and threatening atmosphere
in beer halls, where socialist groups tended to meet, joined temperance
movements. So no, alcohol and politics did not mix well.
Beer was the most popular alcoholic drink in Germany. The German
Purity Law (Reinheitsgebot), promulgated in Bavaria in 1516, was largely
responsible. It was originally designed to prevent competition between
brewers and bakers over the price of grains that were used in both crafts.
But it also prevented the importation of northern beers into the Bavarian
market. With time, once the Purity Law had spread to all German states,
it became an effective non-tariff barrier to foreign competition. German
breweries grew and prospered. In the 1880s, Germany surpassed Britain as
the world’s leading consumer.
89Quotes from James S. Roberts, “Drink and industrial work discipline in 19th century
Germany,” Journal of Social History 15: 25-38 (1981).
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Physicians began calling attention to alcohol’s deleterious effects. They
saw heavy drinkers develop liver damage and delirium tremens, the latter
a serious condition involving tremors, hallucinations and mental confusion.
Gustav Aschaffenburg, Kraepelin’s assistant physician in Heidelberg, wrote
his dissertation on delirium tremens. It was a technical work that found
only a small, professional readership. By contrast, another book on the
medical consequences of alcoholic consumption, by the Swedish physician
Magnus Huss, had a huge impact. Huss complied and assessed a mass
of information on the unhealthy effects of alcohol. From these data, he
concluded that people who drink heavily are truly sick, and he named the
illness “alcoholism”. Huss’s book, published in 1849, marked a turning
point in attitudes toward alcohol. It initiated the temperance movement,
and it engaged the medical/scientific community as never before.
The Good Templars organization was founded in the United States in
1851 with the goal of improving society by limiting the use of alcohol.
Similar movement sprang up in Europe and beyond. The first of several
international congresses was held in Antwerp in 1885. By the mid-1880s, the
German Society Opposed to the Abuse of Spirituous Liquors was arguing
for changes to licensing laws and calling for the medical treatment of alcohol
abusers.
–//–
Meanwhile, alcohol was being given to psychiatric patients to calm their
nerves and encourage their sleep. Kraepelin used it for that purpose. He
also occasionally gave it to patients suffering from obsessions, melancho-
lia, or agoraphobia (anxieties related to open or crowded spaces) – not
as a cure, but rather as something that could boost their self-confidence
and temporarily lessen their suffering. He also used alcohol in his pharma-
copsychological investigations. Recall that he studied the effect of alcohol
on reaction times when he was with Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig. Later, in
Dorpat, he conducted numerous, separate investigations of the effects of
alcohol on verbal associations, reading, serial addition, number learning,
dynamometer (force) associations and time estimations. He obtained re-
sults, but as in Leipzig, the data were inconsistent and difficult to interpret.
With time, Kraepelin became more and more concerned about the neg-
ative effects of alcohol. As a first step, he prohibited its use in the clinic.
Then he, himself, stopped drinking it. Soon after that, he began denounc-
ing alcohol in public declarations. What began as a clinical aid and a
scientific curiosity ended up as the villainous target of a public campaign.
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For many years, Emil Kraepelin believed that drinking was good for
you, that it was something people had to do to remain healthy. Doubts
developed, however, as he grew older. According to the story he tells in his
Memories, the turning point came in the spring of 1895 during a vacation
in Greece. He was drinking the local specialty, wines fermented with small
amounts of pine resin. As he later recalled, “I did not enjoy it at all. As
I returned home, I decided that I would finally give up alcohol altogether
and fight.”90 Yes, he certainly did fight.
It is impossible to know all the reasons why Kraepelin became an ardent
campaigner against alcoholic consumption. His father’s alcoholism may
have been a factor, but moral considerations were probably more impor-
tant. Evidence comes, in part, from his own pharmacological experiments.
In summarizing those experiments, he wrote that alcohol causes “intellec-
tual stupefaction and moral insanity ... which one is forced to call patho-
logical.” And then, this noteworthy qualification, “Of course, there are
rather significant individual differences, depending on the primary moral
predisposition; insecure souls more easily succumb to the seductive effect
of alcohol than strong-minded people.”91 Moreover, when summarizing the
entire pharmacopsychology project, he wrote that, “Alcohol, ether, chlo-
roform, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde and morphine produce, if in different
strengths, this persistent weakness of will ... [italics added].92
References to “weakness of will” appear frequently in Kraepelin’s writ-
ings, as do phrases like “moral insanity” and “strong-minded people”. They
reflect a moral framework in which strength of will was highly valued. Krae-
pelin’s problem with alcohol was that it weakened the will.
As a university student, Kraepelin “eagerly read” the works of many
philosophers (quoted words in his Memoirs). Surely in those works, he
would have read about the will, or will power, because it was a major
subject in German philosophy. In the generation before Kraepelin, Arthur
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) wrote at length about will, generally denouncing
it as evil and naming it as the source of man’s suffering. Kraepelin’s con-
temporary, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), held to a very different opinion.
He took will to be empowering, even going so far as to proclaim will – and
the related “will to power” – as the fundamental stuff of nature.
Granted ... that we succeeded in explaining our entire instinc-
tive life as the development and ramification of one fundamental
90E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 70.
91Steinberg and Angermeyer (2001), p. 309.
92U. Müller, P.C. Fletcher and H. Steinberg (2006), p. 133.
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form of will – namely, the Will to Power as my thesis puts it;
granted that all organic functions could be traced back to this
Will to Power, and that the solution of the problem of gener-
ation and nutrition - it is one problem – could also be found
therein: one would thus have acquired the right to define all ac-
tive force unequivocally as Will to Power [italics in original].93
In a similar vein, Kraepelin wrote in his Memoirs of how his view of life
had been affected by travels in southeast Asia.
My general understanding of nature was influenced by the in-
sight into the tropical world. My unclear conception of the basic
importance of will in nature became clearer and took on a firm
shape. Based on a thousand different phenomena, it became
exceptionally clear that in every living being the dormant, im-
pulsive functions of the will control not only his way of life, but
also his development and constitution.94
Once past university, Kraepelin did not trouble himself with academic
philosophy, but he consistently admired strong-willed individuals and
loathed the weak-willed. He celebrated every birthday of Otto von Bis-
marck, the military and political leader who personified authority, power
and self-confidence. Contrastingly, he routinely referred to his patients
as “weak” and possessed of “failing” wills. In writing about patients
diagnosed with dementia praecox, for example, he stated,
In the whole conduct of the patients the devastation of their
will makes itself conspicuous above everything. They are tired,
weak, lazy, without initiative, irresolute, let themselves become
destitute, live carelessly a day at a time fling away money and
possessions senselessly, let themselves drift according to chance
influences and therefore come quickly down in the world espe-
cially when they begin to drink [italics in original].95
Hannah Decker is an historian and authority on Kraepelin’s clinical work.
After reviewing all his major publications, she wrote that “the stress on the
93Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern. New York,
MacMillan (1886, 1907), section 36, p. 52.
94E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 115.
95Emil Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia, trans. Mary Barclay. Edinburgh,
E&S Livingstone (1896,1919), pp. 106-107.
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will is so omnipresent that the reader cannot help wondering why [he] is
so engrossed ... One possible interpretation is that Kraepelin was the last
in a long line of philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists who, until
the end of the nineteenth century, thought of the will as an independent
faculty of the mind ...96
There can be little doubt that Kraepelin abhorred weak wills. Also, he
believed that alcohol either makes wills weak or is itself the consequence
weak wills. The coupling of these two attitudes led to his disdain for alcohol.
That, plus the conviction that what was bad for the German people must
also be bad for the German empire. As a mature man secure in his place,
Kraepelin chose to act on behalf of these concerns.
When lecturing to medical students, he told them that alcohol is at
the root of many diseases. He stated that alcoholic intoxication on the
part of either parent at the time of copulation predisposes the offspring to
idiocy. He referred to the striking frequency of alcoholism in the parents
of patients diagnosed with dementia praecox. Even progressive paralysis
– usually attributed to syphilis infection – was linked to alcohol. Alcohol
may not be the sole cause of any mental illness, he said, yet there is not a
single mental illness that is not worsened by it.
Kraepelin also spoke to secondary school students and the general public.
When addressing these lay audiences, he emphasized the fact that alcohol
loosens the reins on behavior. It causes us to ignore our moral feelings, and
leaves us at the mercy of our primitive impulses. That explains why alco-
holics so often commit shameless acts. Finally, he never failed to describe,
in gruesome detail, the horrible symptoms of advanced delirium tremens.
Kraepelin’s principled stand on abstinence triggered arguments with col-
leagues and made him the butt of jokes. People stopped inviting him to
certain social events on account of his stand. Those slights hardly both-
ered him because he eschewed such events, but an incident that occurred
while on vacation in Italy struck him more deeply. Kraepelin was in a café
speaking with some Germans who knew that he was from Heidelberg. In
the course of the conversation, his countrymen asked if he had heard about
the weird professor who did not drink alcohol. At that point, Kraepelin
realized that he had become more famous for his refusal to drink alcohol
than he was for his scientific work.
None of this deterred Kraepelin. On the contrary, he converted his per-
sonal commitment into an all-out public campaign. He wrote articles for
96Hannah Decker, “The psychiatric works of Emil Kraepelin: a many-faceted story of
modern medicine,” Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 13:248-276 (2004).
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the popular press. He co-founded the Society of Abstinent Physicians. And,
most energetically, he organized the Heidelberg branch of the German So-
ciety Opposed to the Abuse of Spirituous Liquors. Meeting every week on
Saturday evenings, its membership grew from fifty-one to two hundred fifty
under Kraepelin’s leadership.
Kraepelin suffered from migraine headaches as a young man. He was
delighted, therefore, to discover that the headaches stopped when he quit
drinking. The broader effects of his advocacy were less clear. No doubt
some individuals followed his advice and benefitted from it, but no one
noticed any change in the number of students crowding the Bierstubes and
cafés around Heidelberg.
One day, Kraepelin arrived at the clinic wanting to speak with Nissl.
Because it was still early in the morning, Kraepelin went straight to Nissl’s
apartment, but Nissl was neither there nor in his office. When Kraepelin
enquired among Nissl’s colleagues, each of them mentioned that Nissl had
been drinking beer late into the previous night. They suggested that Krae-
pelin go down to Nissl’s laboratory, and it was there that Kraepelin en-
countered, lined up outside the laboratory door, a long row of one-liter
beer bottles – all empty. Kraepelin was aghast. He took deep breaths. His
face flushed red. Just then, Nissl came bounding out the door laughing.
“Ha ha,” he bellowed, “I fooled you!”
Kraepelin knew Nissl well enough to accept the prank for what it was,
a gentle teasing. Clearly, these men had their own personalities and their
own, contrasting lifestyles. And yet, despite their differences, Kraepelin
and Nissl built a productive relationship based on mutual respect and a
common commitment to scientific psychiatry.
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Seven years after moving to Heidelberg, Kraepelin and his family were still
living on Bergheimer Straße, in an apartment that was conveniently lo-
cated but no longer adequate for the growing family, which now included
four daughters. His mother also stayed with them from time to time. For-
tunately, Emil’s earnings from his activities as author, clinic director and
consultant had brought him to the point where he could afford larger ac-
commodations.
So, when Kraepelin heard of a grand new house being built on Schef-
felstraße, on the northern slope of Heiligenberg Mountain, he bought it.
The street was named after the poet and novelist Joseph Victor von Schef-
fel, who had died two years earlier. The house was large enough to easily
accommodate the family, its servants and its kitchen personnel. All the
rooms had tall ceilings and ornate finishes, and many of them were fitted
with telephone connections.
It was the natural setting, however, that Kraepelin liked best. His new
home lay immediately in front of a natural forest and adjacent to the gentle
landscapes of Philosopher’s Walk. The southern facing windows afforded
an unobstructed view across the Neckar River to the Heiliggeistkirche and,
higher up, nestled on the hill above the old town, the haunting castle.
To the west lay the Rhine plain, punctuated by the towering cathedral of
Speyer, and to the east the green Neckar valley.
In the garden behind the house lay a cozy little cottage, which Kraepelin
immediately recognized as a place meant for undisturbed work. Built years
earlier as a boys’ clubhouse, it was fitted with colonial windows and an
attractive gable. Kraepelin hired a local artist to decorate the gable with
a flute-playing angel, copied from a painting by the Italian artist, Meloggo
da Forli. He installed tables and chairs outside the bungalow so that his
family could join him for coffee and cakes.
Sitting comfortably in his garden study, Kraepelin, would have contem-
plated the puzzle of psychosis. Despite having no precise definition, ev-
eryone knew what it was. It was the worst mental affliction, seen only in
the maddest of the mad. It was not, however, a single disease, nor even a
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Figure 22: Kraepelin’s home in Heidelberg, top center. Photo taken at the
Schloss, on the opposite side of the Neckar River (foreground).
[R. Chase]
consistent set of symptoms. If a patient seemed to be inhabiting a world of
her own, if she described outlandish notions and spoke gibberish, she was
likely psychotic. Today we say that patients who lose contact with reality
are psychotic. For Kraepelin and his colleagues, psychosis was the most
challenging of all mental conditions. They struggled to define it, and they
struggled to identify the individual disorders that fell under its rubric.
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Most people understand that there is a difference between psychosis and
neurosis, but few know the remarkable history of that difference. First came
neurosis. Because its definition changed dramatically over time, attention
must be paid to the original definition. Originally, a mental condition
was a neurosis if it was thought to be caused by a brain abnormality,
but there was no actual evidence of any lesion. By that definition, which
dates from 1777, even the mental disorders that occasionally accompanied
epileptic seizures were known as neuroses. Thus, epileptic insanity was a
recognized type of neurosis. Then, in 1845, the Viennese psychiatrist, Ernst
von Feuchtersleben, coined the term psychosis. His awkward definition of
psychosis, and the distinction that he drew between it and neurosis, caused
understandable confusion. He wrote,
Where psychic phenomena present themselves abnormally, we
speak of mental illness; it is rooted in the mind, and insofar as
these phenomena are transmitted through the brain, they are
rooted in the body because the brain is the organ of the mind...
Every psychosis is at the same time a neurosis, because without
the mediation of the nervous system no mental change is able
to become manifest; but every neurosis is not simultaneously a
psychosis.97
In other words, every mental illness is rooted in the brain (neurosis), but
not every brain problem produces a psychosis. In effect, Feuchtersleben
was confirming and expanding the original definition of a neurosis, while
introducing psychosis as the term for illnesses that have no basis in brain
abnormalities. Somehow, in the ensuing years Feuchtersleben’s intended
meanings were misread and actually reversed. The result was that neuro-
sis came to mean a purely psychological disorder , for example a condition
affecting mood, anxiety or conflict, while psychosis meant any type of psy-
chological disorder caused by a brain disorder . When it is said that Freud
focused on neurotic disorders while Kraepelin focused on psychosis, the
distinction is drawn from the revised definitions.
Psychotic disorders (as currently defined) are severely debilitating. They
resist treatment, disrupt families and account for high rates of suicide.
In the nineteenth century, when psychotic patients were sedated and re-
strained but otherwise untreated, their bizarre signs and symptoms – in-
volving hallucinations, delusions and nonsensical speech – must have left a
97Quoted in Edward Shorter, A Historical Dictionary of Psychiatry. New York, Oxford
University Press (2005), p. 241.
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compelling impression on persons attending them. Following Griesinger’s
call for a scientific psychiatry, and with neuroanatomy developing at a fast
pace, many psychiatrists saw psychosis as the most likely of all mental con-
ditions to show signs of brain pathology. The search for evidence occupied
Nissl and his fellow psychiatrist-anatomists, but no one found anything of
enduring interest. Meanwhile, for clinicians like Kraepelin, who worried
about diagnosis and prognosis, psychosis was another sort of problem.
Apart from the psychoses, most cases brought to the attention of a
psychiatrist were diagnosed without much difficulty. Epilepsy was recog-
nized by its seizures, loss of memory, impaired judgment and weakminded-
ness. Progressive paralysis was diagnosed by immobility and dementia, and
uniquely in such cases, the diagnosis could be confirmed by postmortem ex-
amination of the brain. Alcoholism was more complicated because the signs
and symptoms varied with the stage of the disease. Nevertheless, acute al-
coholic intoxication was indicated by perceptual and motor dysfunctions of
the types observed by Kraepelin in his experimental studies, and chronic
alcoholism was indicated by hallucinations, paranoia and delirium tremens.
Likewise, obsession, hysteria, imbecility and cretinism, had their distinctive
symptoms. Confident though he was in his ability to diagnose the above-
named disorders, Kraepelin was much less certain about diagnosing the
larger number of cases that fell under the umbrella of psychosis. Although
most clinicians had a general idea of what psychosis was, there was no con-
sensus on either its precise definition or the number of separate disorders
that belonged to the category.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, psychosis had roughly the
same meaning as insanity. In France, it amounted to mania and melan-
cholia, whereas in Germany, it was equivalent to Wahnsinn. But confu-
sion reigned. One year after Feuchtersleben introduced the term Psychose
(1845), another German psychiatrist, Heinrich Damerow, published a text-
book in which he listed the terms denoting mental disorder. Psychosen
(pleural form) is there, but so too are thirteen synonyms,
Seelenstörungen, Irresein, Geisteskrankheiten, Verstandesver-
rückungen, Geisteszerrüttungen, Gemüthsstörungen, Gemüths-
krankheiten, Psychosen, Psychoneurosen, Psychopathien, Pre-
nopathien, die sensitiven Krankheiten, Logoneurosen, Persön-
lichkeitskrankheiten, und so weiter [and so on].98
98Quoted in M. Dominic Beer, “Psychosis: from mental disorder to disease concept,”
History of Psychiatry 6 (1995), p. 156.
154
The Making of Modern Psychiatry
The concept of psychosis was in need of repair. Was it just a way of
referencing certain severe symptoms, or were there definable psychotic dis-
orders? Some authors still thought of epilepsy and cretinism as psychotic
illnesses. Others wanted to include late stage progressive paralysis but not
early stage progressive paralysis. So, was it time to cut again at the joints
of mental illness or, as some psychiatrists contended, was it time to put
the knife away? The latter group of psychiatrists expressed no interest
in identifying psychotic disorders. And, they went further, insisting that
the entire practice of dissecting mental illness was unnecessary in prac-
tice and ill-founded in principle. These men called themselves unitarians,
and many psychiatrists, especially in Germany, held to their point of view.
The movement advanced under the banner of Einheitspsychose, or “unitary
psychosis”.
The unitarians maintained that there is just a single disease – call it
psychosis, insanity, madness or whatever. Trying to carve it up is both
senseless and useless. Albert Zeller, the director of an asylum where Wil-
helm Griesinger had once apprenticed, wrote that all afflictions of the soul
must be united because the soul itself is unified. Other unitarians ac-
knowledged that signs and symptoms differ in different patients but, they
claimed, that only indicates different stages in the progression of a single
disease. A physician might find that a patient is melancholic. Later, that
same patient might progress to paranoia, and eventually to dementia, but it
is all just mental illness. Heinrich Neumann, another unitarian theorist put
it this way, “Every classification of mental illness is artificial. We should
throw it all overboard ... there is only one form of mental illness, that
is insanity [Wahnsinn], which does not have different forms but different
stages.”99 Neumann saw mental illness as a continuum ranging from health
to disease. Each degree of sickness has its own characteristic symptoms,
but fundamentally, every patient has the same disease.
For psychiatrists tired of fussing over problematic, time-consuming di-
agnoses, unitary psychosis was an attractive idea. It was welcomed by
practitioners who were comfortable dealing in a practical way with individ-
ual patients, but puzzled by what they felt were abstract definitions. There
was also the fact that the unitarian outlook encouraged early institution-
alization, which many psychiatrists saw as beneficial.
The main reason why Kraepelin did not buy into unitarianism, was pro-
gressive paralysis. Judging by its name alone, one might imagine that
99G. E. Berrios and D. Beer, “The notion of unitary psychosis: a conceptual history,”
History of Psychiatry 5 (1994), p. 26.
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progressive paralysis offered positive proof of unitary psychosis, for it was
a single disease that changed over time. However, while the symptoms were
multiple, the illness as a whole was different enough from all other forms of
psychosis that no mainstream psychiatrist had any difficulty in accepting
progressive paralysis as a distinct illness. In light of this compelling exam-
ple, Kraepelin decided that unitarianism must be false. That decision, and
his recognition of progressive paralysis as a paradigmatic mental illness,
later proved pivotal in the construction of his landmark classification.
Described by some as the “disease of the nineteenth century”, progres-
sive paralysis was important not just because it killed unitary psychosis,
but also because it brought mental illness to the attention of the medical
establishment. Its mix of physical and mental symptoms forced doctors
to consider each dimension as equal in weight and equally demanding of
treatment. There is little record of it prior to 1800, but afterwards it spread
like wildfire. It was particularly prevalent among well-educated merchants
and military personnel, nearly all of whom were men. By the 1860s, an-
nual statistical reports from a private clinic near Breslau were showing
that one-third of the male patients had progressive paralysis, while none
of the seventy-five female patients had it. Although many people believed
that alcohol was the cause, the true cause turned out to be a bacterium,
Treponema pallidum. Progressive paralysis is actually a late manifesta-
tion of syphilis, which accounts for its later name, neurosyphilis. Overall,
millions of people were affected and thousands poured into asylums and
clinics. Most of the infected patients died from the illness, including such
well-known persons as Friedrich Nietzsche, Franz Schubert and Edouard
Manet.
Syphilis had been known since at least the middle ages, but progressive
paralysis was not recognized as a disease until 1822. In that year, An-
toine Laurent Bayle discovered a physical correlate of the disease in the
brains of its victims. Histological methods were not yet good enough to
detect cellular pathologies, but Bayle was able to find unmistakable signs
of inflammation in the arachnoid membrane, which is a tissue that covers
and protects the brain. Many years later, the new breed of anatomically
oriented psychiatrists pointed to Bayle’s work as an example of biological
causation. Franz Nissl’s prize-winning stain was initially put to work look-
ing for relevant pathologies. Later, he and Alois Alzheimer collaborated
over many years in a study of progressive paralysis, work that began in
Frankfurt and continued afterwards in Heidelberg and Munich.
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Patients with progressive paralysis typically moved through several
stages, usually counted as three or four. Different signs and symptoms
characterized each stage. First, there were sores on the penis. Sometimes
the sores disappeared and the victims would remain symptom-free for
several years, but at some point friends and family members would notice
slurred speech and a slight tremor of the lips and tongue. Victims at this
stage reported blurred vision, and they complained of not seeing certain
colors. Next came the mental symptoms, which were various, running
the gamut from mania to dementia. Later still, serious physical problems
developed. The patient’s gait became ataxic (uncoordinated), the muscles
got progressively weaker, and eventually he or she would be unable to
move. Seizures followed, and finally death.
The dramatic manic phase produced classic examples of psychotic delu-
sion, many of which were delusions of grandeur. For example, during the
reign of Napoleon Bonaparte, more than a few patients believed that they
were Napoleon. The general nature of the manic phase was described in a
medical dictionary published twenty years after Napoleon’s death,
It is above all during this phase that [the patient] totally suc-
cumbs to illusions of silly vanity, whether he believes himself
to be king, pope, emperor, grandee, millionaire, or owner of
vast treasures. This one calls himself Napoleon and has won
every battle of empire; another maintains that he has produced
all the masterpieces now gracing our museums of painting and
sculpture; yet another has only to nod his head to erect magnifi-
cent palaces, cities of crystal, houses of diamonds, and he makes
bizarre movements; some paralytics think they are thirty feet,
or forty or fifty cubits, tall.100
Another common theme was profligate spending, as in the case of a
chemistry professor in Frankfurt who suddenly went on a spending spree,
buying 10 automobiles and 100 wrist watches in a single day.101 Similar
cases were described by Julius Mickle in his classic book on progressive
paralysis, originally published in 1880. For example,
Says his head is bad, will get a new head when he goes to
heaven, it was full of diamonds and has been taken off. His
100Quoted by Laure Murat in The Man Who Thought He Was Napoleon: Toward a
Political History of Madness. Chicago, University of Chicago Press (2014), p. 113.
101E. Shorter (1997), p. 54.
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heart and lungs have been taken out ... Will be a giant 125
feet high, and made so, in sum or heaven, by 7 quarts each of
brandy and whisky, and 3 of beer. Has four ducal titles ... is
first field-marshal, has millions and millions of gold watches.
The all-to-common consequence of such delusions is noted in this final
example from Mickle’s book.
If at large, the delusions lead to the most extravagant projects
... [He] sends telegrams containing preposterous orders, such
as to lade a ship with wine, ‘for sale in the uninhabited parts
of the earth,’ and thus, without extraneous aid, these patients
often fritter away their means on impracticable or ill-advised
business-schemes and speculations.102
Writing in the second edition of his treatise (1886), Mickle filled twenty
pages with descriptions of pathologies that could be seen with the naked eye,
including inflammation of the arachnoid membrane, as reported by Bayle.
A further twenty-six pages described microscopic abnormalities, which he
divided into three main categories. Within the category blood vessels, he
mentions twelve types, within neuroglia (the brain’s non-neuronal cells)
eleven types, and within nerve cells and fibers, another eleven types. De-
spite all the current talk about cerebral localization, Mickle found none. He
wrote that the pathology characteristic of progressive paralysis was seen ev-
erywhere in the cerebral cortex, a result confirmed by Nissl and Alzheimer
in their five hundred page review of the disease published in 1904.
Progressive paralysis had everything that a mental disease must have –
plenty of signs and symptoms and a grandiose mania that was unquestion-
ably indicative of psychological disturbance. Yes, some signs, like tremors,
muscle weakness and paralysis were physical, but by the same token they
satisfied the need for a measurable diagnostic criterion. Neural pathol-
ogy was another objective sign, albeit one that was useless for purposes of
diagnosis because it was unavailable until after death. Furthermore, pro-
gressive paralysis had a known cause, syphilis infection, and a predictable
course from penis sores to dementia and death. Some of Kraepelin’s fellow
psychiatrists fretted over whether to regard progressive paralysis as funda-
mentally seated in the mind or in the brain, but he did not. For Kraepelin,
102Wm. Julius Mickle, General Paralysis of the Insane. London, H.K. Lewis (2nd ed.,
1886). Quotes on, pp. 42, 45.
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it was enough that progressive paralysis was widely accepted as a psychi-
atric disease. Considering all of its properties, there was no other psychosis
quite like it. It was a species of disease as real and unique as a platypus
among mammals or a gingko among trees.
Secure now in the knowledge that progressive paralysis was a true illness
as well as a type of psychosis, Kraepelin thought to use it as a model for
finding additional psychotic illnesses. He vowed to complete some of that
work in time for inclusion in the next edition of his textbook, which had al-
ready been twice revised. The second and third editions had been prepared
in Dorpat, where his attention was divided between experimental psychol-
ogy and clinical psychiatry. Moreover, due to language difficulties, he had
been unable to obtain the kinds of data that he needed for reevaluating the
classification. But now, in Heidelberg, he was running his own show. He
had ready access to a wide variety of patients, surveillance rooms in which
to observe them, and a trusted team of assistants to help him. It was the
ideal time to tackle the thorny issue of disease identification.
In the spring of 1893, he took a vacation in Italy. As usual, he mixed
pleasure with work. He went first to Parma where he visited a mental asy-
lum in the province of Reggio Emilia. From there, he rode by postal coach
through the Apennine Mountains to Santa Margherita, for the purpose of
conferring with a professional acquaintance. Finally, he reached the Riv-
iera, hopping from San Remo to Nice, then Cannes and Monte Carlo before
heading home. We do not know for sure that he worked on the textbook
during this long trip, but he may well have, because by September it was
finished.
–//–
When the fourth edition of Kraepelin’s textbook came out in the fall of
1893, the dedication read, “To the memory of Bernhard von Gudden.”
Kraepelin introduced a new illness in this book. He called it dementia
praecox – Latin for precocious dementia – but the name was later changed
to schizophrenia. Today, we know schizophrenia as one of the most common
and most debilitating of all mental disorders. Delusions and hallucinations
are its hallmark symptoms. They cause patients to behave in bizarre ways,
drawing attention to themselves and to the illness. Worldwide, about one
in every one hundred persons has or will have the illness at some point in
their lives. It is, perhaps, the prototypical mental disorder.
Dementia praecox was Kraepelin’s prime cut from the body of psychosis.
However, Kraepelin did not actually discover dementia praecox, as a nauti-
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cal explorer might discover a small island in the Pacific Ocean or a zoologist
might discover a new species of bird. It would be more accurate to say that
he constructed the disease by reading the psychiatric literature, interview-
ing patients, and observing patients in surveillance rooms.
As an avid student of the psychiatric and scientific literatures, Kraepelin
had surely read case histories from the early years of the nineteenth century
that bore the marks of schizophrenia. Phillipe Pinel, for one, had described
such cases, but the most striking of all were those written by John Haslam,
a Londoner who worked as the apothecary, or pharmacist, at the Bethlem
hospital. In his book, Observations of Madness and Melancholy (1809),
Haslam mentions the case of a young man who “under the supposed impu-
tation of having unnatural propensities” had cut off his penis. The patient
also complained “that the boards on which he walked were heated by sub-
terraneous fires, under the direction of invisible and malicious agents, whose
intentions, he was well convinced, were to consume him by degrees.” At
other times, the man was perfectly lucid. According to Haslam, madmen
“have sometimes such a high degree of control over their minds, that when
they have any particular purpose to carry, they will affect to renounce those
opinions, which shall have been judged inconsistent ...”
Elsewhere in the book, Haslam writes about young persons who were dis-
interested in common activities, lacked social relations and suffered from
a loss of memory. “Frequently noticed in females,” he wrote, “the disor-
der commences, about, or shortly after, the period of menstruation, and in
many instances has been unconnected with hereditary trait.” Mixing gen-
ders in the same section, Haslam further stated, “In the interval between
puberty and manhood, I have painfully witnessed this hopeless and degrad-
ing change, which in a short time has transformed the most promising and
vigorous intellect into a slavering and bloated ideot.”103 Notable here are
the observations of an illness that develops in young adults, quickly wors-
ens and is manifested by apathy and intellectual deterioration, all of which
characterize schizophrenia
These brief case descriptions were but small preludes to the psychosis
that Haslam described in his next book, which came with the unwieldy title,
Illustrations of Madness: Exhibiting a Singular Case of Insanity, And a No
Less Remarkable Difference in Medical Opinions: Developing the Nature of
An Assailment, And the Manner of Working Events; with a Description of
103John Haslam, Observations on Madness and Melancholy, 2nd edition. London, Callow
(1809), pp. 49-51, 64-67.
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Tortures Experienced by Bomb-Bursting, Lobster-Cracking and Lengthening
the Brain. Embellished with a Curious Plate.
Better known by its shortened title, Illustrations of Madness, Haslam’s
book was published in 1810. The entire book is devoted to the description
of a single patient, James Tilley Matthews, who had been brought to the
hospital at age twenty-seven and placed under Haslam’s care. Matthews
was a tea merchant with a wife and children. The French Revolution caused
him to worry about a possible war between England and France, so he began
traveling back and forth between Paris and London on a self-appointed
peace mission. Accused of spying, he spent three years in a French prison.
After returning to London, he showed up one day in the public gallery
of the House of Commons. There, he stood up and loudly accused the
Home Secretary of treason, which explains how he wound up at Bethlem
Hospital.
In the Preface to his book – before giving any details regarding Matthews
and his insanity – Haslam explains his motivation for writing it.
The publication of the following case is deemed as much an act
of justice, as it may be regarded a matter of curiosity. It may
possibly effect some good, by turning the attention of medi-
cal men to the subject of professional etiquette ... If it should
merely succeed in curbing the fond propensity to form hasty
conclusions, or tend to moderate the mischief of privileged opin-
ion, the purpose is sufficiently answered.
It happened that Matthews’ family did not believe that he was insane,
and they brought a writ of habeas corpus to get him released. Matthews
was, indeed, remarkably normal at times, consistent with Haslam’s com-
ments in his earlier book. After listening to testimonies from medical and
quasi-medical witnesses, the judge stated that Matthews was too danger-
ous to be released, and he denied the writ. Haslam had been one of the
witnesses. Although he agreed with the judge’s decision, he was offended
by the written judgment because, in his opinion, it gave scant attention
to his own testimony. He was so indignant that he wrote Illustrations of
Madness to correct the judge’s omission.
Matthews believed that he was being persecuted by a gang of undercover
French revolutionaries who were controlling his mind. He spoke of an elab-
orate machine, an “air loom” (Figure 23), which the gang used to impose
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its will upon him. Mike Jay’s splendid book tells the full story of James
Tilly Matthews.104 Here is Jay’s succinct summary of the air loom,
[It] combined recent developments in gas chemistry with the
strange force of animal magnetism, or mesmerism. It incor-
porated keys, levers, barrels, batteries, sails, brass retorts and
magnetic fluid, and worked by directing and modulating mag-
netically charged air currents, rather as the stops of an organ
modulate its tones. It ran on a mixture of foul substances, in-
cluding ‘spermatic-animal-seminal rays’, ‘effluvia of dogs’ and
‘putrid human breath’, and its discharges of magnetic fluid were
focused to deliver thoughts, feelings and sensations directly into
Matthews’ brain. There were many of these mind-control set-
tings, all classified by vivid names: ‘fluid locking’, ‘stone mak-
ing’, ‘thigh talking’, ‘lobster-cracking’, ‘bomb-bursting’, and the
dreaded ‘brain-saying’, whereby thoughts were forced into his
brain against his will.105
Knowing details such as these, one could hardly fault the judge for declar-
ing Matthews insane. He was clearly paranoid, but did he have schizophre-
nia? According to current criteria, delusions and auditory hallucinations
are cardinal symptoms, and Matthews had both. Also indicative are the
facts that he became ill at a young age and he apparently did not recover,
because he remained in an asylum for the rest of his life. If Matthews were
to appear at a clinic today, he would most probably be diagnosed with
schizophrenia.
Given Haslam’s detailed case study – along with similar, albeit less ex-
pansive, accounts written by other early nineteenth century psychiatrists
– why was schizophrenia not seen as a distinct mental illness long before
Kraepelin identified it many decades later? A modern British psychiatrist,
Edward Hare, plunged into old hospital records and government archives
in search of an answer. He found, among other things, that prior to 1800,
there was not a single, unambiguous record of a patient hearing voices.
This striking claim begs an explanation, because auditory hallucinations
are highly characteristic of schizophrenia. There are at least two possi-
bilities. First, since lengthy case histories of any kind were uncommon
104Mike Jay, A Visionary Madness: The Case of James Tilly Matthews and the Influenc-
ing Machine. Berkeley, CA, North Atlantic Books (2014).
105Mike Jay, “The Air Loom Gang: James Tilly Matthews and his visionary madness,”
http://www.nthposition.com/theairloomgangjames.php.
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Figure 23: James Tilley Matthews’ delusional air loom. Drawn by
Matthews himself, it depicts a gang member operating a ma-
chine (center) which transmits thoughts to Matthews (upper
left). [John Haslam, 1810]
until Pinel, Esquirol, Haslam, and a few other alienists starting using them
shortly after the turn of the century, schizophrenia may have gone unno-
ticed in the pared down, simplistic descriptions of earlier times. Insanity
was madness and there was little more to be said about it.
According to a second interpretation, the one favored by Edward Hare,
there were no descriptions of schizophrenia prior to Haslam because there
was no schizophrenia. Recall that asylums were bursting at their seams
in the late nineteenth century, swollen by an influx of new patients. Hare
thinks that at least some of those added numbers were due to patients
suffering from schizophrenia. He claims that “the postulated increase in
the incidence of schizophrenia can account for at least 40% of the increased
prevalence of insanity between 1859 and 1909.” Hare speculates that “a
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change of a biological kind” occurred around 1800 that made schizophrenia-
like disorders more severe and more common.106 In summary, whether or
not schizophrenia existed before 1800 remains an open question.
Although early authors saw cases that seemed to them peculiar and that
featured some of the same symptoms present in schizophrenia, no one used
any special diagnostic term in referring to those cases. Later however,
around the time that Kraepelin was naming and describing dementia prae-
cox, other European psychiatrists were also noting a special form of psy-
chosis. Dr. Valentine Magnan, chief psychiatrist at Sainte Anne’s Hospital
in Paris, was one such psychiatrist.
Magnan was renowned for crafting an elaborate classification of mental
illnesses. He was also an outspoken supporter of August Morel’s doctrine
of degeneration. That Magnan had discovered schizophrenia, or something
like it, is illustrated by a story told by Clarence Farrar, an American visitor
in Heidelberg. Farrar was on his way back to America when he stopped at
Paris, accompanied by Franz Nissl. Once their presence in Paris became
known, Nissl was invited to attend one of Magnan’s clinical demonstrations.
Just prior to Nissl’s visit, Magnan had proudly announced the discovery of
a new disease, which he named délire chronique à évolution systématique
[chronic systematized delusional disorder]. Confident that he had found
something of great importance, he was anxious to impress his visitor from
the famous Heidelberg clinic.
The demonstration took place at Magnan’s hospital. Following a few
introductory remarks, Magnan proceeded with the actual demonstration,
which was nothing more than an interview with a patient who had been
diagnosed with délire chronique à évolution systématique. Magnan skillfully
drew out the man’s paranoia and pointed out the many signs of his mental
and physical degeneration. Farrar reported what happened next.
Nissl listened with closest attention, now and then nodding
appreciatively as the Frenchman made some fine psychologi-
cal analysis of symptoms. The presentation complete, Magnan
hopefully awaited Nissl’s comment. It was brief and to the
point: Ein ganz typicsher Fall von Dementia praecox [A typical
case of dementia praecox.].107
106Edward Hare, “Schizophrenia as a recent disease,” British Journal of Psychiatry 153:
521-531 (1988).
107C. B. Farrar (1954), p. 623.
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According to Farrar, Magnan returned to his office, lowered his head
over his desk, and wept. He could not accept that Kraepelin had already
described the same disease, and that it was more aptly and more concisely
named than his.
–//–
Kraepelin read the works of many authors while revising his textbook. More
than any other, he was most impressed with Karl Kahlbaum. Already in
Dorpat, Kraepelin had incorporated several of Kahlbaum’s ideas into his
inaugural lecture at the university.
Now, it was Kahlbaum, and Kahlbaum’s student, Ewald Hecker, who
were to provide the case histories that inspired Kraepelin’s dementia prae-
cox.
Unlike his illustrious contemporaries Gudden and Griesinger, both of
whom were professors at prestigious universities, Kahlbaum never held
an academic position. His first job was at an asylum in eastern Prus-
sia. Although he had published a major book at the relatively young age
of thirty-five, he could not obtain a professorship. Having no better option,
he accepted the directorship of a private clinic in Görlitz and later pur-
chased the clinic. With no high platform from which to deliver his insights,
his ground breaking ideas were largely ignored until Kraepelin came upon
them a quarter century later.
Kahlbaum took his inspiration from Rudolf Virchow, the man credited
with identifying many infectious diseases. He insisted that psychiatry would
never be accepted as a true medical discipline until it, too, had identified
valid diseases. To accomplish that, he advocated using the so-called “clin-
ical method”. All aspects of the illness needed to be considered, not just
its symptoms. Symptoms, after all, are only the superficial manifestations
of illness. Psychiatry needed to discover the true essence of its illnesses
(again that word).
The various forms in which mental illness has been known since
antiquity, and is still known today, cannot be considered as dif-
ferent species in their own right but only as symptom-clusters
which can appear in the course of different disorders. In this re-
gard, they can be compared with the symptom-complexes such
as fever, dropsy, jaundice, cachexy [poor health and malnutri-
tion], et cetera, which in earlier times were considered as dis-
eases but which nowadays are considered to be what they truly
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are, namely, symptom-clusters capable of being part of different
diseases.108
It was this concept of disease essence that Kraepelin endorsed and
stressed in his Dorpat lecture. Kahlbaum’s skepticism regarding neu-
roanatomy was another theme borrowed by Kraepelin in that lecture.
Contrary to the opinion being voiced by Griesinger, Kahlbaum was less
than optimistic about neuroanatomy’s potential for delivering useful in-
formation. “How wrong it inevitably was to expect pathological anatomy
alone to reform the obsolete psychiatric framework.”109 Kraepelin was of
like mind, at least initially. Commenting in his Memoirs on his attempt
to use brain sections for diagnostic purposes – back in 1879 – he recalled,
“We were not even capable of differentiating between the cerebral cortex
from a paralytic [patient with progressive paralysis of the insane] and from
a healthy person, let alone recognizing a certain disease process from the
anatomic appearance.”110
Far more informative, according to Kahlbaum, were the temporal aspects
of the illness. This was the single most useful idea that Kraepelin got from
Kahlbaum. Psychiatrists tended to assess patients when they were first
admitted to the asylum, but rarely afterwards. Therefore, when trying to
sort out the various types of disorder, a psychiatrist would typically review
the signs and symptoms of his patients, all of whom had been assessed
at the time of admission. Alternatively, a psychiatrist might interview all
previously admitted patients during a single period of investigation. The
technical term for both methodologies is “cross-sectional”, meaning that
they cut through the patient population at a single moment in time.
In contrast to the cross-sectional methods, Kahlbaum advocated a “lon-
gitudinal” approach, whereby the entire course of a patient’s illness was
to be considered, from onset to final outcome. Acute versus chronic con-
ditions had to be distinguished, as well as changing symptoms over time.
Furthermore, he felt it important to note the patient’s age at the onset of
his or her illness, because normal developmental events can affect disease
processes. Kahlbaum believed that all these temporal elements – when
considered alongside symptoms and causes – would provide a solid basis
for identifying and classifying mental diseases.
108Karl Kahlbaum, “The clinico-diagnostic perspective in psychopathology,” translated
by G.E. Berrios. History of Psychiatry 18:233-245 (1878, 2007), quote on p. 237.
109Karl Kahlbaum, Catatonia, translated by Y. Levij and T. Pridan. Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press (1874, 1973), p. 2.
110E. Kraepelin (1987), p. 16.
166
The Making of Modern Psychiatry
In 1863, Kahlbaum published a hefty book with the strangely redundant
title, Die Gruppirung der Psychischen Krankheiten und die Eintheilung
der Seelenstörungen (The Classification of Mental Diseases and the Di-
vision of Psychic Disturbances). It contained the concrete results of his
essence-driven approach to disease identification. He began by discussing
more than forty historical classifications from various authors. Next came
his own classification, which was complex. Modelled after the biological
classifications of Carl Linnaeus, it comprised a hierarchical structure of
mostly Latin terms. The following simplified summary is taken from an
English language book review of Kahlbaum’s Die Gruppirung. The review
is credited to “H.M.”, presumably Henry Maudsley, the renowned British
psychiatrist.111 Note the reliance on temporal factors.
Class I. Neophrenia. Deficiency of mind, produced before, at, or after birth
in the first years of life. Including,
• Genera Innata, Morbosa, Careus
Class II. Paraphrenia. Mental derangement arising in connection with a
transition period of development. Including,
• Genus Bebetica, appearing at the time of puberty.
Class III. Vecordia. Idiopathic [of unknown cause] derangement of limited
extent as regards mental symptoms (monomania), mostly appearing after
puberty. Including,
• Family Dysthymia. Disturbance of feeling or disposition.
• Family Paranoia. Including,
• Genera Ascensa, Descensa, Immota
• Family Diastrephia. Disturbance of the will.
• Family Insania. Without any particular direction of disturbance.
• Genera Religiosa, Ethica
111H. M., Review of Die Gruppirung der Psychischen Krankheiten und die Eintheilung
der Seelenstörungen, British Journal of Psychiatry 9:231-233 (1863).
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Class IV. Vesania. Idiopathic [of unknown cause] derangement of a general
character, affecting all or nearly all mental activity. Including,
• Genus Typica, including,
• Species T. completa (four stages), T. simplex, T. praeceps.
• Genus Progressiva, including,
• Species P. complex, P. divergens, P. apoplectica
Class V. Dysphrenia. Derangement in connection with a physiological or
pathological condition of the body. Including,
• Families Nervosa, Chymosa, Sexualis
At the close of his review, Maudsley wrote, “To the author’s ingenuity,
industry, and learning, his classification is certainly an excellent testimony;
but we fear that it is much too theoretical, and that it will not be applicable
in practice.” Most psychiatrists across Europe were of the same opinion.
Buried and nearly forgotten in Die Gruppirung, Kahlbaum briefly men-
tions hebephrenia, one of his many neologisms, but he includes no descrip-
tion. A few years later, Kahlbaum’s student, Ewald Hecker, did publish
case histories, and it was these descriptions of hebephrenia that led Krae-
pelin to his concept of dementia praecox. Details of Kraepelin’s journey
from hebephrenia to dementia praecox will be given below, after first not-
ing another of Kahlbaum’s enduring contributions.
A few years after Die Gruppirung, Kahlbaum started lecturing about
what he thought was yet another mental illness. He called it catatonia.
Physicians had long recognized a variety of movement disorders. Some
physicians saw them as neurological problems, others saw them as psycho-
logical problems, and the rest were unsure. If a woman does not move, is
it because she cannot move or because she will not move? Should she be
referred to a neurologist or a psychiatrist? Prior to the nineteenth century,
it really did not matter, because neurology and psychiatry were effectively
blended as a single specialty. Nevertheless, different labels were attached
to different types of movement disorders.
The victims of catalepsy, for example, experienced a sudden, transient
paralysis accompanied by a total indifference to sensory stimuli. After
recovery, the person would remember nothing of the event. Hysteria was
another predecessor of catatonia. Although the term later took on other
meanings, hysteria was initially associated with abnormal body movements.
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Thomas Willis, the Renaissance doctor who had a passion for autopsies
and who coined the term neurologie, described the symptoms of hysteria
in ample detail,
... a choking in the throat, a vertigo, an inversion, or rolling
about of the eyes, often-times laughing, or weeping, absurd talk-
ing, sometimes want of speech, and motionless, with an obscure
or no pulse, and deadish aspect, sometimes convulsive motions,
in the face and limbs, and sometimes in the whole body, are
excited: but universal convulsions rarely happen ... I have ob-
served these symptoms in maids before ripe age, also in old
women after their flowers have left them; yea, sometimes the
same kinde of Passions infest men.112
In addition to catalepsy and hysteria, there was also melancholia attonita.
Patients with this disorder were highly depressed, often falling into a kind of
stupor and refusing to eat. In 1873, one year before Kahlbaum described
catatonia, Dr. S. W. D. Williams, superintendent of the Sussex Lunatic
Asylum, reported a partial cure for melancholia attonita by means of elec-
trical stimulation. He used, “a continuous current through [the] head from
a 40-cell Stohrer’s battery [voltage unknown].” He modestly proclaimed,
to have been greatly impressed with the rapid and satisfactory
manner in which these two cases began to recover immediately
the electric current was passed through their brains, as though
the functions of the great nervous centres were suddenly, by the
action of the current, caused to act, and the stupor in which
the patients lay previously was dissipated almost before one’s
eyes.113
Kahlbaum gathered together all these disorders – melancholia attonita,
catalepsy and hysteria – into the single illness, catatonia. In his large book
devoted entirely to this one disorder, he defined it this way,
Catatonia is a brain illness with a cyclic, changing course, in
which the psychic symptoms are in turn melancholia, mania,
112Thomas Willis, An Essay on the Pathology of the Brain and Nervous Stock. London,
Dring, Harper and Leigh (1681), pp. 76-78.
113S. W. D. Williams, “On the treatment of melancholia attonita, with refusal of food,
by the continuous current,” The Lancet 101: 127-128 (1873).
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stupor, confusion and finally dementia. One or more of these
symptoms may be absent from the complete series of psychic
‘symptom-complexes’. Besides these psychic symptoms, loco-
motor neural processes with the general character of muscular
tension occur as typical symptoms.114
Figure 24: Catatonic patients in Heidelberg. “The patients were easily got
into the unusual positions and maintained them as they were
photographed in a group, some with roguish smiles, others with
rigid solemnity. Of these patients, only E was already quite
demented, while A, B and C in particular, were still in the be-
ginning of the disease.” [Kraepelin, 1899, v. II, p. 125]
Fifteen years after the publication of Kahlbaum’s Catatonia, Kraepelin
was working in Dorpat, stuck in a place that he did not like and where he
was unable to speak the language of his patients. Recalling that time in
his Memoirs, he wrote,
114K. Kahlbaum (1874, 1973), p. 83.
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I was interested in the question of catatonia and tried to deter-
mine whether catatonic symptoms, in particular the command
automatism, were characteristic for a certain disease. I was
gradually forced to consider the importance of the course of the
illness with regard to the classification of the mental disorder.
However, I did not come to any clear conclusions, because I had
no opportunity to survey the entire development of the disorder
from the beginning until the final result in a larger number of
patients.115
Kraepelin did get an opportunity to “survey the entire development” of
catatonia, in Heidelberg, and it was from these longitudinal observations –
along with others for related disorders – that he crystallized his notion of
dementia praecox.
115E. Kraepelin (1987), pp. 43-44.
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When Karl Kahlbaum moved to Görlitz, he brought his student with him
and made him his assistant physician. There was a chemistry between
Kahlbaum and Ewald Hecker that proved to be productive in the hunt for
new mental illnesses. It was, in a way, the chemistry of opposites,
Isolated and without encouragement or opportunity to exchange
ideas, Kahlbaum was beginning to withdraw into his own world.
In the young Hecker he found a keen pupil who took up his views
with the other perfectly: on the one hand, there was the austere,
stern, reserved, organized scientist; on the other an amazingly
flexible and warm-hearted pupil, thirsty for new ideas.116
Even before moving to Görlitz, Kahlbaum had already “found” hebephre-
nia. He regarded it as a type of paraphrenia, meaning a mental illness
that occurs at a particular stage of human development, in this case pu-
berty. The name comes from Hebe, the Greek goddess of youth. Since
Kahlbaum gave only a minimal description of hebephrenia in his Die Grup-
pirung book, Hecker started taking notes on those of his patients whom he
thought represented typical cases. The result was a small article published
in the journal, Archiv für pathologische Anatomie und Physiologie und für
klinische Medizin (Archive for Pathological Anatomy and Physiology and
Clinical Medicine). The title of the article (in translation) could not have
been more simple or more modest, “Hebephrenia. A contribution to clinical
psychiatry.”117
Hecker’s article contains detailed descriptions of seven cases – five males
and two females. All patients were between the ages of seventeen and
twenty-three years at the time of their first symptoms. Hecker considered
case number one a model case. When this patient, Theodor K, arrived at
the asylum,
116Karl Wilmanns, “Eward Hecker (1843-1909),” translated by A. Kraam and G.E.
Berrios. Classic Text No. 52, History of Psychiatry 13: 458-465 (1924, 2002), quote
on pp. 458-459.
117Edward Hecker, “Hebephrenia. A contribution to clinical psychiatry,” translated by
A. Kraam. Classic text no. 77, History of Psychiatry 20: 87-106 (1871, 2009).
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[He stood] five foot one inch tall, thin, quite malnourished. Head
without deformities, face pale, expressionless, and silly. Big
eyes, light blue, staring (both pupils equal in size) at the ques-
tioner with a blank expression or casting them over the ceiling
back and forth. The patient gives correct information about
his personality and his background, but keeps inserting into his
speech silly remarks, screams suddenly without motive, knocks
with his feet on the floor and swerves with his arms and hands
clumsily, just like young people in the so-called ‘naughty years’.
He talks a lot to himself and does not take part in activities or
conversation. Instead he does all sorts of silly things: Looking
into the bright sun for a long time, hopping on one leg, run-
ning back and forth aimlessly, spinning in one spot with eyes
closed and head bent backwards in a quick whirl, rubbing his
eyes with grass and answering all questions addressed at him
with the words: ‘But the eyes’.
Hecker included excerpts from his patients’ letters, claiming that they
were “crucial for the completion of the clinical picture.” The following
excerpt is from a letter that Theodor K. sent to his parents. Hecker states
that the author was using “a Jewish jargon”.
And when it evening became our apples and pears they all gone
were but instead of the mush we had we had beer soup and
when the beer soup was all gone there a small minute 60 passed
then before our house there was set alight a big firework ... and
today following that I would like to enquire how the German
farmers and foresters spend their time there whether they kill it.
Yes what is written XXIV that is X and X and again a 4 that is
the 24th agricultural and forestry meeting in K. But there has
not been one before. The 24th meeting of German farmers and
foresters are they walking around naked a lot or what are they
doing.
Kraepelin read Hecker’s article and was impressed by its wealth of detail,
but not totally convinced that hebephrenia was a real disease. He needed
firsthand confirmation, and fortunately, he was able to get it from his own
student and assistant physician, Leon Daraszkiewicz. Just as Hecker had
taken notes on his hebephrenia patients, so too had Daraszkiewicz described
more than twenty cases for his doctoral dissertation. Again, Kraepelin
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was impressed with the clinical detail and the intelligent interpretations.
Moreover, he was reassured by the fact that Daraszkiewicz’s descriptions
closely resembled Hecker’s. The only difference was that Daraszkiewicz’s
cases seemed more severe.
In discussions, Daraszkiewicz convinced Kraepelin that many of their de-
mented patients (seen in cross-section) were actually in the late stages of
a hebephrenic illness, not imbeciles with an inherited mental deficiency, as
many people supposed. He supported the argument by pointing to cases
in which patients were simultaneously demented and psychotic. He did not
believe that these patients were imbeciles, because in most cases the mental
deterioration appeared after, not before, the psychosis. Kraepelin under-
stood the significance of these observations. Hebephrenia, he concluded
had a characteristic progression over time. Needing no further proof that
hebephrenia was a real disease, Kraepelin decided to include it in the fourth
edition of his textbook, albeit under a new name, dementia praecox.
Over time, Kraepelin collected a vast store of clinical observations from
his and his students’ firsthand experiences. Consequently, in writing about
dementia praecox in every edition of his textbook from the fourth through
the ninth, he was able to elucidate the illness by means of lengthy descrip-
tions. In the eighth edition (1913), the last before his death, he mentions no
less than thirty-six psychological symptoms, among which hallucinations,
catatonic excitement, delusions, memory loss, and the “weakening of voli-
tional impulses”.118 In addition, he mentions nineteen bodily symptoms,
including the following.
The tendon reflexes are generally heightened, often very greatly;
in many cases there is also increased mechanical excitability of
the muscles and nerves. The pupils are frequently strikingly
dilated, particularly in the states of excitement; now and then,
distinct but changing pupillary difference is observed, and also
restlessness of the eyeball. Also common are vasomotor dis-
turbances, cyanosis, localized edema and dermographia in all
gradations; in certain cases there is strong perspiration. Saliva-
tion appears to be increased in many cases ... Cardiac activity
is subject to great variations, now slowed down, more often
slightly accelerated, often also weak and irregular. The body
118E. Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia, translated by R. Mary Barclay.
Bristol, England, Thoemmes Press (1913, 2002), pp. 5-73. The original work formed
part of Kraepelin’s textbook on psychiatry, eighth edition.
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temperature is mostly low; I once saw it go down to 33.8 C.
Menstruation tends to cease or become irregular.119
Imitating Hecker, perhaps, Kraepelin also provided paragraph after para-
graph of characteristic behaviors and utterances, such as this,
In the sky there appears a white star, pictures of saints, Christ
on the cross ... color pictures are shown on the wall; angels, dev-
ils, ghosts, wild animals, snakes and the hell bound appear in
the room; flames flare up; human heads are in the food, worms
in the soup. Outside, cocks crow, chains rattle, music plays,
children wail. God speaks to the patient; the devil calls his
name; the whole course of his life is recounted to him. People
know his thoughts, talk about him, speak of ‘murder and such
stories’ ... There are revelations, spiritual voices, ‘vocal inter-
ventions’, ventriloquists; when the patient thinks something, he
immediately hears it being related to others. In the room there
is a vapor, mephitic air, a smell of death; the meal there is hu-
man flesh and garbage. Electric currents circulate in his body;
other people’s blood is pumped in the patient’s head and his
penis made stiff; the bed makes gestures; ‘large frogs crawl into
the mouth through the nose and ear.’120
And again like Hecker, Kraepelin supplemented his own commentaries
with texts written by the patients themselves. Below, is an extract from a
lengthy statement written by a female musician five weeks after the onset
of her illness.
In the following night I was electrified. I conclude that from the
fact that the following morning I felt quite peculiar pains and
twitchings, and it was called out to me a few days before by
an electrical machine, which had inspired me with all possible
moods and thought, and by mean of which each thought is un-
derstood ... Since that day I have had terrible stories of murder
and theft in my head, which, as I know that the machine is
still always working on me, can absolutely not be controlled ...
119Emil Kraepelin, Psychiatry: A Textbook for Students and Physicians, edition 6, vol.
2, edited by J. Quen, translated by S. Ayed. Cambridge, MA, Science History Pub-
lications (1899, 1990), p. 110.
120E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), pp. 120-121.
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horrible smells from time to time, I don’t know how, are trans-
mitted to me. When the physician examined me such plague
smells also streamed out, that the doctor went backwards ter-
rified... One evening it was called out to me by the machine:
‘We conjecture in you the murderer of the Empress of Austria
(!!!).’121
A reader may recognize resemblances between Kraepelin’s case descrip-
tions and John Haslam’s account of James Tilley Matthews. The percep-
tive reader may also notice that many of the signs and symptoms evident in
the preceding quotations are not unique to dementia praecox. They could
equally well have been found in a description of melancholia, mania, or
delirium. However, it was not the signs and symptoms that constituted the
sought-after essence of dementia praecox. Rather it was the combination of
early onset, rapid deterioration, and ultimate dementia that uniquely de-
fined the illness. Together, these properties satisfied Kahlbaum’s definition
of essence.
Kraepelin’s decision to name the illness dementia praecox served to dis-
tinguish two types of dementia, one occurring in young people (dementia
praecox ), the other in old people (senile dementia). Senile dementia was
considered irreversible, and Kraepelin initially believed that the dementia
of dementia praecox was also irreversible, but he later changed his mind,
agreeing that remissions in dementia praecox were sometimes possible.
Kraepelin’s choice of the name dementia praecox may have been apt,
but it was hardly original. The fact that similar names had been used by
other authors is a good indication that they, too, were familiar with the
disease. Although none of these psychiatrists wrote extensively about it,
their choice of terms indicates that they recognized precocious onset as the
key feature. Heinrich Schüle, working at an asylum in Baden, had referred
to das pubische Irresein (pubic insanity); the Parisian psychiatrist, Albert
Charpentier, had written about les démences de la puberté (dementias of
puberty); and Benedict Morel had used the term démence précoce (pre-
cocious dementia). Also, Thomas Clouston, in Edinburgh, had described
what he called “adolescent insanity and its secondary dementia”. And
lastly, Arnold Pick, a German professor teaching at Charles University in
Prague, had referred to the hebephrenia of Kahlbaum and Hecker as the
soon-to-be familiar, dementia praecox.
121E. Kraepelin (1913, 2002), p. 110.
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Despite Kraepelin’s conviction that he had come upon a real mental ill-
ness, there were no truly essential features other than the temporal aspects.
He would have dearly liked pathological markers, as in progressive paral-
ysis, but there were none. Hecker had been similarly disappointed. He
wrote in his article that an anatomist colleague had examined the brain
of case number five – postmortem, of course – but found nothing abnor-
mal. Hecker carefully remarked, “The ultimate evidence that hebephrenia
stands as a unitary mental illness in its own right can only be provided by
pathologic-anatomic facts. But considering the uncertainty provisionally
associated with the pathological anatomy of the brain we probably have to
dispense with this proof for a long time.”
Moreover, again unlike progressive paralysis, there was no probable
cause. Hecker was no more troubled by this fact than he was by the
absence of neuropathology. “The conclusion that there is a common single
cause for such a unified complex of symptoms with a specified and ex-
actly predictable course is not entirely correct but frequently also applied
in other fields without objection. The formation of disease entities like
cholera, typhoid, Morbus Basedowii [Graves’ Disease], et cetera, demon-
strates this.”
Although Kraepelin could not pinpoint any single cause of dementia prae-
cox, he had plenty of ideas. According to degeneration theory, degenerate
families carried hereditary defects. From this, Kraepelin considered the
possibility that a disruption of normal brain development could cause de-
mentia praecox. However, that scenario predicted a slowly developing dis-
order, whereas dementia praecox appeared suddenly and worsened rapidly.
Kraepelin ultimately rejected the idea of developmental defects, but iron-
ically, faulty brain development is now seen as the most likely precursor
of schizophrenia. Kraepelin also considered Darwinian theory, which sug-
gested that early events in the “struggle for survival” might trigger prema-
ture dementia. Kraepelin found that certain of his clinical cases did indeed
have difficult childhoods, but not always. Lacking any proof one way or
the other with respect to these ideas, he settled on the notion of multiple
causation, citing both heredity and the environment – which is more-or-less
the current view.
In addition to the putative causes mentioned above, Kraepelin also be-
lieved that a toxin must, somehow, be involved. Like Nissl in his rabbit
experiments, Kraepelin assumed that even common drugs were toxic and
thus capable of causing mental illness. He had witnessed the adverse effects
of drugs in his experimental studies, and he knew from personal experience
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the destabilizing effects of alcohol, morphine and possibly cannabis. Mostly,
however, he drew upon the example of myxedema, the psychotic disorder
caused by lack of thyroid hormone. Kraepelin strongly suspected that a
toxin was responsible for damaging the thyroid gland. In light of the fact
that dementia praecox begins at puberty, Kraepelin thought that it might
be caused by a toxic substance affecting the sexual organs.
Just as the cause of dementia praecox was unknown, so too was its treat-
ment. A few physicians had recommended castration as a treatment for
psychosis, but Kraepelin’s speculations notwithstanding, he could not bring
himself to try it. However, he did try injecting patients with extracts of
testes. When those trials proved ineffective, he gave up on the sexual spec-
ulation. He noticed that his patients seemed more normal when feverish, so
he thought of raising their body temperature. Cognizant of the association
between fevers and high levels of white blood cells, he tried to increase the
production of white blood cells by injecting patients with sodium nucle-
inate, a compound related to DNA. Unfortunately, none of the patients so
treated showed any sign of improvement. In the end, Kraepelin fell back
on bed rests and baths, and sedation when necessary. As a bit of practi-
cal advice for psychiatrists and nurses, he recommended providing patients
with good nutrition, sufficient sleep and a bit of exercise.
Finally, Kraepelin considered how to prevent dementia praecox, “espe-
cially if the malady had been already observed in the parents or brothers
and sisters.” He thought it best to avoid the dangerous influences “of ef-
feminacy, of poverty, and of exact routine, and especially of city education.”
He recommended a “childhood spent in the country with plenty of open air,
bodily exercise, education beginning late without ambitious aims, and sim-
ple food.”122 Such was the state of psychiatric prevention and treatment
as late as 1913.
–//–
Once the dust had settled – from questions about priority and terminology –
it was Kraepelin and his disease, dementia praecox, that came out in front.
It was a triumph of sorts, although it was not celebrated. His patients
were unaware of the discovery and, since the disease was untreatable, little
changed in their lives – with one exception. Kraepelin was struggling to
maintain control of admissions and discharges at his clinic, fighting off
government bureaucrats who had their own priorities. He was convinced
122E. Kraepelin (1913, 2002), p. 279.
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that dementia was inevitably downhill and irreversible. So, even for a
patient diagnosed in the early stages of dementia praecox, there was no
point in keeping him or her in a clinic dedicated to training and research.
Since the subsequent course of the illness was predictable and unavoidable,
nothing more could be learned from that patient. Better, to send her to a
rural asylum for custodial care and free up the bed for a new, perhaps more
interesting, patient. More patients were in fact moved, probably worsening
their lives, but providing better opportunities for Kraepelin and co-workers.
Always the patriot, Kraepelin saw that his discovery could also bene-
fit the German military. He was aware of stories in which cowardly men
had feigned imbecility in order to avoid military service. Usually an officer
would investigate. If he found that the man had seemed normal before his
induction – according to testimonies from family and friends – he would con-
clude that the soldier was simulating, and he would punish him. Kraepelin
knew that dementia praecox, in its stages, could sometimes masquerade as
imbecility. Moreover, he knew a few dementia praecox patients who had
fluent speech prior to their mental collapse. Some had achieved academic
success or performed well in demanding jobs. He, therefore, informed mili-
tary authorities that they should investigate further before punishing dull,
uncooperative soldiers who were found to have acted normally in earlier
years.
In 1896, or perhaps slightly before then, Kraepelin began using dementia
praecox as a diagnostic term. Figure 25 shows a portion of the patient list
at the Heidelberg clinic for the year 1900. Six cases are listed as “dem.
praecox”, with ages between sixteen and thirty-two years at the time of




Figure 25: Patient list at the Heidelberg psychiatric clinic, 1900. [R. Chase]
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One gets the impression that Kraepelin was constantly at work, whether
seeing patients in the clinic, administering, supervising experiments or
preparing manuscripts.
Undoubtedly, he was a serious person who worked with a prodigious
energy, but he found a balance in life. He had a family, and he also enjoyed
the company of a small group of close colleagues. Although he had cordial
relations with other professors, he avoided banquets and formal events as
much as possible. He preferred hanging out with his male friends, outdoors
and actively.
He once led eight co-workers on an excursion down the Neckar River to
the picturesque village of Neckarsteinach. A photograph of the group shows
the psychiatrists wearing woolen jackets, starched white shirts and black
ties – all except Nissl, who hated ties. On a high slope overlooking the river
valley lay the ruins of a twelfth century castle. It was there, no doubt, that
the group stopped to enjoy their picnic lunch and discuss ... one can only
imagine.
For personal fitness, he bought a bicycle and took long trips. Once, while
visiting in Munich with Ina, he set out by himself for Lake Constance to
consult with a colleague. From there, he cycled to Stuttgart and then to
Ernstthal, covering more than five hundred kilometers in just a few days.
Pedaling bikes in those days over distances along unpaved or poorly paved
roads, as Kraepelin did, was no small feat.
By his own account, Kraepelin spent at least one or two months every
year away from Heidelberg. When traveling in Europe, he mixed business
and pleasure, whereas in the Canary Islands, North Africa and Southeast
Asia it was almost entirely tourism. He had a special fondness for Italy.
Once he was able to afford it (near the end of his stay in Heidelberg), he
bought a lovely vacation villa in the hilly Piedmont region. In London, he
attended the theatre, but found the productions less good than those back
home in Germany. As for the five-month trip with his brother to Ceylon
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Figure 26: Excursion to Neckarsteinach, 1898. Nissl (left), Kraepelin
(right) in front row. [Archive Max-Planck Institute of Psychia-
try MPIP-K16/C]
(now Sri Lanka), South India, Singapore and Java, he said of it, “I never
felt so happy my entire life as I did on this journey.”
At home in Heidelberg, Kraepelin relaxed while walking on the nearby
Philosopher’s Walk. For more strenuous exercise, he hiked along hilly ridges
and explored silent, wooded valleys. As he hiked, he would have been
alert to the various plants and animals that he encountered along the way.
And, thanks to his brother Karl’s instruction during their youthful walks
in Neustrelitz, he would have known the names and unique features of each
species. It must have crossed his mind that he now possessed a related kind
of knowledge, one gained from observing and interviewing patients. Could
he use this knowledge to cut further into the body of mental illness, to find
all the joints both large and small?
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Kraepelin is remembered today mostly for two things: his description of
dementia praecox (schizophrenia) and his classification of mental illnesses.
Neither, however, was achieved at a single point in time. Rather, through-
out his career he fiddled with both the definition of dementia praecox and
the specification of illness groupings in his classification. All of that was
made difficult by the fact that everything in psychiatry was in flux: symp-
tom descriptions, psychological versus biological interpretations, disease
definitions, disease names and causes.
To keep up with the latest developments, Kraepelin read books and med-
ical journals, but there was nothing like person-to-person discussions. It
was one of the reasons that he traveled so often, to learn from his colleagues
and listen to their ideas. In the end, though, it was his responsibility to
sort through all the information, size it up against his own experience,
and arrive at defensible conclusions. Moreover, it was sometimes necessary
to change one’s mind. Kraepelin’s maneuvering with respect to dementia
praecox , alone, leads us to believe that he gave considerable attention to
revising his classification.
Dementia praecox first appeared in the fourth edition of Kraepelin’s text-
book (1893). The table of contents for that book shows dementia praecox
placed, along with Kahlbaum’s catatonia and dementia paranoides, in the
category of Degenerating Psychological Processes. It was one of thirteen
major categories, each with its own sub-entries. The major categories in-
cluded old standards such as delirium, mania, melancholia, dementia para-
lytica (progressive paralysis), plus a few new ones, including chronic intox-
ication and acute exhaustion. Also included were the traditional German
terms, Wahnsinn, for insanity, and Verrücktheit, translating as “craziness”
but associated with paranoid delusions.
Psychiatrists were well acquainted with delusions, whether of the para-
noid variety or not, yet they puzzled over their place in respect to diag-
nosis. Were delusions the defining feature of one particular disease, per-
haps delirium, or were they merely a symptom common to many different
diseases? And, was there a fundamental difference between “ordinary”
delusions and paranoid delusions? Opinions varied. Jean-Etienne Esquirol
saw delusions as obsessional, hence symptomatic of monomania. Wilhelm
Griesinger claimed that delusions rarely occur in the midst of a full-blown
insanity, but only afterwards as a “secondary state” or a “partial insanity”.
By Kraepelin’s time, it was widely assumed that delusions were just a
symptom of undifferentiated psychosis. Kraepelin broke from that conven-
tion by introducing dementia paranoides in the fourth edition of his text-
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book. It was a disorder uniquely characterized by paranoid delusions. He
saw it as related to, but distinct from, dementia praecox. Whereas as delu-
sions were either absent or of minor importance in dementia praecox, they
were dominant in dementia paranoides. Verrücktheit also involved delu-
sions, but somewhat differently. In Kraepelin’s conception, Verrücktheit
was a “durable delusional system in the presence of an intact personal-
ity.” Unlike patients ill with dementia paranoides who were delusional and
demented, those with Verrücktheit were delusional but not totally deterio-
rated.
Kraepelin placed dementia praecox alongside catatonia and dementia
paranoides in a single category, because all three disorders worsened with
time and ended in dementia. His use of the word “degenerating” in the
category title, Degenerating Psychological Processes, was descriptive, be-
cause degeneration implies progressive deterioration. But “degenerating”
also hinted to the then-popular theory of degeneration. Kraepelin himself
was skeptical of that theory, but he may have thought it diplomatic to
at least allude to the theory in this context. Rather than giving any de-
tailed account of the degenerative processes said to characterize dementia
praecox, dementia paranoides and catatonia, Kraepelin instead substituted
metaphors such as “melting” and “dissolving”.
Foretelling future sub-typing exercises, Kraepelin mentioned two “forms”
of dementia praecox in this first description of the illness. He distinguished
a milder type, as described by Ewald Hecker, and a more severe type as
described by Leon Daraszkiewicz.
Kraepelin tweaked many details of the classification in the next edition
of his textbook, the fifth. Briefly, dementia praecox (with its two forms)
was again grouped with catatonia and dementia paranoides, but the group
heading now read Idiot-Producing Processes, instead of Degenerating Psy-
chological Processes. And, whereas in the fourth edition the tripartite
group had stood as an equal with twelve other diagnostic categories, it was
now demoted to a subordinate position within the category, Metabolic Dis-
eases. Also included in that category were myxedema and cretinism (both
caused by low levels of thyroid hormone), and dementia paralytica (caused
by a bacterium). By moving dementia praecox , catatonia and dementia
paranoides into Metabolic Diseases, Kraepelin confirmed his belief that all
three diseases were caused by toxins.
–//–
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In the last year of the nineteenth century, Kraepelin published the sixth
edition of his textbook. At nearly one thousand pages in length (original
edition), it was much longer than any of its predecessors. He was to publish
two more editions in his lifetime, adding another 4418 pages for an aggre-
gate total of 8422 pages, but the sixth was the most important of all. Its
confident tone, engaging observational data and many innovations struck a
chord that still resonates today. It was the crowning – albeit controversial –
achievement of nineteenth century psychiatry and a cornerstone of modern
psychiatry.
The work was published in two volumes. Volume 1 is titled General
Psychiatry; it concerns subjects applicable to all mental illnesses. Volume
2, Clinical Psychiatry, is devoted to classification. Near the beginning of the
second volume, Kraepelin placed a list of forty-four contemporary textbooks
written by other authors, of which fourteen are identified by title. None of
these works, however, is discussed in the text. There a few references to
journal articles but, on the whole, this is not an academic work. Rather, as
stated in the subtitle, it is a practical guide “for students and physicians”.
The textbook contains comprehensive accounts of all known mental dis-
orders. Each one is described according to its psychological, behavioral and
physical symptoms. More interesting for the non-specialist are Kraepelin’s
comments in the two Introductions (one for each volume). In Volume 1, he
spells out his purposes and methods. For readers who might be in doubt
about what psychiatry is, he states unequivocally, in the very first sentence,
that “psychiatry is the science of mental illnesses and their treatment.” The
key word in that sentence is science. Having thus made clear his central
stance, he goes on to reiterate many points for which he had already be-
come known. For example, he acknowledges the potential of pathological
anatomy, but says that it has “so far furnished rather little information.”
As for what psychology might contribute, his assertion echoes Wilhelm
Wundt,
It is not impossible, with the help of that young science, to cre-
ate a physiology of the mind capable also of furnishing a useful
basis for psychiatry. On the one hand, it can be used for break-
ing down complex phenomena into their simple constituents ...
and we shall also be able, in suitable cases, to directly use the
psychologic experiment as a means for a detailed investigation
of pathologic conditions ... On the other hand, scientific psy-
chology is likely to provide useful additions to our view on the
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causes of insanity. Here we again have to refer to toxins acting
upon the course of our mental processes ...123
Having opened the Introduction by stating that psychiatry is the science
of mental illness, he returns to that key opinion at the very end.
Psychiatry is a young, still developing science, that must,
against sharp opposition, gradually achieve the position it
deserves according to its scientific and practical importance.
There is no doubt that it will achieve this position – for it
has at its disposal the same weapons which have served the
other branches of medicine so well: clinical observation, the
microscope and experimentation.124
Those words ring as true today as they did when written in 1899.
Volume 2 begins with a critique of current practices in respect to classi-
fication, emphasizing once again his devotion to the “essential” features of
mental disorders.
By far the most frequently adopted approach to the classifica-
tion of mental disorders has been to classify them according to
their clinical symptoms, because it is the manifestations of in-
sanity that most directly strike the eye of the beholder. This
procedure ... very soon encounters difficulties, once it becomes
a question of distinguishing the essential from the coincidental
and nonessential.
Kraepelin then summarizes his own approach, which stresses the connec-
tion between diagnosis and prognosis,
The clinical grouping of psychic disorders will have to be
supported simultaneously by all three means of classification
[pathological anatomy, causation, symptoms], to which must
also be added the experiences acquired from the course, the
outcome, even the treatment of the disease ... Precisely this
procedure is the only one which, at the present stage of devel-
opment of our science, is also able to some extent to satisfy the
practical requirements that we have. The first thing the doctor
123E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), vol. 1, p. 5.
124E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), vol. 1, p. 8.
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has to do at the patient’s bedside is form an opinion about the
prospective further development of the case of disease. This is
always the first question put to him. For the practical activity
of the clinician, the value of every diagnosis is thus rated essen-
tially by the extent to which it opens up reliable prospects for
the future [italics in original].125
Dementia praecox is given much greater prominence in this edition than
in preceding ones, and it is classified somewhat differently. Whereas de-
mentia praecox was grouped with catatonia and dementia paranoides in
the fourth and fifth editions, it stands alone in the sixth edition as one of
thirteen major categories. All the major categories are divided into smaller
groupings. Dementia praecox has three “forms”: hebephrenic, catatonic
and paranoid. By way of explanation, Kraepelin wrote, “The first one is
identical with the dementia praecox which I described earlier, the second
with catatonia, and the third embraces dementia paranoides.”
Another example of a category with multiple types is General Neuroses.
Kraepelin includes under this heading three types: epileptic insanity, hys-
teric insanity and fright neurosis. It is surprising that Kraepelin would use
the old term, epileptic insanity, and that he would designate it as a neuro-
sis, given the post-Feuchtersleben definition of neurosis as a purely mental
disorder, but he did. Moreover, he lists epileptic dementia and alcoholic
epilepsy as subtypes of epileptic insanity.
The clinical description of dementia praecox extends to seventy-eight
pages. By comparison, Kraepelin needed only ten pages to cover the same
subject in the fourth edition, and thirty-nine pages in the fifth edition.
His coverage of the disorder is replete with page after page of wild behav-
iors and bizarre delusions. The inclusion of so much symptom description
is surprising, given that the Introduction eschews diagnosis by symptoms.
Perhaps he, like previous authors, knew the titillating effect of such mate-
rial. On the other hand, there are plenty of statistics. Between ten and
eleven percent of cases of dementia praecox are preceded by a “severe acute
illness”. Seventeen percent of the individuals in the Heidelberg clinic were
“outstandingly talented,” and eighteen percent of the women had “men-
strual disorders”. Seventy-five percent of cases exhibiting the hebephrenic
form “appear to reach the higher grades of dementia,” whereas seventeen
percent continue with “moderate” dementia. As for the remaining eight
125E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), vol. 2, pp. 3-4.
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percent, “the signs of the hebephrenic disorder vanished so completely that
it might be justifiable to speak of recovery.”
When addressing the causes of dementia praecox , Kraepelin states that
a “hereditary predisposition” was found in “seventy percent of those cases
in which utilizable data were available,” meaning evidence from family
members. The disorder, he writes, is “like a tree whose roots no longer find
nurture in the available soil, so the intellectual powers are said to dwindle
once the inadequate heritage no longer permits further development.” It
can be noted that Kraepelin’s estimate of seventy percent for hereditary
predisposition stands remarkably close to the current estimate of eighty
percent, which comes from sophisticated statistical analyses.126
–//–
With the identification and elaboration of dementia praecox , Kraepelin
built one pillar of his reputation. With the identification of manic-
depressive insanity in the sixth edition (later named bipolar disorder),
he erected a second pillar. Together, these two disorders re-defined the
psychoses. Recall that psychosis refers to illnesses which are caused by
brain abnormalities. In 1845, when Feuchtersleben defined the term, the
abnormalities that were supposed to characterize the psychoses were, for
the most part, imagined. Only progressive paralysis left telltale marks
in the brain. In 1893, when Kraepelin named dementia praecox , progres-
sive paralysis was still the only psychosis with a known neuropathology,
and nothing had changed by the time that Kraepelin introduced manic-
depressive insanity. Despite the lack of anatomical evidence, Kraepelin
took the bold and largely successful step of splitting the entire gamut of
psychosis into two neat categories, dementia praecox and manic-depressive
insanity.
A common, and not incorrect, view of Kraepelin’s classification is that
it separates disorders of affect (manic-depressive insanity) from disorders
of intelligence (dementia praecox ). In psychiatric parlance, affect refers to
a person’s mood or emotion – excitement, depression, anxiety, et cetera –
while intelligence refers to rationality.
People generally expect and tolerate variable affect, but disorders of af-
fect were hardly noticed by early psychiatrists. More feared, and therefore
more prominent, was the prospect of irrationality. Virtually all mental
126Ronald Chase, Schizophrenia: A Brother Finds Answers in Biological Science. Balti-
more, Johns Hopkins University Press (2013), pp. 19-21.
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disturbances were considered disorders of intelligence. Prior to the nine-
teenth century, even melancholy was thought to be a disorder of intelligence.
Opinions began to change in the early 1800s under the influence of faculty
psychology and romanticism. Johann Heinroth, the religiously minded psy-
chiatrist from Leipzig, was particularly insightful. He dismissed the idea
that depression is caused by a faulty intellect, emphasizing instead the role
of “disposition” and a “depressing passion”.
It is obviously nonsensical to keep brooding on the imaginary
misfortunes of others; but the question is if the true origin of
fixed ideas is indeed the intellect, as many are wont to believe.
We say: no! In our view this is the false idea of which humanity
has held for several hundreds of years ... that the origin of the
false notions of patients suffering from melancholia ... is being
erroneously attributed to the intellect ... It is the disposition
which is seized by some depressing passion.127
Meanwhile, mainstream physicians in France were also reevaluating the
role of affect in psychiatry. Phillipe Pinel distinguished two types of mania,
those involving intelligence (manie avec délire) and those that involving
mood (manie sans délire). Jean-Etienne Esquirol came up with lypemania,
a disorder characterized by sadness. With time, mania and depression came
to take on their modern meanings, and by mid-century some psychiatrists
were noting that mania and depression could appear as an alternating pair
in the same patient. It became apparent that mania and depression, while
seemingly very different, must have a common origin. Even the names
of newly recognized disorders reflected the intimate association between
elevated moods and depressed moods, for example, dysthymia mutablilis,
la folie circulaire and la folie à double forme.
Two Parisians alienists, Jean-Pierre Falret and Jules Baillarger, had been
independently caring for patients with alternating moods. Each of them
noted that none of these patients ever became demented. This was an im-
portant observation because everyone knew that disorders of intelligence
could – and often did – lead to dementia. So, if disorders of mood did
not lead to dementia, they must be very different from intellectual dis-
orders. Around the same time, Ewald Hecker and Karl Kahlbaum also
became interested in mood disorders, due to their pronounced temporal
features. Hecker coined the term cyclothymia for a type of recurrent, af-
fective insanity. A few years later, Kahlbaum published his own account
127J. C. Heinroth (1818, 1975), pp. 190-191.
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of the same disorder. In contrast to Hecker, who saw cyclothymia as a
true psychosis, Kahlbaum considered it as a relatively mild disorder with
a favorable course. Taken together, all these early accounts of mood disor-
ders provided Kraepelin with plenty of precedent for his manic-depressive
insanity, just as there had been precedents for dementia praecox.
With manic-depressive insanity, Kraepelin achieved what he had pro-
mised in his inaugural lecture at Dorpat: the identification of a disorder
based on “the clinical study of mental disorders, or the empirical determi-
nation of individual forms of madness according to their cause, course, and
conclusion.” In other words, he combined an analysis of symptoms with
an analysis of temporal course, and he did so with manic-depressive insan-
ity even more powerfully than he had with dementia praecox. Kraepelin’s
succinct definition of his new illness acknowledges both elements,
Manic-depressive insanity ... comprises the entire domain of
so-called periodic and circular insanity on the one hand, and
simple mania which is usually still distinguished from it, on
the other. Over the years, I have convinced myself more and
more that all of the described pictures are simply manifestations
of a single pathological process ... Manic-depressive insanity
takes place in single attacks which present either the signs of
a so-called manic excitation, flight of ideas, elated mood and
urge to be active, or those of a peculiar psychic depression with
psychomotor inhibition, or finally, a mixture of the two states.
[italics in original].128
By way of further elaboration, he describes how the intensity of the
symptoms fluctuates over time, and how each episode is typically inter-
rupted by a “more or less complete return to presence of mind.” Since
manic-depressive insanity is a form of psychosis, patients in all three states
(manic, depressive and mixed) experience delusions. During the manic
state, for example,
The mood is predominately elated and cheerful, and affected
by the feeling of increased fitness. The patient feels the need to
come out of his shell, to have livelier relations with those around
him, to play a role ... The patient establishes many contacts,
suddenly pays all this business debts without constraint, makes
128E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), vol. 2, p. 272.
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magnificent presents, builds all kinds of castles in the air and
throws himself with rash enthusiasm into daring ventures that
overreach his strength by far. He has 167,000 picture postcards
of his village printed, tries to adopt a little black boy from the
Cameroon.
Contrastingly, in the depressive state,
The mood is gloomy. Nothing can arouse his interest for long;
nothing gives him pleasure; he has become indifferent towards
his relatives and to what used to be dearest to him. Everywhere
he sees only the drawbacks and difficulties; the people around
him are not as good and unselfish as he thought they were; one
deception and disillusion follows another.”129
Figure 27: Handwriting in a healthy person (panel I) and in patients with
manic-depressive insanity (panels II-IV). [Kraepelin, 1899]
According to Kraepelin, “By far the most striking disturbances [in manic-
depressive insanity] lie in the psychomotor domain.” He was referring to
abnormalities in his patients’ physical movements. To illustrate the point,
129E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), vol. 2. Manic and depressive states described respectively
on pp. 285 and 293.
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he reproduced experimental data from his Heidelberg laboratory (Figure
27).
Patients were asked to write the numbers 1 and 10. They used a special
stylus that recorded the quickness of their finger movements and the amount
of pressure that was applied to the paper. Panel number I (at the top) is
a control, taken from a “healthy female guard”. The speed and pressure
tracing is above the line, the actual writing below. Panel II is from a
manic-depressive patient in a depressive state. The numbers are smaller
than in panel I, the speed of writing is “greatly retarded”, and the pressure
is “not even 50 grams.” Panel III is from a manic-depressive patient in
a manic state. “It may be considered as the expression of the intensified
psychomotor excitability.” Finally, panel IV is from a woman who “was in
a condition where the urge to be active had vanished completely for a few
days in the course of severe mania.” Panel IV, therefore, represents the
mixed state.
Kraepelin presents dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity in
separate chapters. Although he gives us lengthy descriptions of the symp-
toms associated with each illness, there is little in the way of direct com-
parison. To fill the gap, I made my own comparison using statistics that
Kraepelin left scattered throughout the text (Figure 28). These percentages
indicate a surprising similarity in quantifiable aspects of the illnesses.
Dementia praecox Manic-depressive
Insanity
Prevalence in the clinic 14 - 15% 10 - 15%
36% in hebephrenic form
Females 58% in catatonic form 66%
59% in paranoid form
Age of onset under 25 years 60% 66%
Hereditary cause 80% 70%
Figure 28: Statistical comparison of dementia praecox and manic-
depressive insanity. Author’s tabulation, based on percentages
reported in Kraepelin’s textbook (1899].
Moreover, Kraepelin provides little practical guidance for distinguishing
dementia praecox from manic-depressive insanity during diagnosis.
The depressive states [of manic-depressive insanity] have to be
distinguished, above all, from the introductory depression of
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dementia praecox ... the emphasis here lies on the distinction
between negativism and psychomotor inhibition, which can be
very difficult in the given case. Also to be taken into consid-
eration are the presence of mind and the absence of thought
disturbance, and also particularly the emotional dullness in de-
mentia praecox, as opposed to the hebetude [lethargy], absence
of mind and sad or anxious depression in the case of [manic-
depressive insanity]. Rapid occurrence of very nonsensical delu-
sional ideas and numerous illusions without marked clouding of
the consciousness and depression speaks very much for dementia
praecox.130
Psychiatrists would have had to cull the essence of each disorder from
the totality of material provided in Kraepelin’s textbook. Once distilled,
it came down to two distinguishing features. First, dementia praecox is
fundamentally a disturbance of rational thought, whereas manic-depression
is a disturbance of mood. And second, dementia praecox progresses to
dementia, but manic-depressive insanity does not.
–//–
As the diseases named by his predecessors faded from memory, it was Krae-
pelin’s terminology and Kraepelin’s classification that stood tall. Gone
were the empty speculations of the past, Heinroth’s romantic psychiatry
and Gudden’s indifference to diagnosis. Kraepelin ruled with the author-
ity of science and the persuasion of fact-filled writing. Here at last was a
natural order suited to a modern psychiatry. So the story goes, but there
are more nuanced versions, as we will see.
No one denies that the sixth edition of Kraepelin’s textbook is a master-
piece. It is actually unique in many respects, for it contains not only the
robust case descriptions for which Kraepelin is renown, but also many sup-
plementary materials of a more scientific nature. He includes photographs
to illustrate the body types and facial features supposedly typical of par-
ticular illnesses. There are group portraits of individuals diagnosed with
the same illness, such as the photograph of catatonic patients reproduced
on page 170 of this book. Mood states in manic-depression are illustrated
with multiple photographs of the same patient. Two photographic plates
show histological changes in the cerebral cortex, one of which is credited to
Nissl.
130E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), vol. 2, p. 318-319.
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Kraepelin also took full advantage of mechanical recording devices to
illustrate abnormal motor behaviors. Figure 27, showing the numbers 1
and 10 written by a manic-depressive patient, is one example. He has thir-
teen additional “specimens” of his patients’ handwriting, each containing
several lines of script. And impressively, he presents quantitative data in
graphs. There are graphs showing the ages of illness onset, body weights
over time, and the ups and downs of symptoms such as melancholy, stu-
por and agitation. All of these illustrations – photographs, physiological
traces, graphs – are examples of scientific methodology. Kraepelin did not
forsake clinical symptoms, he sought to objectify them with measurements
and statistics. In this respect, with varying degrees of success, he replaced
personal observation with “hard facts”. And, in so far as objective data
are superior to subjective opinions for purposes of defining and diagnosing
diseases, these innovations were a step forward.
It is generally assumed that Kraepelin took his quantitative data from
the Zählkarten, the cards on which he and his assistants recorded details
of the patients’ medical histories. Although he may well have extracted
information from the cards pertaining to ages, family profiles and disease
outcomes, the more interesting question is the extent to which he used the
cards for constructing his classification. According to one of Kraepelin’s
students, he “again and again worked through thousands and thousands of
his patients’ files in order to group and re-group them.”131
One can imagine Kraepelin sitting at his desk in the bungalow behind
his house. Stacks of Zählkarten lie neatly arranged on the desktop, some
tall, some short. There is a stack for progressive paralysis, one for dementia
praecox, others for idiocy, hysteria, alcoholism and so on. Many more cards
lay strewn about, these not yet assigned to any stack. Kraepelin picks up
one of the loose cards and reads from it. The patient is a male. He was
admitted to the clinic at age twenty-three and is described as “unkempt”.
His mother suffers from depression, his father is an alcoholic. The patient’s
speech is disorganized, his behavior “agitated”. An assistant physician has
noted the patient’s stiff, somewhat lopsided movements. In which stack
should Kraepelin place the card ? He holds it before him, hovering be-
tween dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity. Then he notices
that this patient is no longer in the clinic. Two years previously, his condi-
tion had been characterized as “demented” and he was sent to the asylum
131Quoted in Matthias M. Weber and Eric J. Engstrom, “Kraepelin’s ‘diagnostic cards’:
the confluence of clinical research and preconceived categories,” History of Psychiatry
8:375-385 (1997), p. 383.
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at Heppenheim. There is no longer any question. Kraepelin puts the card
on the dementia praecox stack and turns to another unsorted card.
According to one historian,
[The] crucial distinction from Kahlbaum and Hecker – and
Kraepelin’s major contribution – was that he had detailed,
quantifiable data collected longitudinally over a period of years.
No one had ever approached the identification ... of the insani-
ties using a structured scientific method ... [It was] systematic
science.132
Other authors have disputed these claims, at least in respect to Krae-
pelin’s reliance on the Zählkarten. Two historians of German psychia-
try, Matthias Weber and Eric Engstrom, examined a collection of 705
Zählkarten kept in the archives of the Max-Planck-Institute of Psychia-
try in Munich.133 Although Kraepelin ended his career in Munich, most
of the cards in the institute’s collection date from his earlier years in Hei-
delberg. According to Weber and Engstrom, notations on the cards are
written using “commonplace expressions of everyday speech,” rather than
precise clinical terminology. There is “a lack of systematic rigor, and [the
use of] incomplete diagnostic terms.” Furthermore, it is apparent that in-
dividual patients were followed, on average, for only around three months,
far less than would be required for a meaningful assessment of disease out-
comes. And most damaging for the claim that the cards were used for
sorting illnesses by outcomes, “more than 54% of the cards do not give any
information about the course of the disease.”
In discussing the implications of their investigation, Weber and Engstrom
quote from one of Kraepelin’s last published articles (1919). There, he
admits that the cards were a “means of last resort” and that the patients’
case reports had to be condensed so as to represent the “important” facts.
Weber and Engstrom contend that any such condensation would have been
influenced by preconceived notions of what the facts of a case should be. If,
for example, Kraepelin suspected that an individual might be suffering from
manic-depressive insanity, his assessment of that patient would be biased
toward memories of his or her emotional states. Weber and Engstrom
conclude that Kraepelin’s understanding of disease entities may well have
been acquired “outside, before, or perhaps despite his clinical observations.”
132Richard Noll, American Madness: The Rise and Fall of Dementia Praecox. Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press (2011), p. 63.
133M. M. Weber and E. J. Erickson (1997).
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Thus, “Kraepelin’s concept of diagnosis and prognosis was to a considerable
degree a theoretical ideal which cannot be easily verified on the basis of his
clinical case records.”
Taking all of this into account, it would seem that Kraepelin did try to
use quantitative methods, but he fell short of modern standards in respect
to design and implementation. The questionable value of the Zählkarten
reminds one of the dubious quantitation in his pharmacological and psy-
chological experiments. In balance, perhaps it would be fair to say that
Kraepelin’s classification was as much the product of his insights as it was
his objective methods of data collection.
–//–
History has shown that the sixth edition was a huge success. Kraepelin
probably anticipated the result, because he got it into the hands of book-
sellers just in time for the new state examinations in psychiatry. Two years
later, flush with the money earned from its sales, he bought a parcel of
land at Suna near Pallanza, Italy, upon which he built a beautiful vacation
villa.
Immediately after completing the manuscript, in the Spring of 1899,
Kraepelin and his brother traveled to Egypt. It was a vacation well de-
served by Emil and long awaited by both men. They began their trip in
Cairo where “almost all the guests in [the] hotel were Germans ... We
were particularly impressed by the mule drivers.” A few days later, they
took a saloon-train to Luxor, where they viewed royal graves, ruins and
ancient monuments. After a steamboat ride to Aswan, they returned to
Cairo. They made excursions in and around the city, visited museums,
carpet bazaars and other local attractions. Emil then visited a mental asy-
lum, because he “was particularly interested in seeing some of the mental
disorders caused by hashish.” After the visit, “with Professor Dinkler’s as-
sistance, [he] succeeded in acquiring a large lump of hashish to take home.”
He was disappointed, one supposes, when he experienced “no distinct ef-
fects” from smoking the drug.134
Kraepelin was back in Germany by autumn, and probably in Heidelberg
at the end of the year, which was the final year of the nineteenth century.
New Year’s Eve, known as Silvester in Germany, was always celebrated,
but this year’s New Year’s Eve was special. One imagines Kraepelin in his
home on Scheffelstraße, logs burning slowly in the fireplaces. The girls –
134Quotes from Kraepelin (1987), pp. 91-94.
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Antonie, Eva, Ina and Hanna – would have been allowed to stay up late so
as to witness the magical moment. One can picture Emil and Ina welcoming
their guests, he dressed in a dark suit buttoned high on a starched white
shirt with bow tie, Ina in a white silk gown flaring like a trumpet at the
ankle and tight (with corset) at the waist. The expectant crowd was no
doubt offered plenty of French Champagne and Glühwein, but Emil would
have had none of that. He was drinking Apfelsaft.
With the sound of bells ringing throughout the city, fireworks exploded
above the brown rooftops along the Neckar river. The American author,
Mark Twain, would have recognized the scene. Visiting in Heidelberg on an
earlier occasion, he described “meteor showers of rockets, Roman candles,
bombs, serpents, and Catharine wheels ... discharging in wasteful profusion
into the sky.”135
Two days after that special night, an article in the Heidelberger Tageblatt
described the celebration.
Although the Silvester night was pretty noisy, the noise was not
a considerable degree greater than in previous years. According
to the police report, the protection team had many occasions
to intervene, with no shortage of accidents caused by careless
handling of fireworks and missiles. A room fire was still burning
in the morning. A doctor had to treat as many as five persons
injured on Silvester night.
The Kraepelin home provided the perfect view. Looking out from the
south-facing windows, Emil would have seen the city illuminated, and above
it the castle ruins brooding darkly. Not immune to the significance of the
occasion, he must have felt deeply satisfied. It had been a good year for
him, and a good century for psychiatry.
135Mark Twain, A Tramp Abroad. Charleston, Bibliolife (1880, 2007), appendix B.
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Figure 29: The Schloss at Heidelberg. [Mark Twain, 1880]
198
16 Nineteenth Century Psychiatry Today
and in the Future
History is continuous, so changing the calendar from the nineteenth century
to the twentieth century did not affect the development of psychiatry. It
did, however, end the narrative of this book. In the final chapter, I will
review and reflect upon nineteenth century psychiatry from the vantage
point of the early twenty-first century.
Johann Christian Reil coined the word psychiatry in 1808. At the time,
patients with obvious mental symptoms were housed together with physi-
cally ill patients in poorly funded asylums that offered little in the way of
basic comforts, let alone treatment. The attending physicians thought the
patients mad, but knew not the types, the causes, nor even the words with
which to describe the maladies.
One hundred years later – by the early twentieth century – psychiatry
was a full-fledged medical specialty. Its practitioners understood that the
mind, the brain and behavior are all intimately linked. Patients were gen-
erally well cared for, even if there were few effective treatments. And, the
intellectual basis of psychiatric practice, which had been shaky just fifty
years earlier, was now secure. Thanks to the ideas of Wilhelm Griesinger,
Karl Kahlbaum and Emil Kraepelin, the major mental illnesses were iden-
tified and classified, and a course was charted toward understanding their
neurobiological bases.
We are now more than two hundred years removed from Reil’s neologism,
and more than one hundred years past Kraepelin’s sixth edition textbook.
We need to ask, How many of the specific ideas from the nineteenth cen-
tury remain valid today? Which ones have been modified? Which ones dis-
carded? I will answer these questions by examining four assertions, which
together summarize what are considered to be the major achievements of
nineteenth century psychiatry. I will look separately at each assertion, not-
ing events from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that bear on the
its current relevance. Along the way, I will express some personal opinions
about the issues raised, and even be so bold as to predict the future of
scientific psychiatry.
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Assertion No. 1: Mental illness is an illness
The English term mental illness is relatively new, dating from 1847, when
the novelist Emily Brontë used it in chapter fourteen of her novel, Wuther-
ing Heights. She wrote, “I thought, too, it might create a favorable crisis
in Catherine’s mental illness ...” In the same year, Emily’s Brontë’s older
sister, Charlotte, wrote in her novel, Jane Eyre, of a fictional character who
had mental defects. What exactly did the authors mean by these terms?
Most likely, the Brontë sisters were writing with metaphorical intent.
They would not have referenced a mental illness in the sense that we use
that term today, because the medical model for psychiatry had not yet
been established. It would be another two or three decades before that
concept took hold. Wilhelm Griesinger introduced the medical model at
the Charité hospital in Berlin, Kraepelin adopted it in Heidelberg, and
Kraepelin further refined it after moving to Munich in 1903.
The University Psychiatric Clinic in Munich occupied a magnificent new
building. It had one hundred beds divided among nine wards, a large
out-patient department, a microscopy laboratory and a library. The clinic
operated as a modern hospital, meaning that research went hand-in-hand
with patient care. Alois Alzheimer moved to Munich along with Krae-
pelin, and Franz Nissl joined them later. In addition to neuroanatomy,
physician-scientists in Munich pursued research in experimental psychol-
ogy, physiology, blood chemistry and heredity.
Before his death, in 1926, Kraepelin cemented his legacy as a champion of
biological psychiatry by creating the German Institute for Psychiatric Re-
search, which later became the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry. World-
class clinical care and basic research continues to this day in the buildings
first occupied by Kraepelin and colleagues. Only the street address has
changed. Whereas the clinic was built on Nussbaumstraße, it now sits on
Kraepelinstraße.
While Kraepelin was pursuing his vision of a scientific psychiatry in Mu-
nich, Sigmund Freud was developing a very different approach in Vienna.
Some people have taken the disagreement to mean that Freud did not be-
lieve in the medical model, but this is untrue. It was just that his medical
model differed from Kraepelin’s. Whereas Kraepelin built his on biological
principles, Freud relied on psychology. Nevertheless, and despite the fact
that most psychiatrists lined up with one or the other leader throughout
the twentieth century, the men themselves had much in common and their
ideas were in many ways complementary. Freud, like Kraepelin, was a fully
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qualified medical doctor. While it is true that Freud treated patients in his
home and had no affiliation with any clinic or hospital, he insisted that his
disciples receive conventional medical training.
Kraepelin and Freud were both born in the year 1856, and both were
German speaking, but they traveled parallel paths, with only a single sig-
nificant crossing. Although each man was aware of the other’s work, there
is no evidence of any correspondence. Kraepelin did not see Freud when
he visited Vienna, and Freud may never have visited Germany.136 Their
personal relationship may have been tenuous, but it was neither bitter nor
competitive.
Early in his career, Freud spent a few months with Theodor Meynert,
a highly respected neuroanatomist. Then he then went to Paris where he
worked with Jean-Martin Charcot, a neurologist who was experimenting
with hypnosis as a treatment for hysteria. Charcot considered hysteria to
be a disorder of the nervous system, but Freud thought otherwise, and thus
began Freud’s pivot into psychiatry.
Freud’s psychiatric career played out mostly after 1900. Here, I will
briefly summarize its substance, insofar as it relates to Kraepelin and nine-
teenth century psychiatry. Soon after leaving Paris, and with the conversa-
tions with Charcot fresh in mind, Freud co-authored Studies on Hysteria,
published in 1895. In this book, Freud introduced several seminal ideas
that later formed the basis of psychoanalysis, his psychological approach
to the treatment of mental illness. He wrote, among other things, that
hysteria is not a brain abnormality, but a disorder caused by a psychologi-
cal defense mechanism. He discarded Charcot’s hypnosis in favor of a new
therapeutic technique, which he called “free association”. Freud’s patients
were encouraged to open their minds and speak “freely” about what they
were thinking.
Kraepelin learned of Freud’s interpretation of hysteria while preparing
the sixth edition of his textbook. In a section dealing with hysteria, Krae-
pelin commented sardonically on Freud’s views,
According to their assertions [Freud and Joseph Breuer] hyste-
ria is caused by specific passive sexual experiences in earliest
childhood, which then continue to haunt the individual during
his whole life ... But if our much troubled mind really loses
its equilibrium forever due to long forgotten unpleasant sexual
136Nowhere in the biographies of Sigmund Freud have I found evidence of any travel to
Germany. There are, however, many biographies that I have not read.
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experiences, it would seem that we have reached the beginning
of the end of mankind; nature would have played a cruel hoax
on us!137
Also in 1895, Freud wrote an essay titled Project for a Scientific Psychol-
ogy. It is a short, theoretical work that addresses brain mechanisms possibly
responsible for certain psychological phenomena. Thus, it is more aligned
with Kraepelin’s interests than his book on hysteria. Although the work was
left unfinished, and not published until long after his death, it was eventu-
ally praised for its farsightedness. Freud was obviously well acquainted with
the work of Ramón y Cajal, and in the essay he clearly endorses what he
calls “the theory of neurons”. Speculating on the means of communication
between neurons, he proposes the existence of “contact barriers”, which
could be adjusted to allow for variable degrees of communication. Such
an arrangement, he wrote, could provide a physical substrate for memo-
ries. Remarkably, research completed many decades later demonstrated
the reality of neuronal synapses, and later still, research demonstrated that
human memories reside in structurally modified synapses. Thus, both of
Freud’s conjectures have been proven essentially correct.
Laying aside the incomplete Project , Freud turned his attention to psy-
choanalysis. In 1900, one year after Kraepelin’s sixth edition textbook,
Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams, which was the first of his
fully psychoanalytic writings. The contrast between Kraepelin’s textbook
and Freud’s Dreams is striking. Clearly, Kraepelin and Freud were at
odds about the nature of mental illness and the relevance of psychology to
psychiatry. Kraepelin thought of psychology in terms of Wundt’s mental
processes. For him, the deep structures of the mind were fundamentally the
same in everyone – healthy subjects as well as mentally ill persons. Freud’s
understanding of psychology, by contrast, was focused on the unique inner
conflicts of disturbed individuals. In a similar vein, Kraepelin assumed that
mental illnesses develop either from hereditary defects or when toxins affect
the brain, whereas Freud looked upon them as arising from the patient’s
subjective experiences. It has been said that Kraepelin sought to discover
diseases, whereas Freud sought to understand personalities.
The only squabble directly involving Freud and Kraepelin came about
after a German judge named Daniel Schreber published a memoir about
his own psychotic illness. (Schreber, who was briefly treated by Krae-
pelin’s irritable boss, Paul Flechsig, described Flechsig as the “murderer
137E. Kraepelin (1899, 1990), pp. 381-382.
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of my soul.”) Freud identified Schreber’s disorder as dementia paranoides,
in accordance with Kraepelin’s classification, but he interpreted the case
differently than Kraepelin. Freud wrote that Schreber’s illness originated
in his boyhood homosexual desires. To defend himself against the un-
wanted thoughts, Schreber had unconsciously “repressed” them. Accord-
ingly, Freud saw Schreber’s illness as a conflict between his sex drive and
his ego. Kraepelin bought none of that. For him, Schreber’s paranoia
was caused by a biological process that was likely rooted in a hereditary
disposition.
Freud developed his ideas in Vienna, and came to America only once, in
1909, to deliver a series of five lectures at Clark University in Worchester,
Massachusetts. Adolf Meyer, the outspoken critic of Nissl’s fibril theory,
also spoke at the Clark conference. Although Meyer had spent time with
Kraepelin in Europe, and had endorsed his ideas, he now abandoned Krae-
pelin in favor of Freud. His enthusiastic support of Freud’s ideas secured
a huge following for Freud in America. American psychiatrists welcomed
psychoanalysis as a panacea for anxieties, “sexual deviations”, “nervous
breakdowns” and other neuroses (disorders without obvious neurological
defects).
The popularity of psychoanalysis, both in American psychiatry and in
the public imagination, peaked in the 1950s and 1960s. It was seriously
demoted in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (1980), and continued to decline thereafter. Today, it is
found almost entirely in the offices of certain psychotherapists who borrow
from Freud’s ideas and techniques in the treatment of personality disor-
ders. Writing about psychoanalysis in his full-length history of psychiatry,
Edward Shorter refers to it as the “dinosaur ideology of the nineteenth
century.”
[I]t was only for a few moments that the patient recumbent
upon the couch, the analyst seated silently behind him, occupied
the center stage of psychiatry. By the 1970s, the progress of
science within psychiatry would dim the lights on this scenario,
marginalizing psychoanalysis within the discipline of psychiatry
as a whole. In retrospect, Freud’s psychoanalysis appears as a
pause in the evolution of biological approaches to brain and
mind rather than as the culminating event in the history of
psychiatry.138
138E, Shorter (1997), quotes on pp. 145 and 170.
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Notwithstanding their disagreements, Kraepelin and Freud were united
in regarding madness as a form of illness. That uniformity of opinion,
combined with the high esteem enjoyed by both men within their respective
professional circles, helped to secure a place for psychiatry within medicine.
Public opinion accepted the concept of mental illness more slowly, but with
time it too fell in line. The consensus threatened to fall apart only in the
1970s when some people started to believe that mental illness is nothing
but a myth.
–//–
Doubts about whether mental conditions are really medical illnesses arose
from several sources. One was a study in which eight healthy people were
admitted to a hospital after faking a mental condition. Even though they
attempted to behave normally once they had been admitted, all were de-
tained for long periods, in one case fifty-two days. People saw the study as
evidence that even trained psychiatrists cannot distinguish mental illness
from normal oddness. Other studies, of family dynamics, pointed out that
even otherwise normal people exhibit extreme behaviors when stressed.
And, critics pointed out that judgments of what constitutes insanity have
varied greatly throughout recorded history. Even now, diverse opinions per-
sist within and between cultures. If there are no objective criteria, argued
the critics, perhaps there is nothing there. All of these arguments, and
more, were encapsulated in a highly influential book written by the Amer-
ican psychiatrist Thomas Szasz. Published in 1961 with the unabashed
title, The Myth of Mental Illness, it carried the message that patients who
are identified with mental problems are nothing more than social misfits,
the unfortunate victims of scapegoating and maltreatment.
The authors of these critiques were not uninformed cranks, but well-
intended psychiatrists and academics who challenged the very meaning of
the word “illness” and its equivalent, “disease”.139 They made two kinds
of claims. Some authors said that only physical conditions can be illnesses.
139“Illness is generally used as a synonym for disease. However, this term is occasionally
used to refer specifically to the patient’s personal experience of his or her disease.
In this model, it is possible for a person to have a disease without being ill (to have
an objectively definable, but asymptomatic, medical condition, such as a subclinical
infection), and to be ill without being diseased (such as when a person perceives
a normal experience as a medical condition, or medicalizes a non-disease situation
in his or her life – for example, a person who feels unwell as a result of embarrass-
ment, and who interprets those feelings as sickness rather than normal emotions).”
https://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disease.
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Others said that mental conditions may be bad but not sufficiently disabling
to be deemed illnesses.
The question of what is, and what is not, an illness, goes back at least
to Aristotle. Scholars do not agree upon any particular definition. Illness
is commonly understood as a malfunction of a biological organ or process,
but most contemporary philosophers think that that definition is too broad.
Rachel Cooper, for example, is a specialist in the philosophy of medicine
and, in particular, the philosophy of psychiatry. After reviewing several
competing accounts of disease, she concludes,
There is much work to be done with developing an account
of disease. However, I suggest that a consensus is emerging
with respect to some key issues: first, most of the accounts
of disease being developed treat physical and mental disorders
together ... Secondly, there is a general consensus that diseases
are necessarily harmful.140
Cooper adds a further stipulation, namely that a condition must be med-
ically treatable for it to qualify as a disease. Since treatments are now
available for most, possibly all, mental conditions, Cooper maintains that
mental illnesses pass that final philosophical test. Moreover, few people
today give credence to Thomas Szasz’s mythical view of mental disorder.
Governments, medical institutions, and popular attitudes are – for the most
part – comfortable with the idea that mental illness is an illness. Whether
mental illness is in the mind or in the brain is a separate issue, which I
discuss below.
Assertion No. 2: Mental illness is a brain illness
Once again, we can look to the history of words to find clues about how
ideas have changed over time. As I have already noted, the word “mad-
ness” first appeared in a document dated to 1330 (according to the Oxford
English Dictionary). Expressions linking madness to the brain appeared
much later. The first documented example is “crack-brained”, which was
used in 1634. Afterwards, it was not until 1770 that “brainsickly” appeared
in print, followed by “mad-brained” in 1822. It would seem, therefore, that
140Rachel Cooper, Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. Montreal, McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press (2007), p. 42.
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the notion of mental illnesses as brain illnesses grew slowly through the
centuries.
“Patients with so-called mental illnesses are really individuals with ill-
nesses of the nerves and brain,” said Wilhelm Griesinger in 1868. Subse-
quent authors often quoted the statement out of context, turning it into
“mental illnesses are brain illnesses,” which is shorter, but also stronger.
Griesinger – and Kraepelin too – were more cautious. They understood
the difference between belief and proof. They knew that brain anatomy
was still a young science and that the truly significant findings were yet to
come. Be patient, they advised, let the scientists do their work. Meanwhile,
disagreements about the fundamental nature of mental illness continued.
The central issue of mind versus brain was kept alive in arguments be-
tween the Psychiker and the Somatiker. It was highlighted in discussions
over the definitions of neurosis and psychosis. Then, making matters worse,
two new terms were introduced. These were the so-called “organic” illnesses
and the so-called “functional” illnesses. Organic was roughly equivalent to
psychotic (in the sense of brain-based), and functional was roughly equiv-
alent to neurotic (in the sense of psychological). But, confusion ensued.
Lecturing in 1912, one German psychiatrist recalled,
For a time, ‘functional’ meant merely that we cannot yet prove
anatomical changes with our present day equipment ... Today,
however, the adjective is also used in the sense that by such
disorders we mean those that will never have a pathological
anatomy because they cannot have one.141
Even as late as 1978, the well-regarded Swiss psychiatrist, Manfred
Bleuler, thought the organic/functional dichotomy useful. He, therefore,
referred to senile dementia, progressive paralysis and the psychoses re-
sulting from head trauma as organic illnesses. By contrast, according to
Bleuler, schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness were functional disor-
ders, because their biological bases were unknown.
The lack of solid evidence for brain pathologies was a problem for ev-
eryone, not to be relieved until the 1970s. Theoreticians were stymied
and clinicians frustrated by the absence of biological markers for diagnosis.
The anatomists were just plain discouraged. Even Franz Nissl, who had
doggedly sought brain correlates for decades, began to despair. When asked
141German E. Berrios, Rogelio Luque and José M. Villagrán, “Schizophrenia: a conceptual
history.” International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3:111-140
(2003), p. 124.
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to speak about recent advances in psychiatry at a meeting of the Natural
History and Medical Association of Heidelberg, in 1907, he said,
While we can be proud of our tremendous role in the develop-
ment of brain anatomy, we cannot ignore the fact that in as
much as the studies of brain anatomy have devoured us since
the end of the [eighteen] sixties, so clinical psychiatry has been
as good as lost ... It was a bad mistake not to realize that the
findings of brain anatomy [would bear] no relationship to psychi-
atric findings, unless the relationships between brain anatomy
and brain function were first clarified, and they certainly have
not been up to the present.142
Nissl went on to say that the focus on anatomy at the expense of clin-
ical psychiatry had given birth to what he called “speculative anatomical
teachings”, such as in the works of Freud’s neuroanatomy mentor, Theodor
Meynert. These are disparaging comments, implying that his own research,
as well as that of many contemporary anatomists, had been an unproduc-
tive sideshow. Not only had it failed to produce anything useful, it had
also impeded patient-oriented work.
Ironically, Nissl’s comments came in the same year in which the Nobel
Prize for Medicine and Physiology was jointly awarded to Santiago Ramón
y Cajal and Camillo Golgi for their pioneering work in elucidating the cel-
lular organization of the nervous system. It was – and is – the custom
for Nobel laureates to give short speeches describing their work. On this
occasion, the two winners famously presented different interpretations of
their works. Cajal argued for neuronism (physically separated individual
neurons) while Golgi argued for reticularism (all neurons joined in a contin-
uous web). It would be another half-century before unequivocal evidence
showed the correctness of Cajal’s neuronism (also known as the neuron
theory). The resolution of this long-standing controversy fostered an accel-
eration of neuroscience research.
Much of the anatomical work from the nineteenth century, including
some of Nissl’s research, remains relevant and valid today. Nissl’s aniline
dye stains are a mainstay in most neuroanatomy laboratories, and the small
granules that he discovered, the “Nissl bodies”, are illustrated in nearly ev-
ery textbook of cell biology. Spinal punctures – so strongly promoted by
142Franz Nissl, “Über die Entwicklung der Psychiatrie in den letzten 50 Jahren,” Ver-
handlungen des Naturhistorisch-Medizinischen Vereins, N.F. 8:510-525 (1908), quote
on p. 520.
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Nissl – are routinely used in the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. Never-
theless, neuroscience in the twenty-first century is very different from what
it was in Nissl’s time. Neither the methods now available, nor the results
obtained using those methods, could have been imagined by Nissl and col-
leagues. It is now possible, for example, to obtain detailed images of the
entire brain in living persons, and even monitor localized brain activity in
patients while they engage in assigned tasks. Also, animal models of cer-
tain psychiatric illnesses allow researchers to manipulate genes and control
neuronal activity, thus enabling strong tests of mechanistic hypotheses.
The powerful methods of modern neuroscience have revealed numerous
anatomical, biochemical and physiological features that are, on average,
different in the brains of persons with mental illness than in healthy indi-
viduals. However, because there is considerable overlap, these findings are
not yet useful for diagnosis or treatment.
One particularly well-documented example of an illness-linked biomarker
is the size of brain areas. It is now relatively easy to measure brain struc-
tures in living patients, thanks to whole brain imaging and computer-
assisted analysis. In a study that compared the brains of 2540 healthy
persons and 2028 patients with schizophrenia, researchers found that cer-
tain areas, including the hippocampus, the amygdala and the thalamus,
are considerably smaller in schizophrenia brains than in healthy brains,
whereas the opposite is true for other areas, such as the putamen, the pal-
lidum and the lateral ventricle.143 While a statistical analysis showed that
these results are unlikely to have occurred strictly by chance, the extent to
which they reflect medication usage or life styles is unsettled.
One of Nissl’s cherished goals was to identify function-specific neuron
types. He failed because his stains highlighted only a small number of the
many physical and chemical properties of nerve cells, and he was unable to
relate those particular properties to functions. Today, we have a far greater
knowledge of neuron types based on morphological, physiological and chem-
ical criteria. Recent work leans heavily on the biochemical composition of
neurons, focusing on neurotransmitters, neurotransmitter receptors and ion
channels. Aided by the tools of molecular genetics, investigators use these
properties to group neurons into types. Whereas Nissl thought there were
five types of neurons, today’s scientists tell us that there are more than
three hundred types, and some of them are implicated in mental illness.
143T.G.M. van Erp et al. “Subcortical brain volume abnormalities in 2028 individuals with
schizophrenia and 2540 healthy controls via the ENIGMA consortium,” Molecular
Psychiatry 21:547-553 (2016).
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For example, the parvalbumin basket cells, found in the cerebral cortex,
are implicated in schizophrenia. These neurons ordinarily act by inhibiting
the activity of a second type of neuron, the pyramidal cells. In persons
with schizophrenia, however, basket cells may be less effective in inhibiting
pyramidal cells. Since the pyramidal cells are the only neurons in the cere-
bral cortex that convey messages over long distances, any errant activity
on their part is likely to impact normal functions.144
A second of Nissl’s fascinations, which he acquired from Bernhard Gud-
den, was fiber bundles and their pathways. This project, too, found new
life in contemporary neuroscience. Altogether, nervous fibers constitute
about 60% of the human brain volume. Modern imaging methods allow
researchers to view all the major tracts in living persons. Moreover, the
physical status of the fibers – healthy or damaged – can be precisely mea-
sured using special optical techniques. When researchers compared fibers
in psychiatric patients and healthy volunteers, they discovered a significant
amount of structural damage in the brains of schizophrenia patients. In a
follow-up study, researchers scanned the brains of teenagers living in fami-
lies with a history of schizophrenia. None of these teenagers was ill at the
time of scanning, but some had damaged nerve fibers. It turned out that
the teenagers who were free of fiber damage grew into healthy adults, but
those who had fiber damage as teenagers developed schizophrenia later.145
This result implies that fiber damage is a cause of schizophrenia rather
than a consequence or schizophrenia, in other words, it is unlikely due to
medication or changes in life styles.
Despite all the wondrous findings of modern neuroscience, some people
remain unconvinced that mental illnesses are brain illnesses. The National
Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) was concerned that the rejection of neu-
robiological accounts might encourage stigma, so it attempted to persuade
holdouts by promoting the motto, “Schizophrenia is a disorder of the brain,
caused by problems with brain chemistry and brain structure.” The state-
ment, however, did not remain for long on NAMI’s website. Perhaps people
noticed the apparent contradiction between the name of the organization
and the message contained in the motto. After all, the organization is an
alliance on mental illness. If the illnesses are mental, how can they be
144David A. Lewis et al. “Cortical parvalbumin interneurons and cognitive dysfunction
in schizophrenia,” Trends in Neuroscience 35:57-67 (2012).
145Mark M. Bohlken et al. “Structural brain connectivity as a genetic marker for
schizophrenia,” Journal of the American Medical Association Psychiatry 73:11-19
(2016).
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Figure 30: “White matter” in the human brain (posterior view), shown
here as a 3-D reconstruction from magnetic resonance diffusion
tensor imaging. [Prevue Medical]
caused by chemistry and brain structure? That question rouses a hornet’s
nest of philosophical issues.
People who believe in philosophical dualism – whether consciously or
unconsciously – have a problem accepting that mental illnesses are brain
illnesses. According to the dualistic philosophy, humans possess two types
of substances, mind and body. Each is independent of the other, yet each
can influence the other. If true, it would follow that the so-called mental
illnesses might arise from, and reside in, the mind. Although nearly all
academic philosophers disavow dualism as a valid account of mind and
consciousness, it remains alive and well in our society.146
Public opinion surveys reveal the extent to which people’s philosoph-
ical beliefs affect their attitudes toward mental illness. For example, in
the United States, one survey found that thirty-three percent of the re-
spondents believe that schizophrenia is caused by the patient’s “own bad
character”. In Germany, survey participants were told fictitious stories in-
volving behaviors that mimic those seen in schizophrenia. A striking fifty
146Ronald Chase, The Physical Basis of Mental Illness, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction
(2012).
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percent of the respondents cited “lack of will power” as a likely cause of
the behaviors. Finally, from a 2008 survey in Canada, forty-six percent
of respondents agreed with the statement, “We call some things mental
illness because it gives some people an excuse for their poor behavior and
personal failing.” Ten percent of respondents believed that “most people
with mental illnesses could just snap out of it if they really wanted to.”
This is the stuff of which stigma is made.
Notwithstanding the data noted above, the majority of respondents in re-
cent surveys accept that brain abnormalities underlie mental illness. Many
of the same respondents, however, may also believe that mental illnesses
are in the mind. Dualism allows for such mixed attitudes. The problem is,
mixed attitudes contribute to the stigma of mental illness.147
Rather than arguing about metaphysics, and possibly promoting stigma
in the process, why not avoid the issue entirely? We could take a step in that
direction by abandoning the phrase, mental illness, and replacing it with
a term like psychiatric illness. Alternatively, we could forego all inclusive
terms, replacing them with specialized terms like obsession-compulsion,
depression, schizophrenia, et cetera.
Assertion No. 3: Dementia praecox (schizophrenia) is a
distinct mental illness
Kraepelin did not claim to have discovered dementia praecox. He acknowl-
edged the valuable clinical descriptions authored by Karl Kahlbaum, Ewald
Hecker and Leon Daraszkiewicz. He knew that similar, if not identical dis-
orders, had already been described and named. It cannot be doubted,
however, that Kraepelin put dementia praecox, and thus schizophrenia, in
the textbooks. There are few other psychiatric disorders from that period
that still hold a place in psychiatric classifications. Kraepelin’s account
of dementia praecox drew attention to age of onset as a diagnostic cri-
terion, and it paved the way for the emergence of child psychiatry as a
medical specialty. Nevertheless, one needs to ask, how solid is the notion
of schizophrenia as an actual disease? As I stated above, a condition of
human suffering can qualify as a disease (or illness) even if its symptoms
147M. C. Angermeyer and S. Dietrich, “Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people
with mental illness: a review of population studies,” Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica
113:163-179 (2006). For additional survey data and their implications for stigma, see
R. Chase (2013), chapter 14.
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are predominately mental. The question now is whether schizophrenia is
real enough and distinct enough.
Kraepelin spent his entire adult life searching for mental diseases that
really exist. According to the Kraepelin scholar, Paul Hoff, who has read
most, if not all, of Kraepelin’s works, Kraepelin’s philosophical outlook was
founded on a belief in the “real world”. It contains, among other things,
mental processes and mental states, and they are the same for everyone
whether healthy or sick. Moreover, their existence does not depend on
any scientist who might study them. Hoff notes that Kraepelin “often em-
phasized that the psychiatric researcher has to describe objectively what
‘really exists’ and what ‘nature presents’ to him or her.” He further states
that, “Kraepelin strongly advocated the view that different mental disor-
ders are categorically distinct objects, ‘natural kinds’ or, as he usually put
it, ‘natural disease entities’.”148
Kraepelin’s concept of natural disease entities fits with the notion of
natural kinds, which has a long history in philosophical literature. While
academics debate its exact meaning, most agree that animal species and
plant species are natural kinds. Each has its own essence, to use the word
favored by Kahlbaum and Kraepelin. Natural kinds of things are “out
there” and “real”, not simply imagined. Atomic elements are also consid-
ered to be natural kinds. Definitions get dicey, however, when it comes to
californium and einsteinium, two elements that can be made in the labora-
tory but are not found in nature. Are they natural kinds? And, what are
we to make of animal hybrids, sub-species and “forms”? Although found
in nature, these variants beg the question of how distinctive and how stable
a thing must be for it to be a natural kind. Charles Darwin taught us to
think of biological species as continuously changing. Any given species is
capable of changing so much (over a long period of time), that it ceases to
be that species, but becomes a new one.
Similarly, the history of psychiatry contains the names of numerous men-
tal conditions that were once thought to be “real”, but which later turned
out to be “unreal”. Perhaps the best example is hysteria. The term first ap-
peared in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, it was widely
used in clinical descriptions, albeit with variable interpretations. Not until
1980 was it abandoned as a diagnostic term. Its doom was sealed by the
absence of any consistent description. At different times, and according
to different authorities, hysteria meant a type of epilepsy, a psychosomatic
148Paul Hoff, “The Kraepelian tradition,” Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 17: 31-41
(2015), quotes on p. 33.
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illness, a movement disorder, a personality disorder, and a catchphrase for
certain female behaviors unfamiliar to male doctors.
It is not unusual for people to hold inconsistent opinions about what
they see and hear. These disagreements may raise concerns, but they do
not necessarily imply that the thing in question is other than a natural
kind. For thousands of years, people have reported seeing bright objects
suddenly appear in the night sky, only to fade away in the following weeks.
In China, in the fourth century, one such bright object was described as
a “guest star”. Observers in sixteenth century Europe thought they were
aberrant phenomena associated with the earth’s atmosphere. Now we know
them as supernovas, and they are a natural kind.
Just as hysteria and supernovas have had different interpretations
through time, so too has Kraepelin’s concept of dementia praecox been
refined, redefined and of course, renamed. Rarely, if ever, has the disorder
enjoyed a consensus definition. Does that mean that dementia praecox,
like hysteria, is not a natural kind of mental illness? Or, does it mean that
dementia praecox, like supernovas, has finally been correctly defined?
Alfred Hoche, a German psychiatrist known to Kraepelin, did not be-
lieve that dementia praecox is an illness. He was a unitarian who dismissed
the whole idea of conventional psychiatric disorders, claiming that none was
truly different from any another. In his opinion, dementia praecox, progres-
sive paralysis and senility were all fundamentally the same, all characterized
by “progressive disintegration of the mental personality”. If they seemed
different to some observers, it was only because each one “is accompanied
by a colorful palette of symptoms in a great variety of combinations.”149
Two psychiatrists at the Burgholzli hospital in Zurich decided to take a
close look at the symptoms present in their patients diagnosed with demen-
tia praecox. They also wanted to find out what became of them over time.
Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung were inquisitive men with a psychoanalytic
inclination. They discovered – contrary to Kraepelin’s statements and to
their own expectations – that not all the dementia praecox patients dete-
riorated steadily or wound up in a deep, irreversible dementia. No patient
was ever “cured”, but many benefited from a partial recovery or at least a
pause in the decline.
Furthermore, after deeply studying the patients’ symptoms, Bleuler and
Jung came to see them in a different light than had Kraepelin. Here,
149Alfred Hoche, “The significance of symptom complexes in psychiatry,” transl. R.G.
Dening and T.R Dening. History of Psychiatry ii:334-343 (1912, 1991), quote on
p. 340.
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Bleuler’s ideas proved especially influential, not least because he renamed
the illness. In his book, Dementia praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias
(1911), Bleuler wrote, “I call dementia praecox schizophrenia because ...
the splitting of the different psychic functions is one of its most impor-
tant features.” Although the book’s title implies an equivalence between
dementia praecox and schizophrenia (the one or the other), the preced-
ing statement makes it clear that Bleuler’s schizophrenia is different from
Kraepelin’s dementia praecox. Bleuler envisaged fractures separating in-
telligence, affect and volition, in other words splits between the faculties
of mind discussed by Emanuel Kant and the romantic psychiatrists. His
diagnosis of schizophrenia is said to have featured four A’s: autism, ambiva-
lence, lowered affect and randomized associations. While he acknowledged a
role for brain pathology, he emphasized the patients’ subjective experiences,
at times interpreting psychological symptoms in psychoanalytic terms. In
short, while Kraepelin thought of dementia praecox as thoroughly biologi-
cal, Bleuler saw schizophrenia as basically psychological.
Further changes ensued after dementia praecox came to America.
Richard Noll tells the fascinating story in his book, American Madness.
Adolf Meyer brought dementia praecox to America in 1896, after returning
from a six week visit to Kraepelin’s clinic in Heidelberg. Meyer, who
was born in Switzerland and studied medicine there, moved to the United
States while still a young man. Most of his work was done at Johns Hop-
kins University in Baltimore. While professionally ambitious – and highly
successful – he was inconsistent in his thinking. He initially embraced
dementia praecox as a fine example of biological psychiatry. Later, he
adopted a psychological approach and moved away from dementia praecox.
He infused his writing with Freudian references and encouraged psychother-
apy, even for psychotic disorders (in the sense of severe). As his attacks on
dementia praecox continued, he stopped using that term entirely, switched
to schizophrenia, and later spoke only of “schizophrenic reactions”.
From 1950 to 1980, approximately, American psychiatrists followed
a loose set of criteria in diagnosing schizophrenia. In Noll’s words,
“Schizophrenia was simply a synonym for severe functional impairment
... a label for grossly impaired persons who could not meet the ‘ordinary
demands of life’.”150 Meanwhile, according to the International Classifi-
cation of Diseases (ICD-8), published by the World Health Organization,
150Richard Noll, American Madness: The Rise and Fall of Dementia Praecox. Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press (2011), p. 274.
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schizophrenia was – and still is –defined by bizarre delusions, delusions of
control, abnormal affect, hallucinations and disorganized thinking.
The discrepancy between American and international criteria led to strik-
ing differences in the rates of diagnosis. During the 1930s, around twenty-
five percent of all psychiatric diagnoses in both New York and London
were for schizophrenia. By the 1950s, however, the rate had jumped to
between sixty and seventy percent in New York, while remaining steady at
twenty-five percent in London.
A study was done to see how psychiatrists in New York and London
would evaluate the same patient.151 For this purpose, interviews with eight
selected patients were videotaped and shown to psychiatrists in both coun-
tries. All participating psychiatrists were asked to diagnose the same inter-
viewed patients. As it turned out, every patient received more diagnoses
of schizophrenia from the New York psychiatrists than from the London
psychiatrists. One patient got a diagnosis of schizophrenia from eighty-five
percent of the New Yorkers, but only seven percent of the Londoners. The
study authors concluded, “The New York and London hospital psychia-
trists were found ... to differ profoundly in the criteria they set for making
the diagnosis of schizophrenia ...”
Meanwhile, the number and character of schizophrenia subtypes kept
changing. Kraepelin originally recognized three subtypes (in the sixth
edition of his textbook): catatonic, hebephrenic and paranoid. Eugen
Bleuler (1911) accepted Kraepelin’s three subtypes, but spoke about a
wider “group of schizophrenias” that included, among other inventions,
“simple schizophrenia” and “latent schizophrenia”. By 1913 (in the eighth
edition), Kraepelin’s trio of subtypes had risen to eleven subtypes. The cur-
rent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) contains none of these subtypes but does include several related
disorders, namely, schizotypal personality disorder, schizophreniform dis-
order, schizoaffective disorder and “psychotic disorder not otherwise spec-
ified”.
In 1939, a psychiatrist named Kurt Schneider published a textbook on
psychiatric diagnosis that was translated into English in 1959. Following a
second delay of two additional decades, Schneider’s work brought about a
significant change in the clinical definition of schizophrenia. As the director
of Kraepelin’s Psychiatric Research Institute, Schneider had access to the
151United States-United Kingdom Cross-National Project, “The diagnosis and psy-
chopathology of schizophrenia in New York and London,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 11:
80-102 (1974).
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records of the Heidelberg Clinic in the years 1900-1925. Because he wanted
to include an unambiguous definition of dementia praecox in his textbook,
he examined these records, noting in particular the symptoms attributed
to each patient diagnosed with the illness. He was assisted in this work
by Karl Jaspers, who had personally known many of the patients while
working as a psychiatrist in Heidelberg. Jaspers later became a prominent
existential philosopher.
Schneider distinguished a group of so-called first-rank symptoms and a
group of second-rank symptoms, advising that a patient should be diag-
nosed with schizophrenia if, and only if, he or she shows any one of the
first-rank symptoms. There were six first-rank symptoms: auditory hallu-
cinations, delusions of being controlled, delusions of having thoughts with-
drawn (from the patient), delusions of having thoughts inserted, thought
broadcasting, and delusional perception. Schneider’s work struck a chord
with a group of American psychiatrists who were looking for well-defined,
non-Freudian, definitions for psychotic illnesses. These psychiatrists were
labeled “neo-Kraepelians”, because they favored a medically-oriented, bio-
logical approach consistent with Kraepelin’s views. When it came time for a
revision of the DSM, in 1980, the neo-Kraepelians insisted that schizophre-
nia be diagnosed on the basis of Schneider’s first-rank symptoms. Con-
sequently, beginning with DSM-III, and continuing as recently as DSM-5
(2013), Schneider’s first-rank symptoms have been incorporated into the
diagnostic criteria, albeit in different ways in each edition. Schneider’s
first-rank symptoms also form part of the diagnosis for schizophrenia in
the current version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10,
1990).
Clearly, the concept of schizophrenia has had a rough ride through its
history. German Berrios, an expert on psychotic disorders and their defini-
tions, examined that history in detail. Working with colleagues, he found
many changes in schizophrenia’s definition over time, but no consistent di-
rection to the changes.152 Berrios and co-authors assert that Kraepelin,
Bleuler, Meyer and Schneider all described different disorders. The various
views eventually “converged” onto the current concept of schizophrenia,
which is, therefore, a patchwork incorporating several meanings. The situ-
ation described by Berrios and co-authors brings to mind Gertrude Steins’
remark about her childhood home in Oakland, California. Upon returning
to the city late in life, she discovered that “there is no there, there.” Is that
152G. E. Berrios, R. Luque and J. M. Villagrán (2003).
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the case with schizophrenia? Has the concept of schizophrenia become so
muddled as to be useless?
The DSM is published by the powerful American Psychiatric Association.
In preparation for DSM-5, the Association organized a task force to “field
test” the diagnostic criteria that had been proposed for the new manual.153
The test for schizophrenia involved patients at two large psychiatric clinics
– one in Canada, one in the United States. Soon after admission, but prior
to any diagnosis, the patients were assessed to determine if they had any
symptoms suggestive of schizophrenia. If so, the patient was assigned to
two experienced psychiatrists (randomly selected from a large pool). The
purpose of the field test was to evaluate the reliability of the diagnostic
criteria, that is, to see whether the two doctors would arrive at the same
diagnosis for the same patient. Therefore, each patient was interviewed
twice, once by each psychiatrist, and neither psychiatrist was made aware
of the other’s diagnosis. Overall, the study found that when two doctors
interviewed the same patient they agreed on the diagnosis about eighty-five
percent of the time.
Eighty-five percent is a pretty good result. It shows that, for the most
part, the psychiatrists participating in the study understood the diagnostic
criteria for schizophrenia as stated in DSM-5 . The fifteen percent of cases
in which the doctors disagreed can be attributed to subjective judgements.
But, consistency in diagnosis is not the same as proving that schizophre-
nia is a disease. It means only that the criteria were clearly stated and
clearly present (or not) in the majority of cases. The question remains, is
a collection of symptoms that includes hallucinations, disorganized speech,
reduced emotions, lack of motivation and social dysfunction sufficient to
validate schizophrenia as a real illness?
A more convincing case for the “realness” of schizophrenia would be an
objective measurement akin to the blood sugar test for diabetes. Krae-
pelin thought that he had an objective criterion when he announced that
dementia praecox invariably went downhill to permanent dementia. Peo-
ple called it “diagnosis by prognosis”, but it was a logical nonstarter, and
anyway, Bleuler’s experience contradicted Kraepelin’s. Subsequent obser-
vations, including some by Kraepelin himself, confirmed the variable course
of schizophrenia. The truth of the matter is that Kraepelin provided page
153Darrel A. Regier et al., “DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada, Part II:
Test-retest reliability of selected categorical diagnoses.” American Journal of Psychi-
atry 170:59-70 (2013).
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after page of clinical description, but no practical or concrete criteria for
diagnosing dementia praecox.
It was Ewald Hecker’s account of hebephrenia, published in 1871, that
led Kraepelin to dementia praecox. Hecker’s comment on the validity of
the disease deserves repetition here (it already appears on page 177 of this
book). After reporting that a colleague had found no neuropathology in
the brain of patient number five, Hecker wrote, “The ultimate evidence
that hebephrenia stands as a unitary mental illness in its own right can
only be provided by pathologic-anatomic facts. But considering the uncer-
tainty provisionally associated with the pathological anatomy of the brain
we probably have to dispense with this proof for a long time.” Many people
believe that, finally, the time has come to define and diagnose schizophrenia
according to its genetic profile and its brain abnormalities. If this could be
done, it would strengthen the case for schizophrenia being a natural kind
of mental illness.
Alternatively, perhaps it is time to abandon the notion of schizophrenia
as a distinct illness. Two distinguished psychiatrists argued just that in a
recent article titled, “The slow death of the concept of schizophrenia and the
painful birth of the psychosis spectrum.”154 According to them, it would
be prudent to return to something like the pre-Kraepelin notion of undif-
ferentiated psychosis, which recognizes a continuous range of symptoms
and outcomes. Thus, schizophrenia would be subsumed within a spectrum
disorder, in a manner similar to that which has transpired with respect to
autism and substance abuse, both of which were previously seen as distinct
disorders but which now appear as spectrum disorders in DSM-5.
Assertion No. 4: Dementia praecox (schizophrenia) is
different from manic-depressive insanity (bipolar disorder)
The identification of dementia praecox did not complete Kraepelin’s work.
It could not have, because once he had identified dementia praecox as a
distinct illness within the broad, loosely defined group of psychoses, he was
obliged to identify other members of that same group. This, of course, is the
stuff of classification. Kraepelin, like all intellectually-minded psychiatrists
of the nineteenth century, was drawn to classification as a vital component
154S. Guloksuz and J. van Os, “The slow death of the concept of schizophrenia
and the painful birth of the psychosis spectrum.” Psychological Medicine, 1-16.
doi:10.1017/S0033291717001775.
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of the sciences they emulated. While zoologists traveled to distant lands
looking for, and discovering, new species of animals, psychiatrists visited
their asylum wards pondering varieties of mental illness.
The sixth edition of Kraepelin’s textbook was the ultimate expression of
nineteenth century classification. In this work Kraepelin famously named a
new illness, manic-depressive insanity, and in the process he distinguished
it from dementia praecox. With dementia praecox representing disorders
associated with a loss of rational thinking, and manic-depressive insanity
representing disorders of affect, the whole range of psychoses was effectively
partitioned into two large groups. That division was adopted in America
and remains evident in DSM-5. Just as dementia praecox suffered a num-
ber of name changes, so too did manic-depressive insanity. And again,
Adolf Meyer had a hand in the changes. As part of his campaign to re-
frame mental illnesses as “psychobiological reactions”, he introduced the
term manic-depressive reaction as a companion to his schizophrenic re-
action. Then, in the third edition of the DSM (1980), manic-depressive
insanity and manic-depressive reaction were folded into a new diagnostic
term, bipolar disorder. While neither of Kraepelin’s original disease names
is spoken today in the wards of our psychiatric hospitals, his grand parti-
tion of psychosis remains in force, now represented by schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder.
But, the partition met with opposition in Kraepelin’s time, and it is now
part of a larger discussion about the usefulness – even the validity – of all
psychiatric classifications. Recall that the nineteenth century unitarians
denied any categorical distinctions between mental conditions. Kraepelin’s
contemporary, Alfred Hoche, avoided the word illness altogether, opting
instead for symptom complexes, or syndromes. He wrote that the entire
exercise of classification was like “trying to clarify a cloudy liquid simply
by pouring it from one container into another ... the hopeless pursuit of a
mirage.”155
In America as well, Kraepelin’s classification encountered resistance.
Adolf Meyer, once a Kraepelin devotee, came to distain it. Karl Men-
ninger, the founder of a prominent clinic in Topeka, Kansas, went further.
All classifications are nonsense, Menninger said, because the whole notion
of mental illness is wrong. In The Vital Balance (1919), Menninger wrote,
“Gone forever is the notion that the mentally ill person is an exception.
It is now accepted that most people have some degree of mental illness
at some time, and many of them have a degree of mental illness most of
155A. Hoche (1912, 1991), pp. 336, 343.
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the time.”156 Kraepelin, in his later years, entertained similar thoughts,
“Wherever we try to mark out the frontier between mental health and dis-
ease, we find a neutral territory, in which the imperceptible change from
the realm of normal life to that of obvious derangement takes place.”157
Current critics of classification understandably target the DSM, which is
the custodian of psychiatric diagnosis and classification in North America.
In the Spring of 2013, just before the release of the most recent edition,
Thomas Insel, then director of the National Institute of Mental Health
(United States), posted this surprising statement on his web blog,
While the DSM has been described as a ‘bible’ for the field, it is
at best, a dictionary, creating a set of labels and defining each.
The strength of each of the editions of DSM has been ‘reliability’
– each edition has ensured that clinicians use the same terms
in the same ways. The weakness is its lack of validity. Unlike
our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS,
the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of
clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure. In the
rest of medicine this would be equivalent to creating diagnostic
systems based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of
fever.158
Insel’s criticism of the proposed DSM-5 did not stop its publication, but
it did encourage other critics. In voicing their concerns about the lack of
validity in DSM definitions, commentators pointed out that two individuals
with very different symptoms can nonetheless be diagnosed with the same
illness. That happens because of the mixed nature of the criteria (their
heterogeneity). For example, one person may have delusions and reduced
affect, while a second person may have neither of those symptoms but show
disorganized speech and reduced motivation. Under DSM-5 guidelines,
both persons would be diagnosed with schizophrenia.
It can also happen that a single patient is diagnosed with two or more
distinct disorders (comorbidity), owing to an overlap of definitions. An
example comes from a major psychiatric center in Houston, Texas where
156Karl Menninger, The Vital Balance: The Life Process in Mental Health and Illness.
New York, Viking (1963), p. 33.
157Emil Kraepelin, Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry , 3rd ed. New York, William Wood
(1917), p. 295.
158Thomas Insel, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/directors/thomas-insel/blog/2013/
transforming-diagnosis.shtml (April 29, 2013).
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two hundred sixty-four diagnoses were analyzed.159 Three of the center’s
most common, single-disorder diagnoses are listed below, together with
the percentage of each named diagnosis relative to the total number of
diagnoses. Next, the most common multiple diagnoses are listed, with
their percentages.
• Posttraumatic stress disorder, 12%
• Major depressive disorder, 10%
• Alcohol use disorder, 8%
• Posttraumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder, 11%
• Posttraumatic stress disorder and alcohol use disorder, 9%
• Posttraumatic stress disorder and alcohol use disorder and major
depressive disorder, 7%
These data show that patients were given multiple diagnoses almost as
often as single diagnoses, a remarkable result given that each named disor-
der is supposed to be distinct. It is like saying someone has diabetes and
cancer – possible, but surely more rare than a patient having one disease or
the other. The prevalence of multiple diagnoses in psychiatry suggests that
some disorders are defined in such a manner that they intersect or overlap
with other disorders.
The imprecision of diagnostic criteria generates other types of problems.
In one published commentary, the DSM-IV was said to be,
replete with problematic boundary disputes, many of which
could be the result of arbitrary categorical distinctions being im-
posed along common, underlying domains of functioning. New
diagnoses added to the nomenclature ... reflect not so much
the discovery of a previously unrecognized disease, pathogen,
or lesion but are instead efforts to fill gaps among existing cat-
egories.160
159D.A. Regier et al. (2013).
160Quotes from Thomas A. Widger and Douglas B. Samuel, “Diagnostic categories or
dimensions? A question for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
– Fifth Edition.” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 114:494-504.
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Filling the gaps between “arbitrary categorical distinctions” has led to
the inclusion of about three hundred disorders in the latest edition of the
diagnostic manual, DSM-5. The difficulty of differentiating related dis-
orders is particularly evident in the area of personality disorders, where
the DSM names ten separate disorders. Schizophrenia is another dis-
puted area. Many psychiatrists believe that there are conditions which
are “schizophrenia-like”, but not actually schizophrenia. As a solution to
this problem, the DSM-5 includes “schizoaffective disorder”, which is said
to be the “prototypic boundary condition” (note 161). First introduced to
the DSM in 1980, schizoaffective disorder was meant to cover cases in which
a person has symptoms characteristic of both schizophrenia (delusions, hal-
lucinations, disorganized thought) and mood disorders (depression and ma-
nia). The diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder is highly controversial owing
to its poor definition, low reliability and overuse.
To investigate whether the diseases schizophrenia, schizoaffective disor-
der and bipolar disorder are really distinct and if so, in what ways, several
prominent psychiatrists formed a research consortium. They began by ask-
ing whether each disorder has a unique set of symptoms. Patients were
evaluated on a range of symptoms using interviews and clinical tests. The
long list of possible symptoms included delusions, hallucinations, disor-
ganized thinking, blunted affect, stereotyped thinking, mania, depression,
tension, anxiety and social functioning.
In this manner, a symptom profile was generated for each patient, this
being a compilation of his or her test results.
After analysis, it was found that the symptom profiles corresponded only
weakly to disease descriptions as defined in the DSM. Patients diagnosed
with schizophrenia and patients diagnosed with bipolar disorder shared “a
high degree of overlap in clinical characteristics.” As for schizoaffective
disorder, “Clinical and demographic characteristics ... were often more
similar to those of the schizophrenia (patients) than those of the bipolar
group ... Yet, in some cases, the characteristics of schizoaffective disorder
mirrored those of psychotic bipolar disorder.”161
So, the consortium asked whether neurobiological measures would work
better than psychological and social measures for differentiating between
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder. They consid-
ered a variety of measures that had previously been shown to characterize
161Carol A. Tamminga et al., “Clinical phenotypes of psychosis in the Bipolar-
Schizophrenia Network on Intermediate Phenotypes (B-SNIP).” American Journal
of Psychiatry 170:1263-1274 (2013). Quotes on p. 1269.
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one or another of these conditions, among which eye movements, verbal
memory, whole brain images, electrical activity in resting brains and phys-
iological responses evoked by auditory stimuli. Unfortunately, these neu-
robiological measures worked no better than the psychological and social
measures. They “did not regularly discriminate individuals with different
DSM psychosis diagnoses.”162
Even Kraepelin, near the end of his life, moderated his earlier opinion
that schizophrenia and manic-depressive insanity constitute different dis-
eases. In an article published in 1920, he admitted that the symptoms can
be similar.
We shall have to get accustomed to the notion that our much
used clinical checklist does not permit us to differentiate reli-
ably manic-depressive insanity from schizophrenia in all circum-
stances; and that there is an overlap between the two, which de-
pends on the fact that the clinical signs have arisen from certain
antecedent conditions.163
Nevertheless, Kraepelin insisted that schizophrenia and manic-depressive
insanity have different courses (“irreversible dementia” versus “personali-
ties that remain intact”), and so, “we cannot help but maintain that the
two disease processes themselves are distinct.” Taken together, these state-
ments suggest that Kraepelin recognized the impracticality of reliable diag-
nosis, but was not ready to abandon the ultimate goal of identifying “real”
disease entities.
If neither symptomatic measures nor neurobiological measure validate
Kraepelin’s disease categories, what about genetics? Again, studies show
considerable overlap. There is no genetic profile that can discriminate be-
tween schizophrenia and bipolar disease. Certain specific mutations in-
crease the risk for schizophrenia and bipolar disease and, in some cases,
autism. Family studies also suggest a genetic overlap. If each disease had
a different genetic basis, one would expect family histories to have multiple
cases of either schizophrenia or bipolar disease, but not both. That is, If
one family member had schizophrenia, other members of the extended fam-
ily might also have schizophrenia, but none would have bipolar disorder,
162Carol A. Tamminga et al., “Bipolar and schizophrenia network for intermediate pheno-
types: Outcomes across the psychosis continuum.” Schizophrenia Bulletin 40:S131-
S137 (2014), quote on p. S131.
163Emil Kraepelin, “The manifestations of insanity,” transl. D. Beer. History of Psychi-
atry iii:499-529 (1920, 1992), quote on pp. 528-529.
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and the opposite would be true of families touched by bipolar disorder. Re-
search reveals a different picture, however. In studies of family pedigrees,
it is often found that families have both schizophrenia and bipolar disease
(in different individuals).
Collectively, the research summarized above points to a number of over-
lapping features in psychotic mental conditions. This leads us to regard
Kraepelin’s historic distinction between dementia praecox (schizophrenia)
and manic-depressive insanity (bipolar disorder) as an unproven hypoth-
esis, one best described as tenuous and contentious in professional circles
today. Although both illnesses continue to be diagnosed on a daily basis,
serious questions have been raised as to their validity. These concerns need
to be addressed because the ultimate purpose of diagnosis is effective treat-
ment. Incorrect diagnoses were not a problem in the nineteenth century
because sedatives, baths and bed rests were the only treatments available,
and they were administered more or less indiscriminately to patients of all
diagnostic descriptions. Today, we have drugs targeted to specific psychi-
atric disorders, and they are the mainstays of treatment. It is important,
therefore, to get the diagnoses right.
Psychiatric medications help some patients but not others, and few pa-
tients completely. Individual patients are sometimes prescribed two or more
medications, and when this involves a “mood stabilizer” together with an
“antipsychotic”, it again suggests a blended clinical condition somewhere
between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Outside of psychiatry, other
areas of medicine are moving toward individualized treatments. Cancers,
for example, are being defined not by their locations and appearances, but
by their genetic and biochemical signatures. Only the latter characteriza-
tions allow the selection of medications specifically targeted to the cancers
of individual patients. The same type of “precision medicine” is needed in
psychiatry.
Most psychiatrists believe that we are now coming to the end of the neo-
Kraepelian era, one in which mental illnesses are defined by psychological
and behavioral symptoms, conceived as real diseases, and treated according
to diagnostic categories. In fact, a new era has already begun, with several
options for moving forward.
In one approach, already being pursued by some researchers, the goal is
to construct a new kind of classification.164 It will be based on quantifiable
signs and symptoms, such as the size of brain areas, rather than all-or-none
164Brett A. Clementz et al., “Identification of distinct psychosis biotypes using brain-
based biomarkers.” American Journal of Psychiatry 173:373-384.
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judgements, such as the presence or absence of hallucinations. Researchers
will look for groups of individuals scoring with extreme measurements on
the same set of signs or symptoms. An example might be a group of patients
with small hippocampi, structural defects in nerve fibers and inaccurate
visual tracking of moving objects. Researchers would assign a label to this
particular set of extreme measurements, calling it a “biotype” rather than a
mental illness. A different group of patients might have small frontal lobes,
reduced brain responses to sensory stimuli and reduced ability to inhibit
reactions; this grouping would constitute a second type of biotype. For the
project to succeed, it will need to study very many patients and very many
healthy persons, and the data will have to analyzed using sophisticated
statistical tools. Still, it remains to be seen whether the work will produce
a classification more valid or more useful than the DSM.
Meanwhile, a group of researchers at the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) in the United States is taking a different approach.165 If
successful, it would eventually eliminate classifications altogether, and even
discard the concept of discrete mental illnesses. Like Kraepelin’s unitarian
critics, these psychiatrists do not believe it is possible – or at least not
useful – to name illnesses. Rather than treating mental illnesses, they want
to repair specific functional problems.
The first step involves identifying the behavioral and psychological func-
tions necessary for healthy living. Wundt and Kraepelin would have called
them processes. So far, the NIMH researchers have targeted responses to
fear, responses to reward, habit formation, attention, perception, mem-
ory and social communication. The next step will be to study the neural
control of these functions using genetic, neurobiological, behavioral and
psychosocial tools.
The goal is to discover the mechanisms normally operating in the relevant
neural circuits, and how they become damaged. Once this is accomplished,
the researchers hope to design therapies for repairing the damage and pos-
sibly even preventing it. It is an ambitious project and still in its early
stages, but it may one day lead to an entirely different way of diagnosing
and treating patients.
Much work remains to be done to refine and implement the ideas outlined
above. The very existence of the described projects suggests that psychiatry
has a considerable way to go before completing its modernization. It may
be firmly established as a medical specialty, and it may be scientific in
165Bruce N. Cuthbert and Thomas R. Insel, “Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis:
the seven pillars of RDoC.” BMC Medicine 11:126 (2013).
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many respects, but few would argue that it fully meets the needs of its
patients. The future of psychiatry is likely to depend on its ability to
harness the combined powers of psychology, neuroscience and genetics. It
is a lofty ambition, but one already foreseen by Bernhard Gudden, Wilhelm
Griesinger, Franz Nissl and Emil Kraepelin.
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The field of psychiatry changed dramatically in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, largely by embracing science. The transformationwasmost evident in
Germany, where many psychiatrists began to work concurrently in the clinic
and the laboratory. Some researchers sought to discover brain correlates of
mental illness, while others looked to experimental psychology for insights into
mental dynamics. Featured here, are the lives and works of Emil Kraepelin
– often considered the founder of modern scientific psychiatry, his teacher
BernhardGudden, and his anatomist colleague FranzNissl. The book describes
scientific findings together with the methods used; it explains why diagnoses
were then (and are still now) so difficult to make; it also explores mind-brain
controversies. The Making of Modern Psychiatry will inform and delight mental
health professionals as well as all persons curious about the origins of modern
psychiatry.
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